Optimal monetary policy rules : theory and estimation for OECD countries by Zhang, Wenlang
Optimal Monetary Policy Rules: Theory and
Estimation for OECD Countries
Inaugural Dissertation for a Doctoral Degree
of the Faculty of Economics
at the University of Bielefeld
submitted by
Wenlang Zhang
Bielefeld, March 2004
1. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Willi Semmler
2. Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Peter Flaschel
Acknowledgement
I wish to thank the Faculty of Economics at the University of Bielefeld for
the opportunity to write this dissertation and for the facilities which enabled
me to do so.
I am very grateful to my supervisor, Professor Willi Semmler, for his
kind and patient supervision of my dissertation. It is he who led me into the
field of dynamic macroeconomics and economic policy and encouraged me
to further my research, especially in the area of monetary policy. His broad
knowledge of economics has shown me that economics is not only a branch
of science, but also a world of wonder, which makes life more beautiful.
I am grateful to my second supervisor, Professor Peter Flaschel, not only
for his advice on my dissertation, but also for his observations and instruction
on dynamic systems.
I would like to thank the members of IMW in the University of Bielefeld,
especially Professor Walter Trockel, for his encouragement and guidance. I
am also grateful to Professor Gerd Ronning at the University of Tuebingen
for his guidance and support. I thank Professor Lars Gruene for his instruc-
tion on the dynamic programming algorithm, and also Wolfgang Lemke and
Chih-Ying Hsiao, for their friendship and valuable discussions on mathemat-
ical problems. I also would like to thank Professor Wenda Hong at Fudan
University in China for his kind support. I am grateful to my friends in
the US, Helen Ogden and Rick McGarrity, not only for their corrections in
English, but, more importantly, for their more than ten years of encour-
aging friendship. I also wish to thank Miss Gaby Windhorst for her kind
hospitality.
i
ii
Last, but not least, I thank my family for their unflagging support and
also my friends in China and Germany, Dr. Fulin Wu, Dr. Shaoze Hou,
Dr. Shuncheng Mao, Dr Ningning Liu, and Mark Hahmeier, for example, for
their friendship and encouragement.
Contents
Acknowledgement ii
1 Introduction 1
2 Empirical Evidence of the IS and Phillips Curves 10
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 The IS and Phillips Curves with Backward-Looking Behaviors 13
2.3 The IS and Phillips Curves with Forward-Looking Behaviors . 16
2.4 Time-Varying Phillips Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Monetary Policy and Interest-Rate Rules 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 The Money-Supply Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 The Interest-Rate Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 Time-Varying Monetary Policy Rules 64
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.2 The OLS Regression and Chow Break-Point Tests of the Interest-
Rate Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 Estimation of the Time-Varying Interest-Rate Rule with the
Kalman Filter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4 Euro-Area Monetary Policy Effects Using the Time-Varying
US Monetary Policy Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
iii
CONTENTS iv
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5 Monetary Policy Rules Under Uncertainty 95
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.2 Empirical Evidence of Uncertainty: A State-Space Model with
Markov-Switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Monetary Policy Rules with Adaptive Learning . . . . . . . . 111
5.4 Monetary Policy Rules with Robust Control . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6 Monetary Policy Rules with Financial Markets 138
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.2 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.3 Monetary Policy Rule in Practice: The Case of the Euro-Area 147
6.4 Endogenization of P and a Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rule . 151
6.5 The Zero Bound on the Nominal Interest Rate . . . . . . . . . 160
6.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7 Concluding Remarks 169
Bibliography 173
List of Figures 192
List of Tables 193
CV 194
Chapter 1
Introduction
The topic of monetary policy rules has a long history in macroeconomics. As
stated by McCallum (1999), early contributions have been made by Wicksell
(1898), Fisher (1920) and others. The last century, however, has seen many
changes in monetary policy rules. I will not survey alternative monetary
policy rules in history but will instead mention a few policy rules which may
have played important roles. A short historical review of monetary policy
rules can be found in Adema and Sterken (2003), Taylor (1999), McCallum
(2000) and Svensson (2003a).
As surveyed by Adema and Sterken (2003, p.12), the early monetary the-
orists, Wicksell for instance, emphasized the “indirect monetary transmission
mechanism”. Wicksell (1898), for example, proposed that the interest rate
should be adjusted with the changes in the price level. Examples of monetary
rules proposed or applied later include the price level targeting in Sweden in
the 1930s and the constant money-growth-rate rule by Friedman (1960). As
stated by Adema and Sterken (2003, p.15), the aim of the constant money-
growth-rate rule is to eliminate inflation and the main problem is that it
assumes a constant income velocity of money, which may, however, experi-
ence significant changes in practice.
In the 1980s the money supply began to be taken as the monetary policy
instrument and it had been argued that the growth rate of the money supply
should be the sum of the targeted inflation rate plus the desired growth
1
2rate of output. The main disadvantage of the money-supply rule is that the
velocity of the money supply has fluctuated too much and the demand for
money is unstable. This problem has been analyzed by numerous researchers,
see Mishkin (2003, Ch. 21), Blanchard (2003a, Ch. 25) and Semmler (2003,
Ch. 1), for example. Therefore, at the beginning of the 1990s the short-
term interest rate was proposed to be the monetary policy instrument. A
typical interest-rate rule is the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), which proposes
that the short-term interest rate should be a function of the inflation rate,
output gap and long-run equilibrium short-term interest rate. Interest-rate
rules have recently attracted much attention and have been employed by
numerous central banks. Therefore, I will focus on interest-rate rules in this
dissertation.
Although there may exist alternative definitions of a monetary policy
rule, this dissertation adopts the definition of Taylor (1999):
... a monetary policy rule is defined as a description—expressed
algebraically, numerically or graphically—of how the instruments
of policy, such as the monetary base or the federal funds rate,
change in response to economic variables (Taylor, 1999, p.319).
Moreover, some researchers, Svensson (1999a), for example, distinguish mon-
etary policy rules as “instrument rules” and “targeting rules”. Svensson
defines “instrument rules” and “targeting rules” as follows
An instrument rule expresses the instruments as a prescribed
function of predetermined or forward-looking variables, or both.
If the instruments are a prescribed function of predetermined vari-
ables only, that is, a prescribed reaction function, the rule is an
explicit instrument rule. If the instruments are a prescribed func-
tion of forward-looking variables, that is, a prescribed implicit re-
action function, the rule is an implicit instrument rule (Svensson,
1999a, p.614).
and
3By a targeting rule, I mean, at the most general level, the as-
signment of a particular loss function to be minimized. More
precisely, a target(ing) rule specifies a (vector of) target vari-
able(s) Yt, a (vector of) target level(s) Y
∗, and a corresponding
loss function...that is to be minimized (Svensson, 1999a, p.617).
In the research below I will not explore whether a monetary policy rule is an
instrument rule or a targeting rule, since this requires much discussion which
is out of the scope of this dissertation.
Recent Literature on Monetary Policy Rules
Next, I make a brief sketch of the recent literature on monetary policy rules
which can be roughly divided into four directions:
Theory and Empirical Evidence of Alternative Interest-Rate Rules
Much research has been done on the Taylor rule since it was proposed in 1993.
Alternative Taylor-type rules have, however, been proposed because of some
drawbacks claimed of the simple Taylor rule. These papers include Kozicki
(1999), Svensson (2003b), Taylor (1999), Sack and Wieland (2000) and oth-
ers. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998), for instance, estimate a Taylor-type
rule with expectations and interest-rate smoothing by way of the general-
ized method of moments (GMM). An important discussion on the Taylor-
type rules is whether interest-rate smoothing is desirable. Sack and Wieland
(2000, p.209-210), for example, argue that interest-rate smoothing can be
desirable for at least three reasons: (a) forward-looking behaviors, (b) mea-
surement error in macroeconomic variables, and (c) parameter uncertainty.
Woodford (2003b) also shows that interest-rate smoothing may be desirable.
Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimate a Taylor-type reaction function and
claim that such a rule seems to “capture some important elements of mon-
etary policy during Alan Greenspan’s tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman”
(Judd and Rudebusch, 1998, p.12). Fair (2000b) examines the ability of the
estimated, calibrated and optimal interest-rate rules to stabilize economic
4fluctuations. Some researchers, Benhabib and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2001), for in-
stance, argue that the Taylor rule cannot prevent an economy from falling
into a “Liquidity Trap” when a zero bound on the nominal interest rate is
taken into account. Benhabib and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2001, abstract) argue that
active interest rate feedback rules can lead to “unexpected consequences” in
the presence of a zero bound on the nominal rate. That is, there might exist
infinite number of equilibrium trajectories converging to a Liquidity Trap
even if there exists a unique equilibrium. Moreover, Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2001) find that active interest-rate feedback rules might
lead to multiple equilibria.
Monetary Policy Rules under Uncertainty In the profession it has
been increasingly recognized that formal modelling of monetary policy faces
great challenges because of many kinds of uncertainties such as model un-
certainty, data uncertainty and shock uncertainty. Recent literature deal-
ing with these uncertainties can be found in Giannoni (2002), So¨derstro¨m
(1999), Meyer et al. (2001), Wieland (2000), Tetlow and von zur Muellen
(2001), Orphanides and Williams (2002), Hansen and Sargent (2002), Beck
and Wieland (2002), Onatski and Williams (2002) and others. These papers
explore, usually theoretically, how a certain kind of uncertainty affects the
decisions of the central bank and regulatory agencies. Beck and Wieland
(2002), for instance, explore how parameter uncertainty may affect the econ-
omy, assuming that the central bank designs the optimal monetary policy
by learning through the Kalman filter mechanism. Orphanides and Williams
(2002), however, analyze monetary policy with imperfect knowledge by em-
ploying the least squares learning algorithm.
On the other hand, Hansen and Sargent (2002) employ another approach
to explore the economy under uncertainty, namely, robust control. Unlike
the learning algorithm, which assumes that economic agents improve their
knowledge of economic models by learning, robust control seeks a policy rule
robust to uncertainty. That is, the economic agents seek the best rule from
the “worst case”.
Another interesting topic concerning monetary policy-making under un-
5certainty is whether the central bank should be bolder or more cautious
than when no uncertainty exists. Employing a macroeconomic model with
forward-looking behaviors, Giannoni (2002, abstract) claims that “...although
it is commonly believed that monetary policy should be less responsive when
there is parameter uncertainty, we show that robust optimal Taylor rules pre-
scribe in general a stronger response of the interest rate to fluctuations in
inflation and the output gap than is the case in the absence of uncertainty.”
Asset Prices and Monetary Policy Rules It is well known that the
inflation rates in the industrial countries in the 1990s remained relatively
stable and low, while the prices of equities, bonds, and foreign exchanges ex-
perienced strong volatility with the liberalization of financial markets. Some
central banks, therefore, have become concerned with such volatility and
doubt whether the volatility is justifiable on the basis of economic fundamen-
tals. The question has arisen whether a monetary policy should be pursued
that takes into account financial markets and asset price stabilization. In
order to answer this question it is necessary to model the relationship be-
tween asset prices and the real economy. An early study of this type can
be found in Blanchard (1981) who has analyzed the relationship between the
stock value and output in “good news” and “bad news” cases. Recent papers
on this topic include Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Smets (1997), Kent and
Lowe (1997), Chiarella et al. (2001), Mehra (1998), Vickers (1999), Filardo
(2000), Okina, Shirakawa and Shirats (2000), and Dupor (2001).
Among these papers, the work by Bernanke and Gertler (2000) has at-
tracted much attention. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) employ a macroeco-
nomic model and explore how the macroeconomy may be affected by alterna-
tive monetary policy rules which may, or may not, take into account the asset
price bubble, and conclude that “asset prices become relevant only to the ex-
tent they may signal potential inflationary or deflationary forces” (Bernanke
and Gertler, 2000, abstract). This argument is supported by Okina and
Shiratsuka (2002) with Japan’s experience. In contrast, Smets (1997) argues
that the optimal monetary-policy response to changes in asset prices depends
on the role they play in the “monetary transmission mechanism” as well as
6the sources of shocks.1 He further explores the potential problems of the
view that asset prices should not be considered in monetary policy-making.
Some empirical work has been done to explore whether the financial mar-
kets have been taken into account in monetary policy-making. Following
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) (CGG98), Smets (1997) estimates the mon-
etary reaction function of Canada and Australia by adding three financial
variables (the nominal trade-weighted exchange rate, ten-year nominal bond
yield, and a broad stock market index) into the CGG98 model. He finds that
the changes in the exchange rate and stock market index in Canada induce
significant changes in the interest rate. The response coefficients are, how-
ever, insignificant in the case of Australia. By adding stock returns into the
CGG98 model, Bernanke and Gertler (2000) test whether the short-term in-
terest rate has responded to stock returns in the US and Japan and find that
the federal funds rate did not show a significant response to stock returns
from 1979-97. For Japan, however, they find different results: for the whole
period from 1979-97 the interest rate seems not to have been affected by the
stock market, but for the two subperiods from 1979-89 and from 1989-97 the
response coefficients of stock returns are significant enough, but with differ-
ent signs. Rigobon and Sack (2001), however, claim that the US monetary
policy has reacted significantly to stock market movements for the sample
1985-1999.
Monetary Policy Rules in Open Economies How to design monetary
policy rules in open economies is another important issue in macroeconomics.
While in a closed economy the short-term interest rate is usually taken as
the policy instrument and the inflation and output gap are taken as targeted
variables, the exchange rate may play an important role in an open econ-
omy. Recent papers on monetary policy rules in open economies include Ball
(1999), Devereux and Engel (2000), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2002), Svensson
(1998), McCallum and Nelson (2001), Batini et al. (2001), Walsh (1999),
Benigno and Benigno (2000), Clarida et al. (2002), and others. Ball (1999)
1See Smets (1997, p.219).
7extends the Svensson (1997)-Ball (1997) closed economy model to an open
economy and finds that the optimal monetary policy rule in an open economy
is different from that in a closed economy in two aspects: (a) the policy vari-
able is a combination of the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate,
rather than the interest rate alone, and (b) the inflation rate in the Taylor
rule is replaced by a combination of inflation and the lagged exchange rate.
Clarida et al. (2002) explore monetary policy between two countries with and
without cooperation and find that under cooperation central banks should
respond to the foreign inflation as well as the domestic inflation. Svensson
(1998) presents a simple model and examines the properties of “strict” vs.
“flexible inflation targeting”, and “domestic” vs. “CPI-inflation targeting”.
The Goal and Organization of this Dissertation
The Goal of this Dissertation This dissertation focuses mainly on the
following problems:
1. Time-varying behaviors in monetary policy rules. Although there
is a large literature on monetary policy rules, few papers consider time-
varying behaviors which may be caused by the changing economic environ-
ment. Therefore, time-varying monetary policy rules will be estimated and
the results will be discussed.
2. Monetary policy rules under uncertainty. As surveyed in the literature,
this is an important problem for central banks. I will employ economic
models different from those in the literature and employ different approaches
in numerical studies. I will study adaptive learning as well as robust control.
A dynamic programming algorithm that is recently developed with adaptive
grids will be applied.
3. Financial markets and monetary policy rules. Unlike other papers
on this topic, I will use an optimal control framework and endogenize the
probability for the asset price bubble to increase or decrease in the next
period. Most researchers, Bernanke and Gertler (2000) and Smets (1997),
for instance, either take such a probability as a constant or assume it to be
8a linear function of the asset price bubble and interest rate. In my model
such a probability is endogenized as a nonlinear function of the asset price
bubble and interest rate because both positive and negative bubbles will be
considered. The problem of a zero bound on the nominal interest rate will be
considered in the context of financial markets, while most researchers have
explored this problem only in a real economy.
Numerical studies and empirical evidence will be undertaken and explored
using the data of OECD countries.
The Organization of this Dissertation The rest of this dissertation is
organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents some empirical evidence of the IS and Phillips curves
which have been shown to be the baseline model of monetary policy. Both
backward- and forward-looking behaviors will be considered, since numerous
economists argue that inflation is influenced by forward-looking as well as
backward-looking behaviors. A survey of monetary policy from the New
Keynesian perspective can be found in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). In
this chapter a time-varying Phillips curve will also be estimated to explore
regime changes in the economy.
Chapter 3 discusses monetary policy and interest-rate rules. While the
money-supply rule was widely used in the 1980s, the short-term interest
rate has been generally taken as the policy instrument since the 1990s. The
derivation, advantages and disadvantages of these monetary policy rules will
be explored in this chapter. Before deriving an interest-rate rule from a
dynamic macroeconomic model, I will follow Woodford (2003a) and briefly
discuss the loss function of the central bank in pursuing monetary policies.
The traditional quadratic loss function will be used in the dissertation, since
it has been claimed by some researchers, Svensson (2002) for instance, to
dominate other alternatives such as the asymmetric LINEX function.
The empirical evidence of a time-varying Phillips curve in Chapter 2 and
the derivation of the interest-rate rule in Chapter 3 indicate that the interest-
rate rule may be state-dependent rather than invariant. Therefore, Chapter
4 illustrates a time-varying monetary policy reaction function by way of the
9Kalman filter as well as the OLS regression and Chow break-point test. In
order to explore whether the monetary policy in the Euro-area was too tight
in the 1990s, some simulation of the Euro-area economy employing the time-
varying US monetary policy rule will be undertaken.
The empirical evidence of the time-varying Phillips curve and monetary
policy reaction function in the previous chapters indicates that there may
exist uncertainties as well as structural changes in economic models. Mone-
tary policy rules under uncertainty are, therefore, explored in Chapter 5. I
will first present some empirical evidence of model uncertainty employing a
State-Space model with Markov-Switching. With such a model I can explore
shock uncertainty as well as parameter uncertainty. Based on this evidence,
I will then explore monetary policy rules under uncertainty with two ap-
proaches: (a) the adaptive learning algorithm, and (b) robust control. By
the former approach the central bank is assumed to improve its knowledge
of an economic model by learning, while the latter assumes that the central
bank seeks a monetary policy rule robust to uncertainty.
While the previous chapters focus on monetary policy rules in a real econ-
omy, Chapter 6 explores monetary policy rules with the financial markets.
The difference between my model and others, that of Bernanke and Gertler
(2000), for example, is that I will endogenize the probability for the asset
price bubble to increase or decrease in the next period as a nonlinear func-
tion of the interest rate and the size of the bubble. I will also consider the
effects of financial markets on the real economy in the presence of a zero
bound on the nominal interest rate in the situation of a Liquidity Trap and
deflation.
Chapter 7 presents some concluding remarks of this dissertation.
Chapter 2
Empirical Evidence of the IS
and Phillips Curves
2.1 Introduction
The study of monetary policy is usually concerned with two important equa-
tions: the “IS” curve, which implies a negative relation between output gap
and real interest rate, and the Phillips curve named after A.W.Phillips, which
implies a positive relation between inflation and output gap. While the IS
curve originally described the equilibrium in the goods market, the Phillips
curve was originally developed by Phillips (1958) who explored the relation
between the unemployment and the rate of change of money wage rates in
the UK from 1861-1957.
While some researchers doubt whether the Phillips curve is dead, nu-
merous researchers, Eller and Gordon (2003), Karanassou et al. (2003) and
Mankiw (2000), for example, insist on the traditional view that there exists
a tradeoff between inflation and output. Mankiw (2000), however, claims
that what he means by “tradeoff between inflation and output” is somewhat
different from the traditional view:
I do not mean that a scatterplot of these two variables produces a
stable downward-sloping Phillips curve. Nor do I mean that any
particular regression fits the data well or produces any particular
10
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set of coefficients. The inflation-unemployment tradeoff is, at its
heart, a statement about the effects of monetary policy. It is the
claim that changes in monetary policy push these two variables
in opposite directions (Mankiw, 2000, p.2).
Karanassou et al. (2003) argue that there exists a tradeoff between inflation
and output even if there is no money illusion because of “frictional growth”.
They further claim that there exits a long-run tradeoff between inflation and
output.
Some researchers, Flaschel and Krolzig (2002), Chen and Flaschel (2004),
Flaschel et al. (2004), and Fair (2000a), for example, argue that two Phillips
curves, rather than a single one, should be considered. This has been stated
by Flaschel and Krolzig (2002) as follows
Rarely, however, at least on the theoretical level, is note taken of
the fact that there are in principle two relationships of the Phillips
curve involved in the interaction of unemployment and inflation,
namely one on the labor market, the Phillips (1958) curve, and
one on the market for goods, normally not considered a separate
Phillips curve, but merged with the other one by assuming that
prices are a constant mark-up on wages or the like, an extreme
case of the price Phillips curve that we shall consider in this paper
(Flaschel and Krolzig, 2002, p.2).
Numerous researchers on macroeconomics and monetary policy, Rude-
busch and Svensson (1999), Woodford (2001, 2003b), Clarida, Gal´ı and
Gertler (2000), Svensson (1997, 1999a, 1999b), and Ball (1997), for example,
have, however, employed a single Phillips curve. One justification for this
simplicity, as mentioned by Flaschel and Krolzig (2002, p.3), can be “rigid
markup pricing”. Flaschel and Krolzig (2002, p.3), moreover, state that
there may exist microfoundations to justify a single Phillips curve, especially
in the case of the New Keynesian Phillips curve. In the research below I
will employ a single Phillips curve just for simplicity, following the papers
mentioned above.
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While the traditional Phillips curve considers mainly backward-looking
behaviors, the “New Keynesian” Phillips curve takes forward-looking behav-
iors into account. Because of the drawbacks claimed of the “New Keynesian”
Phillips curve which will be discussed below, a so-called “hybrid New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve” has been proposed. The hybrid Phillips curve considers
backward- as well as forward-looking behaviors.
Another topic concerning the Phillips curve is its shape. While most
papers in the literature have assumed a linear Phillips curve, some researchers
have recently argued that the Phillips curve may be nonlinear. These papers
include Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998a), Schaling (1999), Laxton, Rose and
Tambakis (1998), Aguiar and Martins (2002) and others. Semmler and Zhang
(2003), for example, explore monetary policy with different shapes of the
Phillips curve. Flaschel et al. (2004) also claim to have detected nonlinearity
in the Phillips curve.
This topic will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. In the present
chapter I will focus on the linear Phillips curve, because there is no consensus
on the form of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve yet. Some researchers,
Schaling (1999), and Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1998), for example, argue
that it is convex, while other researchers, Stiglitz (1997), for instance, argue
that it is concave. Filardo (1998), however, argues that the Phillips curve is
convex in the case of positive output gaps and concave in the case of negative
output gaps.
Next, I will present some empirical evidence of the IS and Phillips curves,
since they are very often employed in the following chapters. While in Section
2 only backward-looking behaviors will be considered, in Section 3 I will
estimate the two curves with both backward- and forward-looking behaviors.
These two sections estimate the IS and Phillips curves under the assumption
that the coefficients in the equations are invariant, in the fourth section,
however, I will estimate the Phillips curve with time-varying coefficients,
since there might exist regime changes in the economy.
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2.2 The IS and Phillips Curves with Backward-
Looking Behaviors
In this section I will estimate the traditional IS and Phillips curves, which
consider only backward-looking behaviors, as shown in Rudebusch and Svens-
son (1999):
πt = α0 +
m∑
i=1
αiπt−i + αm+1yt−1 + εt, (2.1)
yt = β0 +
n∑
i=1
βiyt−i + βn+1(¯it−1 − π¯t−1) + ξt, (2.2)
where πt denotes the inflation rate, yt is the output gap and it is the short-
term interest rate. εt and ξt are shocks subject to normal distributions with
zero mean and constant variances. The symbol “-” above it and πt denotes
the four-quarter average values of the corresponding variables. Quarterly
data are used and the data source is the International Statistical Yearbook.
The inflation rate is measured by changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI,
base year: 1995). The output gap is defined as the percentage deviation of
the log of the Industrial Production Index (IPI, base year: 1995) from its
polynomial trend, the same as in Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998). The
polynomial trend reads as
y∗ =
n∑
i=0
cit
i,
with n=3.1 Because the IPI of Italy is not available, I use the GDP at a
constant price (base year: 1995) instead. The Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) is used to determine how many and which lags of the dependent vari-
ables should be used in the estimation. The estimation results are presented
below with T-Statistics in parentheses. The equations are estimated sepa-
rately with the ordinary least squares (OLS). I have also tried the estimation
1As surveyed by Orphanides and van Norden (2002), there are different approaches to
measure the potential output. In the following chapters I will try some other methods.
While Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1998) use the quadratic trend to measure the potential
output, I use the third-order trend because the data used here cover a much longer period
and the third-order trend fits the data better.
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with the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) and find that the results are
very similar to those of the separate OLS regressions, since the covariances
of the errors are almost zero. The countries I will look at include Germany,
France, the UK, Italy and the European Union (EU) as an aggregate econ-
omy.
Germany The short-term interest rate of Germany is measured by the 3-
month treasury bill rate. The data from 1963.1-98.2 generate the following
estimates:
πt = 0.004
(3.314)
+ 1.082
(13.049)
πt−1 − 0.179
(2.215)
πt−2 + 0.184
(3.796)
yt−1, R
2 = 0.907,
yt = 0.001
(1.727)
+ 0.946
(29.896)
yt−1 − 0.046
(2.330)
(¯it−1 − π¯t−1), R
2 = 0.868.
France The short-term interest rate of France is measured by two different
rates. From 1962-68 I take the call money rate and from 1969-99 I use the
3-month treasury bill rate, because the 3-month treasury bill rate before
1968 is unavailable. With the data from 1962.1-99.4 I obtain the following
estimates:
πt = 0.003
(3.158)
+ 1.402
(19.120)
πt−1 − 0.440
(6.108)
πt−2 + 0.165
(3.167)
yt−1, R
2 = 0.979,
yt = −0.001
(0.980)
+ 0.603
(7.521)
yt−1 − 0.185
(2.351)
yt−2 − 0.041
(2.227)
(¯it−1 − π¯t−1), R
2 = 0.683.
Italy The short-term interest rate of Italy is measured by the official dis-
count rate, because other interest rates are unavailable. The quarterly data
from 1970.1-99.3 generate the following estimates:
πt = 0.002
(1.094)
+ 1.412
(16.761)
πt−1 − 0.446
(5.243)
πt−2 + 0.236
(2.250)
yt−1, R
2 = 0.964,
yt = 0.002
(2.689)
+ 0.712
(9.964)
yt−1 − 0.107
(1.596)
yt−3 − 0.030
(1.912)
(¯it−1 − π¯t−1), R
2 = 0.572.
The UK The short-term interest rate of the UK is measured by the 3-
month treasury bill rate. The data from 1963.2-99.1 generate the following
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estimates:
πt = 0.004
(2.034)
+ 1.397
(17.004)
πt−1 − 0.413
(2.909)
πt−2 − 0.216
(1.517)
πt−3 + 0.192
(2.408)
πt−4 + 0.494
(3.708)
yt−1,
R2 = 0.954.
yt = 0.00003
(0.076)
+ 0.849
(19.706)
yt−1 − 0.015
(1.810)
(¯it−4 − π¯t−4), R
2 = 0.735.
From the estimation of the IS and Phillips curves of the four main Euro-
pean countries above one observes that the T-Statistics of the coefficients of
yt in the Phillips curve and the real interest rate in the IS curve are signifi-
cant enough. This indicates that there exists a significant relation between
the output and the inflation, and between the inflation and the real interest
rate.
Next, I come to the aggregation of the EU economy. I undertake the
estimation with the aggregate data of the four main countries of Germany,
France, Italy and the UK (EU4) and then the three countries of Germany,
France and Italy (EU3). The aggregate inflation rate and output gap are
measured by the GDP-weighted sums of the inflation rates and output gaps
of the individual countries. I use the German call money rate as the short-
term interest rate of EU4 and EU3. Such aggregation of data can be found
in Peersman and Smets (1998). There they have also justified using the
German rate to measure the monetary policy in the aggregate economy of
the Euro-area.
The aggregate data of EU4 and EU3 from 1978.4-98.3 generate the fol-
lowing estimates:
EU4
πt = 0.003
(1.979)
+ 1.175
(15.860)
πt−1 − 0.469
(3.262)
πt−3 + 0.265
(2.424)
πt−4 + 0.396
(3.126)
yt−1, R
2 = 0.974.
yt = 0.001
(1.280)
+ 0.947
(26.242)
yt−1 − 0.033
(2.055)
(¯it−1 − π¯t−1), R
2 = 0.900.
EU3
πt = 0.003
(1.652)
+ 1.235
(17.182)
πt−1 − 0.510
(3.438)
πt−3 + 0.240
(2.121)
πt−4 + 0.236
(2.025)
yt−1, R
2 = 0.972,
yt = 0.001
(1.480)
+ 0.969
(25.524)
yt−1 − 0.039
(2.141)
(¯it−1 − π¯t−1), R
2 = 0.901.
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From these results one can come to the same conclusion as for the indi-
vidual countries, that is, there exists a significant relation between π and y,
and between y and the real interest rate.
2.3 The IS and Phillips Curves with Forward-
Looking Behaviors
As mentioned by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999, p.1664), the New Keyne-
sian IS and Phillips curves can be derived from a dynamic general equilibrium
model with money and temporary nominal price rigidities. Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1999 p.1665) write the IS and Phillips curves with forward-looking
behaviors as
yt = Etyt+1 − ϕ[it − Etπt+1] + gt, (2.3)
πt = λyt + βEtπt+1 + ut, (2.4)
where gt and ut are disturbances terms. it is the short-term interest rate and
E denotes the expectation operator.
Numerous researchers, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), Gal´ı, Gertler and Lo´pez-
Salido (2001a), Woodford (1996), and Chadha and Nolan (2002) for example,
have derived the New Keynesian Phillips curve (2.4). While Gal´ı and Gertler
(1999) derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve under the assumption that
firms face identical constant marginal costs, Gal´ı, Gertler and Lo´pez-Salido
(2001a) derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve under the assumption of
increasing real marginal costs. Although there exist some differences between
their frameworks, their models do have something in common, that is, the
Calvo (1983) pricing model and Dixit-Stiglitz consumption and production
models are usually employed. In the appendix of this chapter I will make a
brief sketch of Woodford’s (1996) derivation of the New Keynesian IS and
Phillips curves.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), moreover, describe the properties of the
above two equations as follows:
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Equation (2.3) is obtained by log-linearizing the consumption eu-
ler equation that arises from the household’s optimal saving deci-
sion, after imposing the equilibrium condition that consumption
equals output minus government spending. The resulting expres-
sion differs from the traditional IS curve mainly because current
output depends on expected future output as well as the inter-
est rate. Higher expected future output raises current output:
Because individuals prefer to smooth their consumption, expec-
tation of higher consumption next period (associated with higher
expected output) leads them to want to consume more today,
which raises current output demand. ...
... Equation (2.4) is simply a log-linear approximation about
the steady state of the aggregation of the individual firm pric-
ing decisions. Since the equation relates the inflation rate to the
output gap and expected inflation, it has the flavor of a tradi-
tional expectations-augmented Phillips curve. A key difference
with the standard Phillips curve is that expected future inflation,
Etπt+1, enters additively, as opposed to expected current infla-
tion, Et−1πt. ... In contrast to the traditional Phillips curve, there
is no lagged dependence in inflation. Roughly speaking, firms set
nominal price based on the expectations of future marginal costs
(Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, p.1665-1667).
The virtues of the New Keynesian Phillips curve have been described by
Mankiw (2000) as follows
First, it gives some microfoundations to the idea that the overall
price level adjusts slowly to changing economic conditions. Sec-
ond, it produces an expectations-augmented Phillips curve loosely
resembling the model that Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps
pioneered in the 1960s and that remains the theoretical bench-
mark for inflation-unemployment dynamics. Third, it is simple
enough to be useful for theoretical policy analysis (Mankiw, 2000,
p.13).
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Mankiw (2000, p.13-16), however, also mentions three failures of the New
Keynesian Phillips curves: (a) disinflationary booms, (b) inflation persis-
tence, and (c) impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks. More-
over, Eller and Gordon (2003) criticize the New Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC) as follows
This paper shows that the NKPC approach is an empirical fail-
ure by every measure. Its residual unexplained error in inflation
equation is between three and four times that of the mainstream
model. In dynamic simulations its error over the 1993-2002 pe-
riod is between three and ten times that of the mainstream model.
Its only claim for attention, that it is tied to theoretical maxi-
mizing models, fades away when its central driving variable, ex-
pected future inflation, is shown to have no explanatory power
beyond that contributed by lagged, backward-looking inflation.
The NKPC variables that push future inflation up or down, the
output gap and marginal costs, are shown by simple theoretical
reasoning to have coefficients that are biased toward zero and are
shown here in statistical tests to have the wrong sign and/or to
contribute virtually nothing to the explanation of inflation (Eller
and Gordon, 2003, abstract).
Because of the problems of the traditional and New Keynesian Phillips
curves, a third type of Phillips curve, the so-called hybrid New Keynesian
Phillips curve, has been derived and employed in macroeconomics. In the
hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve both backward- and forward-looking
behaviors are considered. The IS curve (with backward- and forward-looking
behaviors) and the hybrid Phillips curve have been written by Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (1999, p.1691) as follows
yt = α1yt−1 + (1− α1)Etyt+1 − α2(rt − Etπt+1) + εt, αi > 0, (2.5)
πt = β1πt−1 + (1− β1)β2Etπt+1 + β3yt + ξt, βi > 0, (2.6)
where rt is the short-term interest rate and β2 is the discount factor. εt
and ξt are disturbances terms. The difference between the derivations of the
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New Keynesian Phillips curve and the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve
consists in a fundamental assumption of the models. The former assumes
that each firm resets its price with probability (1-θ) each period and keeps
its price unchanged with probability θ. The latter, however, further assumes
that the firms can be divided into types, that is, a fraction 1 − ω of the
firms are “forward-looking” and the remaining ω of the firms are “backward-
looking”. Some estimations of the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curves
have been undertaken. Using the real marginal costs rather than the output
gap in the estimation, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999), for example, come to the
following conclusions
... (b) Forward looking behavior is very important: our model
estimates suggest that roughly sixty to eighty percent of firms ex-
hibit forward looking price setting behavior; (c) Backward looking
behavior is statistically significant though, in our preferred spec-
ifications, is of limited quantitative importance. Thus, while the
benchmark pure forward looking model is rejected on statistical
grounds, it appears still to be a reasonable first approximation of
reality ... (Gal´ı and Gertler, 1999, p.197).
Moreover, Gal´ı, Gertler and Lo´pez-Salido (2003), employing different ap-
proaches (GMM, nonlinear instrumental variables and maximum likelihood
estimation), estimate the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve with the US
data and find that the estimation results are robust to the approaches em-
ployed. Gal´ı, Gertler and Lo´pez-Salido (2001b) estimate the hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve with more lags of inflation and find that the addi-
tional lags of inflation do not greatly affect the results.
The hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve given by Eq. (2.6) is, in fact,
similar to the hybrid Phillips curve proposed by Fuhrer and Moore (1995),
which reads
πt = φπt−1 + (1− φ)Etπt+1 + δyt. (2.7)
Although Eq. (2.7) looks similar to Eq. (2.6), the former is mainly an
empirical issue. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) derive this hybrid Phillips curve
from a model of relative wage hypothesis. Moreover, Fuhrer and Moore
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(1995) set φ = 0.5. In case β2 = 1, the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve
then looks the same as Eq. (2.7) except for a disturbance term in Eq. (2.6).
Next, I will estimate the system (2.5)-(2.6) with the generalized method
of moments (GMM), following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). In the
estimation below, I find that β2 is always very close to one (0.985 in the case
of Germany, 0.990 in France and 0.983 in the US, for example). Therefore, I
will assume β2 = 1 for simplicity. Thus, the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
curve looks the same as the hybrid Phillips curve derived and employed by
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) except that the former has a disturbance term.
Defining Ωt as the information available to economic agents when expec-
tations of the output gap and inflation rate are formed, and assuming εt and
ξt to be iid with zero mean and constant variances for simplicity, one has
yt = α1yt−1 + (1− α1)E[yt+1|Ωt]− α2(rt − E[πt+1|Ωt]) + εt, αi > 0, (2.8)
πt = β1πt−1 + (1− β1)E[πt+1|Ωt] + β3yt + ξt, βi > 0, (2.9)
After eliminating the unobservable variables from the system one has the
following new equations:
yt = α1yt−1 + (1− α1)yt+1 − α2(rt − πt+1) + ηt, (2.10)
πt = β1πt−1 + (1− β1)πt+1 + β3yt + ǫt, (2.11)
with
ηt = (1− α1)(E[yt+1|Ωt]− yt+1) + α2(E[πt+1|Ωt]− πt+1) + εt
ǫt = (1− β1)(E[πt+1|Ωt]− πt+1) + ξt.
Let ut (∈ Ωt) be a vector of variables within the economic agents’ information
set at the time they form expectations of the inflation rate and output gap
that are orthogonal to ηt and ǫt, one has E[ηt|ut] = 0 and E[ǫt|ut] = 0. ut
includes any lagged variable that helps to forecast the output and inflation,
as well as any contemporaneous variable that is uncorrelated with the current
shocks εt and ξt. One now has the following equations:
E[yt − α1yt−1 − (1− α1)yt+1 + α2(rt − πt+1)|ut] = 0, (2.12)
E[πt − β1πt−1 − (1− β1)πt+1 − β3yt|ut] = 0. (2.13)
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I will estimate this system by way of the GMM with quarterly data. The
data source is the International Statistical Yearbook.2 The measures of the
inflation rate, output gap, and short-term interest rate are the same as in
the previous section. The estimation results of several OECD countries are
presented below with T-Statistics in parentheses. Because the number of
instruments used for the estimation is larger then that of the parameters to
be estimated, I present the J-statistics (J-St.) to illustrate the validity of the
overidentifying restriction.3
Germany The estimation for Germany is undertaken with the data from
1970.1-98.4. The instruments include the 1-4 lags of the short-term interest
rate, inflation rate, output gap, the percentage deviation of the real money
supply (M3) from its HP-filtered trend, the log difference of the nominal
DM/USD exchange rate, price changes in imports, energy and shares and a
constant. Correction for MA(1) autocorrelation is undertaken. J-St.=0.388
and the residual covariance is 1.11×10−10.
yt = 0.002
(0.883)
+ 0.491
(21.024)
yt−1 + (1− 0.491)E[yt+1|ut]− 0.011
(1.956)
(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt
= 0.002 + 0.491yt−1 + 0.509E[yt+1|ut]− 0.011(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt,
R2 = 0.662, (2.14)
πt = 0.001
(2.236)
+ 0.147
(4.162)
yt + 0.345
(22.655)
πt−1 + (1− 0.345)E[πt+1|ut] + ξt
= 0.001 + 0.147yt + 0.345πt−1 + 0.655E[πt+1|ut] + ξt, R
2 = 0.954.
(2.15)
France The estimation of France is undertaken with the data from 1970.1-
99.4. The instruments include the 1-4 lags of the interest rate, output gap,
inflation rate, log difference of index of unit value of import, log difference
2I use the 2SLS to obtain the initial estimates of the parameters and then use these
initial estimates to obtain the final estimates by way of the GMM with quarterly data.
3The J-statistic reported here is the minimized value of the objective function in the
GMM estimation. Hansen (1982) claims that n · J
L
−→ χ2(m− s), with n being the sample
size, m the number of moment conditions and s the number of parameters to be estimated.
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of the nominal Franc/USD exchange rate, the unemployment rate and a
constant. Correction for MA(1) autocorrelation is undertaken. J-St.=0.303
and the residual covariance is 9.27×10−11.
yt = 0.0004
(2.198)
+ 0.361
(10.725)
yt−1 + (1− 0.361)E[yt+1|ut]− 0.009
(2.279)
(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt
= 0.0004 + 0.361yt−1 + 0.639E[yt+1|ut]− 0.009(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt,
R2 = 0.615, (2.16)
πt = −0.0004
(1.075)
+ 0.551
(6.682)
yt + 0.709
(17.865)
πt−1 + (1− 0.709)E[πt+1|ut] + ξt
= −0.0004 + 0.551yt + 0.709πt−1 + 0.291E[πt+1|ut] + ξt, R
2 = 0.991.
(2.17)
Italy For Italy I undertake the estimation from 1971.1-99.3. The instru-
ments include the 1-4 lags of the interest rate, inflation rate, output gap, the
log difference of index of unit value of import, the log difference of nominal
LIRA/USD exchange rate, the unemployment rate and a constant. J-St.
is 0.193 and the residual covariance is 1.12 × 10−9. Correction for MA(2)
autocorrelation is undertaken.
yt = 0.001
(7.387)
+ 0.357
(17.788)
yt−1 + (1− 0.357)E[yt+1|ut]− 0.019
(6.847)
(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt
= 0.001 + 0.357yt−1 + 0.643E[yt+1|ut]− 0.019(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt,
R2 = 0.673, (2.18)
πt = −0.0004
(1.232)
+ 0.106
(3.138)
yt + 0.572
(47.104)
πt−1 + (1− 0.572)E[πt+1|ut] + ξt
= −0.0004 + 0.106yt + 0.572πt−1 + 0.428E[πt+1|ut] + ξt, R
2 = 0.986.
(2.19)
The UK The estimation of the UK is undertaken from 1962.4-99.1. The
instruments include the 1-4 lags of the interest rate, inflation rate, output
gap, price changes in imports, the log difference of the nominal Pound/USD
exchange rate, the unemployment rate and a constant. Correction for MA(2)
autocorrelation is undertaken. J-St. is 0.214 and the residual covariance is
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5.11×10−10.
yt = 0.0001
(1.150)
+ 0.363
(15.840)
yt−1 + (1− 0.363)E[yt+1|ut]− 0.007
(3.443)
(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt
= 0.0001 + 0.363yt−1 + 0.637E[yt+1|ut]− 0.007(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt,
R2 = 0.752, (2.20)
πt = −0.002
(3.973)
+ 0.333
(3.893)
yt + 0.553
(22.513)
πt−1 + (1− 0.553)E[πt+1|ut] + ξt
= −0.002 + 0.333yt + 0.553πt−1 + 0.447E[πt+1|ut] + ξt, R
2 = 0.980.
(2.21)
The EU4 As in the previous section I also undertake the estimation with
the aggregate data of the Euro-area. The estimation for the EU4 is under-
taken from 1979.1-98.3. The instruments include the 1-4 lags of the output
gap, inflation rate, interest rate, GDP-weighted average price changes in
imports, the GDP-weighted unemployment rate, the first difference of the
GDP-weighted log of exchange rate and a constant. Correction for MA(1)
autocorrelation is undertaken, the residual covariance is 4.59×10−11 and J-
St.=0.389.
yt = 0.0004
(6.283)
+ 0.811
(46.290)
yt−1 + (1− 0.811)E[yt+1|ut]− 0.018
(6.310)
(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt
= 0.0004 + 0.811yt−1 + 0.189E[yt+1|ut]− 0.018(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt,
R2 = 0.739, (2.22)
πt = 0.0005
(1.715)
+ 0.335
(6.631)
yt + 0.610
(47.103)
πt−1 + (1− 0.610)E[πt+1|ut] + ξt
= 0.0005 + 0.335yt + 0.610πt−1 + 0.390E[πt+1|ut] + ξt, R
2 = 0.987.
(2.23)
The US Next, I undertake the estimation for the US from 1962.1-98.4.
For the US I use two lags of the inflation rate in equation (2.8), since the
estimates will have signs opposite to the definition in equation (2.8) and
(2.9) if I just estimate Eq. (2.11) with one lag of the inflation rate. The
inflation rate of the US is measured by changes in the CPI, the short-term
interest rate is the federal funds rate, and the output gap is the percentage
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deviation of the log of the IPI from its third-order polynomial trend. The
instruments include the 1-4 lags of the interest rate, inflation rate, output
gap, percentage deviation of the real money supply (M3) from its HP filtered
trend, price changes in imports, the log difference of the nominal USD/SDR
exchange rate, the unemployment rate and a constant. Correction for MA(1)
autocorrelation is undertaken. J-St. is 0.298 and the residual covariance is
2.16×10−11.
yt = 0.0004
(2.650)
+ 0.526
(22.814)
yt−1 + (1− 0.526)E[yt+1|ut]
− 0.011
(2.275)
(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt
= 0.0004 + 0.526yt−1 + 0.474E[yt+1|ut]− 0.011(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt,
R2 = 0.931, (2.24)
πt = 0.0004
(2.217)
+ 0.042
(2.548)
yt + 0.861
(19.294)
πt−1 − 0.235
(7.427)
πt−2
+ (1− 0.861 + 0.235)E[πt+1|ut] + ξt
= 0.0004 + 0.042yt + 0.861πt−1 − 0.235πt−2 + 0.374E[πt+1|ut] + ξt,
R2 = 0.990. (2.25)
Japan The estimation of Japan with the data from 1970.1-99.4 is shown
below. The inflation rate is measured by changes in the CPI (base year:
1995), the short-term interest rate is the call money rate and the output gap
is the percentage deviation of the IPI (base year: 1995) from its third-order
polynomial trend. The instruments used for Japan include the 1-4 lags of the
inflation rate, output gap, call money rate, changes in the import prices and
a constant. MA(4) autocorrelation is undertaken and the residual covariance
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is 1.27×10−8 with the J-St. being 0.149.
yt = 0.0001
(0.402)
+ 0.463
(38.226)
yt−1 + (1− 0.463)E[yt+1|ut]
− 0.025
(2.083)
(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt
= 0.0001 + 0.463yt−1 + 0.537E[yt+1|ut]− 0.025(rt − E[πt+1|ut]) + ǫt,
R2 = 0.986, (2.26)
πt = 0.0008
(1.365)
+ 0.143
(11.857)
yt + 0.988
(31.641)
πt−1 + (1− 0.988)E[πt+1|ut] + ξt
= 0.0008 + 0.143yt + 0.988πt−1 + 0.012E[πt+1|ut] + ξt,
R2 = 0.929. (2.27)
The estimation results above show that the expectations do play some
roles in the equations, since the coefficients of the expected variables are
usually large enough in comparison with the coefficients of the lagged vari-
ables.
2.4 Time-Varying Phillips Curve
Above I have estimated the IS and Phillips curves with both backward- and
forward-looking behaviors. One crucial assumption is that the coefficients
in the equations are invariant. Recently, there has been some discussion on
whether there are regime changes in the economy. That is, the parameters in
the model might not be constant but instead time-varying. Cogley and Sar-
gent (2001, 2002), for example, study the inflation dynamics of the US after
WWII by way of Bayesian Vector Autoregression with time-varying param-
eters and claim to have found regime changes. In this section I will consider
this problem and estimate the Phillips curve with time-varying coefficients
for several OECD countries. This concerns the time-varying reaction of the
private sector to the unemployment gap as well as the time variation of what
has been called the natural rate of unemployment (or the NAIRU). The time-
varying NAIRU has been estimated by Semmler and Zhang (2003). Therefore
I will estimate only the time-varying coefficients of the Phillips curve with
the NAIRU taken as a constant.
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There are different approaches to estimate time-varying parameters, among
which are the Recursive Least Squares (RLS), Flexible Least Squares (FLS)
and the Kalman filter. In this section I will apply the Kalman filter because
of the drawbacks of the FLS and RLS. By the RLS algorithm, the coefficient
usually experiences significant changes at the beginning and becomes rela-
tively stable at the end of the sample because old observations are assigned
larger weights than new ones. Therefore, the RLS estimates tend to be rel-
atively smooth at the end of the sample, and the real changes in coefficients
are not properly shown.
The FLS is developed under the assumption that the coefficients evolve
only “slowly”. In this approach two kinds of model specification errors can
be associated with each choice of an estimate b = (b1, ..., bN ) for the se-
quence of coefficient vectors bn: the residual “measurement error” which is
the difference between dependent variable yn and the estimated model x
T
nbn,
and the residual “dynamic error” which is computed as [bn+1 − bn].
4 One
of the most important variables in the FLS estimation is the weight µ (can
be vector or scalar) given to the dynamic errors. The smaller the µ is, the
larger the changes in the coefficients, and vice versa. In the extreme, when µ
tends to infinity, the coefficients do not change at all. It is quite difficult to
assign an appropriate value to µ and, therefore, it is hard to figure out the
real changes of the coefficients. Moreover, there are not only “slow” but also
drastic changes in the coefficients in economic models and, therefore, on the
basis of the FLS, Luetkepohl and Herwartz (1996) develop the Generalized
Flexible Least Squares (GFLS) method to estimate the seasonal changes in
coefficients.
In fact, Tucci (1990) finds that the FLS and the Kalman filter are equiv-
alent under some assumptions, that is, under certain conditions there is no
difference between these two methods. The Kalman filter undoubtedly has
disadvantages too. One example is that it requires the specification of prob-
abilistic properties for residual error terms. It is usually assumed that the
4N denotes the number of observations and x is the vector of independent variables. b
is the vector of time-varying parameters. The reader can refer to Kalaba and Tesfatsion
(1988) for the FLS.
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error terms have Gaussian distributions, which is not necessarily satisfied in
practice. A brief sketch of the Kalman filter can be found in the appendix
of this chapter.
In order to simplify the estimation I do not consider forward-looking be-
haviors in the Phillips curve below. Replacing the output with the unemploy-
ment rate, one has the following Phillips curve with time-varying reaction
πt = α0 +
n∑
i=1
αiπt−i + αut(Ut − U
N
t ) + ξt, (2.28)
αut = αut−1 + ηt, (2.29)
where πt is the inflation rate, Ut is the unemployment rate and U
N
t denotes
the so-called NAIRU. ξt and ηt are shocks subject to normal distributions
with zero mean and variance σ2ξ and σ
2
η respectively. The αut is expected to
be smaller than zero. The number of lags depends on the T-Statistics of the
corresponding coefficients, namely, the lags with insignificant T-Statistics will
be excluded. Equation (2.29) assumes that αut is time-varying and follows
a random-walk path. In order to estimate the time-varying path of αut, I
employ the maximum likelihood estimation by way of the Kalman filter.5
The countries to be examined include Germany, France, the UK, Italy, the
US and Japan. Quarterly data are used. The data source is the International
Statistical Yearbook. T-Statistics of the estimation are shown in parentheses.
The inflation rate of Germany is measured by changes in the CPI. The
NAIRU is assumed to be fixed at 6 percent. This is undoubtedly a sim-
plification, since the NAIRU may change over time too.6 The data from
5The reader can also refer to Hamilton (1994, Ch. 13) for the details of the Kalman
filter. In this section I apply the random-walk model (shown in the appendix) to estimate
the time-varying coefficients.
6Here I assume that the NAIRU is fixed for all countries, close to the average values
of the unemployment rates in these countries. It is obvious that the value of the constant
NAIRU does not essentially affect the estimation. Semmler and Zhang (2003) estimate
the time-varying NAIRU with the Kalman filter, following Gordon (1997).
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1963.4-98.4 generate the following estimation results:
πt = 0.005
(1.495)
+ 1.047
(9.922)
πt−1 − 0.181
(2.268)
πt−2 + αut(Ut − U
N
t ).
The path of αut is presented in Figure 2.1A.
The inflation rate of France is measured by the log difference of the GDP
deflator. The NAIRU is also assumed to be 6 percent. The data from 1969.1-
99.4 generate the following estimation results
πt = 0.008
(0.566)
+ 0.901
(6.070)
πt−1 − 0.003
(0.045)
πt−2 + αut(Ut − U
N
t ).
The path of αut is presented in Figure 2.1B.
The inflation rate of the UK is measured by changes in the CPI. The
NAIRU is assumed to be 6 percent. The data from 1964.1-99.4 generate the
following estimation results
πt = 0.007
(2.403)
+ 1.384
(15.845)
πt−1 − 0.491
(6.695)
πt−2 + αut(Ut − U
N
t ).
The path of αut is presented in Figure 2.1C.
The inflation rate of Italy is also measured by changes in the CPI and the
NAIRU is assumed to be 5 percent. With the data from 1962-99 the changes
of αut are insignificant, but for the period from 1962-94 the changes are
significant enough, therefore the estimation is undertaken from 1962.3-94.3
and the result reads
πt = 0.004
(0.887)
+ 1.409
(14.111)
πt−1 − 0.448
(2.870)
πt−2 + αut(Ut − U
N
t ).
The path of αut is presented in Figure 2.1D.
Next, I undertake the estimation for the US and Japan. The inflation
rate of the US is measured by changes in the CPI and the NAIRU is taken to
be 5 percent. The data from 1961.1-99.4 generate the following estimation
results
πt = 0.004
(2.665)
+ 1.198
(12.242)
πt−1 − 0.298
(2.119)
πt−2 + 0.203
(1.589)
πt−3 − 0.202
(2.275)
πt−4 + αut(Ut − U
N
t ).
The path of αut is shown in Figure 2.1E. In Figure 2.1E one finds that for
many years αut is positive, which is inconsistent with the traditional view that
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Figure 2.1: Time-Varying αut
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there is a negative relation between the inflation rate and the unemployment
rate. One reason may be the value of the NAIRU, which is assumed to be
fixed at 5 percent here. The unemployment rate in the US was quite high in
the 1970s and 1980s, attaining 11% around 1983. It experienced significant
changes from the 1960s to the 1990s. Therefore, assuming a fixed NAIRU of
5% does not seem to be a good choice.
The inflation rate of Japan is measured by changes in the CPI and the
NAIRU is assumed to be 3 percent which is close to its average value from
the middle of the 1960s to the end of the 1990s. The estimation result with
the Japanese data from 1964.1-2002.4 reads
πt = 0.006
(2.208)
+ 1.216
(22.081)
πt−1 − 0.290
(5.225)
πt−2 + αut(Ut − U
N
t ).
The path of Japanese αut is presented in Figure 2.1F. It is negative most
of the time and experienced some structural changes before the 1980s and
remained relatively stable thereafter. This is consistent with the fact that the
inflation rate also experienced some significant changes before the 1980s and
remained relatively stable thereafter. The inflation rate and unemployment
rate of Japan are presented in Figure 2.2.
From the empirical evidence above one finds that the αut in Eq.(2.28) did
experience some changes. For the three EU countries of Germany, France
and Italy, one finds that the changes of αut are to some extent similar. αut
of France and Italy have been decreasing persistently since the 1960s. In the
case of Germany, however, it has been increasing slowly since the middle of
the 1980s. As regards the UK, the change of αut is relatively different from
those of the other three countries. It decreased very fast in the 1960s and
started to increase in 1975. In order to analyze the causes of the differences
of the evolution of αut, I present the inflation and unemployment rates of
the four EU countries from 1970 to 1999 in Figure 2.3 and 2.4 respectively.
It is obvious that the changes in inflation rates of the four countries are
similar. πt attained its highest point around 1975, decreased to a low value
in about 4 years, increased to another peak at the end of the 1970s and
then continued to go down before 1987, after which it evolved smoothly
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Figure 2.2: Inflation Rate and Unemployment Rate of Japan
and stayed below 10 percent. The evolution of the inflation rate does not
seem to be responsible for the differences in the paths of αut of the four
countries. The evolution of the unemployment rates in Figure 2.4, however,
may partly explain why the change of αut in the UK is somewhat different
from those of the other three countries. Before 1986 the unemployment rates
of the four countries increased almost simultaneously, while after 1986 there
existed some differences. The evolution of Ut in the UK was not completely
consistent with those of the other three countries. After 1992 the Ut of the
UK decreased rapidly from about 10 percent to 4 percent, while those of the
other three countries remained relatively high during the whole of the 1990s
and did not begin to go down until 1998.
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Figure 2.3: Inflation Rates of Germany, France, Italy and the UK
Figure 2.4: Unemployment Rates of Germany, France, Italy and the UK
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents some empirical evidence of the baseline model of mon-
etary policy, the IS and Phillips curves. Both backward- and forward-looking
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behaviors have been considered. The evidence of the countries studied shows
that there do exist some significant relations between the output gap and
real interest rate, and between the inflation and the output gap. In order to
explore regime changes in the economy I have also estimated a time-varying
Phillips curve. The estimation results show that the reaction to the unem-
ployment gap has been changing, indicating regime changes in the economy.
34
Appendix A: The State-Space Model and Kalman
Filter
Here I make a brief sketch of the State-Space model (SSM) and Kalman
filter, following Harvey (1989, 1990) and Hamilton (1994).7 After arranging
a model in a State-Space form, one can use the Kalman filter to obtain the
paths of time-varying parameters.
The State-Space Model
The State-Space model applies to a multivariate time series, yt, containing
N elements. These observable variables are, via a so-called “measurement
equation”, related to anm×1 vector, αt which is known as the “state vector”,
yt = Ztαt + dt + ǫt, (2.30)
with t = 1, ..., T , Zt is an N × m matrix, dt is an N × 1 vector and ǫt is
an N × 1 vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances with zero mean and
covariance matrix Ht. Usually the elements of αt are not observable but are
known or assumed to be generated by a first-order Markov process, which is
known as the “transition equation”
αt = Ttαt−1 + ct +Rtηt, (2.31)
with t = 1, ...T . Tt is an m×m matrix, ct is an m× 1 vector, Rt is an m× g
matrix and ηt is a g×1 vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances with zero
mean and covariance Qt. If the system matrices Zt, dt, Ht, Tt, ct, Rt and Qt
do not change over time, the model is said to be time-invariant, otherwise,
it is time-variant.
The Kalman Filter
The Kalman filter estimates time-varying parameters in three steps. Given all
the information currently available, the first step forms the optimal predictor
7Although there are numerous books dealing with the Kalman filter, the framework in
this appendix is mainly based on Harvey (1989, 1990).
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of the next observation via the so-called “prediction equations”. The second
step is to update the estimator by incorporating the new observation via
the “updating equations”. These two steps use only the past and current
information, disregarding the future information which may also affect the
estimation. Therefore, the third step is to “smooth” the estimators based on
all of the observations to get a more reasonable result.
Prediction Let at−1 denote the optimal estimate of αt−1 based on the
observations up to and including yt−1. Let Pt−1 denote the m×m covariance
matrix of the estimate error, i.e.
Pt−1 = E[(αt−1 − at−1)(αt−1 − at−1)
′].
Given at−1 and Pt−1, the optimal estimate of αt is given by
at|t−1 = Ttat−1 + ct, (2.32)
while the covariance matrix of the measurement error is
Pt|t−1 = TtPt−1T
′
t +RtQtR
′
t, t = 1, ..., T. (2.33)
These two equations are called the prediction equations.
Updating Once the new observations of yt become available, the estimate
of αt, at|t−1, can be updated with the following equations
at = at|t−1 + Pt|t−1Z
′
tF
−1
t vt, (2.34)
and
Pt = Pt|t−1 − Pt|t−1Z
′
tF
−1
t ZtPt|t−1, (2.35)
where vt = yt − Ztat|t−1 − dt, which is called the prediction error, and Ft =
ZtPt|t−1Z
′
t +Ht, for t = 1, ..., T .
Smoothing The prediction and updating equations estimate the state vec-
tor, αt, conditional on the information available at time t. The aim of
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smoothing is to take account of the information available after time t.8 The
smoothing algorithms consist of a set of recursions that start with the final
quantities (aT and PT ) and work backwards. The equations are
at|T = at + P
∗
t (at+1|T − Tt+1at − ct+1), (2.36)
and
Pt|T = pt + P
∗
t (Pt+1|T − Pt+1|t)P
∗′
t , (2.37)
where
P ∗t = PtT
′
t+1P
−1
t+1|t, t = T − 1, ..., 1,
with aT |T = aT and PT |T = PT .
The Maximum Likelihood Function In order to estimate the state vec-
tor, one must first estimate a set of unknown parameters (n × 1 vector ψ,
referred to as “hyperparameters”) with the maximum likelihood function.
For a multivariate model the maximum likelihood function reads
L(y;ψ) =
T∏
t=1
p(yt|Yt−1),
where p(yt|Yt−1) denotes the distribution of yt conditional on the information
set at time t − 1, that is, Yt−1 = (yt−1, yt−2, ..., y1). The likelihood function
for a Gaussian model can be written as
logL(ψ) = −(1/2)(NTlog2π +
T∑
t=1
log|Ft|+
T∑
t=1
v′tF
−1
t vt), (2.38)
where Ft and vt are the same as those defined in the Kalman filter.
In sum, one has to do the following to estimate the state vector with the
Kalman filter. (a) Write the model in a State-Space form of Eq. (2.30)-
(2.31), run the Kalman filter of Eq. (2.32)-(2.35) and store all vt and Ft for
future use. (b) Estimate the hyperparameters with the maximum likelihood
8Harvey (1989) points out three smoothing algorithms: “Fixed-point” smoothing,
“Fixed-lag” smoothing and “Fixed-interval” smoothing. In this dissertation I use the
third one, which is widely used in economic problems.
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function presented in Eq. (2.38). (c) Run the Kalman filter again with the
estimates of the hyperparameters to get the non-smoothed estimates of the
state vector. (d) Smooth the state vector with the smoothing equations Eq.
(2.36)-(2.37).
In order to run the Kalman filter one needs starting values of at and Pt,
that is, one needs to know a0 and P0. For a stationary and time invariant
transition equation, the starting values are given as follows:
a0 = (I − T )
−1c, (2.39)
and
vec(P0) = [I − T ⊗ T ]
−1vec(RQR′). (2.40)
If the transition equation is non-stationary, the initial conditions must be
estimated from the model. There are usually two approaches to deal with this
problem. The first approach assumes that the initial state is fixed with P0 = 0
(or a zero matrix) and the initial state is treated as unknown parameters that
will be estimated from the model. The second approach assumes that the
initial state is random and has a diffuse distribution, that is, its covariance
matrix is P0 = κI, with κ being a large number.
Time-Varying Coefficient Estimation Consider a linear model
yt = x
′
tβt + ǫt, t = 1, ..., T,
where xt is a k× 1 vector of exogenous variables and βt is the corresponding
k × 1 vector of unknown parameters which evolve over time according to
certain stochastic processes. Defining βt as the state vector, one can use the
State-Space model and Kalman filter to estimate the time-varying param-
eters. There are basically three classes of models that can be used for the
time-varying coefficient estimation:
The Random-Coefficient Model In this model the coefficients vary ran-
domly about a fixed, but unknown mean, β¯. The State-Space form is
yt = x
′
tβt
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βt = β¯ + ǫt, ǫt ∼ NID(0, Q),
for all t. The time-varying coefficients in this model are stationary and do
not show structural changes.
The Random-Walk Model In the random-walk model the coefficients
are non-stationary and follow a random-walk path. The State-Space form
reads:
yt = x
′
tβt + ǫt, t = 1, ..., T
where ǫt ∼ NID(0, H) and the vector βt is generated by the process
βt = βt−1 + ηt,
where ηt ∼ NID(0, Q).
The Return-to-Normality Model In this model the coefficients are gen-
erated by a stationary multivariate AR(1) process. The State-Space form
reads
yt = x
′
tβt + ǫt, t = 1, ..., T, (2.41)
βt − β¯ = φ(βt−1 − β¯) + ηt, (2.42)
where ǫt ∼ NID(0, H), and ηt ∼ NID(0, Q). The coefficients are stationary
and evolve around a mean, β¯. It is clear that the random-coefficient and
random-walk models are just two special cases of the return-to-normality
model.
In order to apply the Kalman filter one has to rearrange the return-to-
normality model in a standard State-Space form. Let β∗t = βt − β¯, one has
yt = (x
′
t x
′
t)αt + ǫt, t = 1, ..., T (2.43)
and
αt =
[
β¯t
β∗t
]
=
[
I 0
0 φ
][
β¯t−1
β∗t−1
]
+
[
0
ηt
]
. (2.44)
A diffuse prior is used for β¯t, implying that the starting values are constructed
from the first k observations. The starting value of β∗t is given by a zero vector
with the starting covariance matrix given by Eq. (2.40).
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Appendix B: Derivation of the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve by Woodford (1996)
Here I make a brief sketch of Woodford’s (1996) derivation of the New Key-
nesian Phillips (and IS) curve. The details of the derivation can be found in
Woodford (1996, p.3-14).
The economy consists of a continuum of identical infinite-lived house-
holds indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], and z ∈ [0, 1] denotes a continuum of differenti-
ated goods produced by the households. The objective of each household is
assumed to maximize the following function
E
{
∞∑
t=0
βt〈u(Cjt +Gt) + v(M
J
t /Pt)− ω[yt(j)]〉
}
, (2.45)
where u and v are increasing concave functions and ω is an increasing convex
function. β denotes the discount factor between 0 and 1. yt(j) denotes the
product supplied by household j. The term v “indicates the existence of
liquidity services from wealth held in the form of money” (Woodford, 1996,
p.5). Cjt is the consumption of household j
Cjt ≡
(∫ 1
0
cjt(z)
θ−1
θ dz
) θ
θ−1
, (2.46)
where cjt(z) denotes household j’s consumption of good z at time t, and θ > 1
is the constant elasticity of substitution among alternative goods. Gt denotes
the public goods. M jt denotes the household’s money balances at the end of
period t, and Pt is the price index of goods
Pt ≡
(∫ 1
0
pt(z)
1−θdz
) 1
1−θ
, (2.47)
with pt(z) being the price of good z at time t. The budget constraint of each
household reads∫ 1
0
pt(z)c
j
t(z)dz +M
j
t + Et(Rt,t+1B
j
t+1) ≤ W
j
t + pt(j)yt(j)− Tt, (2.48)
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where Bjt+1 denotes the bond portfolio at date t and Rt,T is the stochastic
discount factor. W jt denotes the nominal value of the household’s financial
wealth at the beginning of period t, that is,
W jt =M
j
t−1 +B
j
t , (2.49)
and Tt is the net nominal lump-sum tax. Woodford (1996, p.6) further claims
that the budget constraint (2.48) is equivalent to the following expression
∞∑
T=t
Et
{
Rt,T [
∫ 1
0
pT (z)c
j
T (z)dz +
iT
1 + iT
M jT
}
≤
∞∑
T=t
Et{Rt,T [pT (j)yT (j)dz − TT ]}+W
j
t , (2.50)
with it denoting the nominal interest rate on a riskless bond, therefore
1 + it ≡
1
Et(Rt,t+1)
. (2.51)
The consumption of good z in line with expenditure minimization and the
demand of good j in line with cost minimization turn out to be
cjt(z) = C
j
t
(
pt(z)
Pt
)−θ
(2.52)
and
yt(j) = Yt
(
pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
, (2.53)
with Yt = Ct + Gt and Ct =
∫ 1
0
Cht dh. Woodford (1996, p.7) further gives
three necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimal consumption and
portfolio plan of a household, that is,
βT−t
u′(YT )
u′(Yt)
Pt
PT
=Rt,T (2.54)
v′(Mt/Pt)
u′(Yt)
=
it
1 + it
(2.55)
and that (2.50) holds with equality at date 0. From (2.54) one knows
βEt
u′(Yt+1)
u′(Yt)
Pt
Pt+1
=
1
1 + it
. (2.56)
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Next, Woodford (1996, p.8-9) shows how to set the price. Following the
Calvo (1983) price-setting model, namely, each period a fraction 1 − α of
goods suppliers set a new price and the remaining α keep the old price,
Woodford (1996, p.8) shows that the price p must be set to maximize
∞∑
k=0
αk{ΛtEt[Rt,t+kpyt+k(p)]− β
kEt[ω(yt+k(p))]},
with yT (p) being the demand at date T given by (2.53). Λt denotes the
marginal utility of holding money. The optimal price Pt satisfies the first-
order condition
∞∑
k=0
αkEt{Rt,t+kYt+k(Pt/Pt+k)
−θ[Pt − µSt+k,t]} = 0, (2.57)
where µ ≡ θ
θ−1
and ST,t denotes the marginal cost of production at date T :
ST,t =
ω′[YT (Pt/PT )
−θ]
u′(YT )
PT . (2.58)
Employing Eq. (2.47), one finds that
Pt = [αP
1−θ
t−1 + (1− α)P
1−θ
t ]
1
1−θ . (2.59)
On the basis of the analysis above, Woodford (1996) then explores how fiscal
policy may affect macroeconomic instability. I will not sketch his analysis
of this problem here, since this is not of much interest in my dissertation.
Defining xt as the percentage deviation of Yt from its stationary value Y
∗
(namely, xt =
Yt−Y ∗
Y ∗
) and πˆt as the percentage deviation of πt from its sta-
tionary value,9 and linearizing (2.56) at the stationary values of Yt, πt and
it, one then obtains the following IS curve
10
xt = Etxt+1 − σ(ˆit − Etπˆt+1), (2.60)
with iˆt being the percentage deviation of the nominal interest rate from its
stationary value, and
σ ≡ −
u′(Y ∗)
u′′(Y ∗)Y ∗
.
9pit is defined as
Pt
Pt−1
, since the stationary value of pit is 1, pˆit is then equal to
Pt−Pt−1
Pt−1
.
10The stationary value of it is found to be β
−1 − 1.
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After linearizing Eq. (2.57)-(2.59) around the stationary values of the vari-
ables and rearranging the terms, one obtains
Pˆt =
κα
1− α
∞∑
k=0
(αβ)kEtxt+k +
∞∑
k=1
(αβ)kEtπˆt+k, (2.61)
πˆt =
1− α
α
Pˆt, (2.62)
with
κ ≡
(1− α)(1− αβ)
α
̟ + σ
σ(̟ + θ)
and ̟ ≡
ω′(Y ∗)
ω′′(Y ∗)Y ∗
,
where Pˆt is the percentage deviation of Pt/Pt from its stationary value, which
is 1. After rearranging Eq. (2.61) as
Pˆt = αβEtPˆt+1 +
κα
1− α
xt + αβEtπˆt+1 (2.63)
and substituting (2.62) into (2.63), one finally obtains the following Phillips
curve:
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κxt. (2.64)
Chapter 3
Monetary Policy and
Interest-Rate Rules
3.1 Introduction
The topic of monetary policy rules has a long history in macroeconomics.
The last century has, however, seen much discussion of this topic and many
changes in monetary policy rules. There are, in fact, two important monetary
policy rules that have been recently discussed. The first rule takes money
supply as the policy instrument and proposes that the growth rate of the
money supply should be the sum of the target inflation and the desired
growth rate of output. The second rule, however, proposes that the short-
term interest rate should be taken as the policy instrument and the interest
rate can be determined as a function of the output gap and the deviation
of the inflation rate from its target. While the first rule was mainly applied
in the 1980s, the second rule began to be adopted at the beginning of the
1990s. In this chapter I will briefly discuss these two monetary policy rules
with more emphasis on the second one, since it has been proposed to have
some advantages over the first one and has been adopted by numerous central
banks recently.
Moreover, some researchers, Svensson (2003b), for example, distinguish
monetary policy rules as “instrument rules” and “targeting rules”. As men-
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tioned by Svensson (1999a), most of the literature focuses on instrument
rules, by which the policy instrument is prescribed as a function of a small
subset of the information available to the central bank. The Taylor rule
(Taylor 1993) is a typical instrument rule with the subset of information be-
ing the output gap, actual inflation and its target. In the research below
I will not explore whether a monetary policy rule is an instrument rule or
targeting rule, since this requires much discussion which is out of the scope
of this dissertation.
3.2 The Money-Supply Rule
The money-supply rule originated in the monetarist view of the working of
a monetary economy (Semmler, 2003, p.11). According to this rule money
supply should be taken as the policy instrument and the rate of the nominal
money growth should be equal to the target inflation rate plus the desired
growth rate of output. To be precise,
mˆ = pˆ+ yˆ,
where mˆ denotes the nominal money growth rate, pˆ is the target inflation
rate and yˆ is the desired growth rate of output. As mentioned by Semmler
(2003, p.11), this view prevailed during a short period in the 1980s in the US
and until recently at the German Bundesbank. The derivation of this rule is
shown below.
According to Fisher’s quantity theory of money, the equation of exchange
can be written as
MV = PY, (3.1)
where M denotes the total quantity of money (money supply), V is the
velocity of money, P is the price level and Y denotes the aggregate output.
As mentioned by Mishkin (2003, p.539), it has been claimed that the velocity
of money is relatively constant in the short run and changes in the price level
are mainly caused by changes in the quantity of money.
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Let △Mt+1 = Mt+1 −Mt, the growth rate of M is then
△Mt+1
Mt
. In order
to derive the money-supply rule I first show that
△Mt+1
Mt
≃ lnMt+1 − lnMt.
It is obvious
lnMt+1 − lnMt = ln
Mt+1
Mt
= ln[
△Mt+1
Mt
+ 1]. (3.2)
Define x = △Mt+1
Mt
+ 1, the Taylor expansion tells us that
f(x) ≃ f(a) + f ′(a)(x− a),
where a is a constant and f ′(a) denotes df(x)
dx
evaluated at a. Taking f(x) =
lnx and letting a = 1, one obtains
ln[
△Mt+1
Mt
+ 1] = lnx = ln1 +
△Mt+1
Mt
=
△Mt+1
Mt
. (3.3)
Equation (3.2) and (3.3) together tell us that △Mt+1
Mt
≃ lnMt+1 − lnMt.
Taking log of both sides of (3.1), one obtains
lnMt + lnVt = lnPt + lnYt
and
lnMt+1 + lnVt+1 = lnPt+1 + lnYt+1,
If Vt is assumed to be constant, one has
△Mt+1
Mt
=
△Pt+1
Pt
+
△Yt+1
Yt
,
namely,
mˆ = pˆ+ yˆ. (3.4)
This monetary policy rule has been widely applied since the 1980s, but
has been given up by numerous central banks in the past decade. The deriva-
tion of the rule above assumes that the velocity of money is constant. This
has, however, been a strong assumption. Mishkin (2003, Ch. 21) shows that
the velocity of both M1 and M2
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constant in the US from 1915 to 2002. Moreover, Mendiza´bal (2004) ex-
plores the behavior of money velocity in low and high inflation countries by
endogenizing the money velocity which can be influenced by fluctuations in
the interest rate. There it is found that there exists a significant correlation
between the velocity and inflation rate if transaction costs are considered.
Another assumption of this rule is that there exists a close relation be-
tween inflation and nominal money growth. But this relation has not been
found to be close in practice because money demand may experience large
volatility. Recently, numerous papers have been contributed to this prob-
lem and the conclusions differ across countries. Wolfers et al. (1998), for
example, test the stability of the money demand in Germany from 1976 to
1994 and find that money demand has been stable except for a structural
break around 1990 when the German monetary union was formed. Lu¨tkepohl
and Wolters (1998) further explore the stability of the German M3 by way
of a system estimation rather than a single-equation estimation and find
that there does not exist a strong relation between money and inflation and
therefore the money growth appears not to be a good instrument to control
inflation. By using different estimation techniques and testing procedures
for long-run stability, Scharnagl (1998) also claims to have found stability
in the German money demand. Tullio et al. (1996), however, claim that
there is empirical evidence that the money demand in Germany has been
unstable after the German monetary union was formed. Moreover, Choi and
Jung (2003) test for the stability of money demand in the US from 1959 to
2000 and claim that a stable long-run money demand does not exist for the
whole period, but a stable long-run money demand is claimed to exist for the
subperiods 1959-1974, 1974-1986 and 1986-2000. Vega (1998) explores the
stability of money demand in Spain and claims that the long-run properties
of the money demand have been altered.
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3.3 The Interest-Rate Rules
The Taylor Rule
Because of the drawbacks of the money-supply rule mentioned above, another
type of monetary policy rule, which takes the short-term interest rate as the
policy instrument, has been proposed. The most popular interest-rate rule
is the so-called Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), named after John B. Taylor. The
Taylor rule can be written as
rt = r¯ + πt + β1(πt − π
∗) + β2yt, β1, β2 > 0, (3.5)
where rt denotes the nominal interest rate, r¯ is the equilibrium real rate
of interest, πt is the inflation rate, π
∗ is the target inflation and yt denotes
the deviation of the actual output from its potential level. β1 and β2 are
reaction coefficients that determine how strongly the monetary authority
stresses inflation stabilization and output stabilization.1
Taking π∗ as 2 percent and using a linear trend of the real GDP to
measure the potential output, Taylor (1993) finds that with β1 = 0.5, r¯ = 2
and β2 = 0.5 this rule can accurately simulate the short-term nominal interest
rate of the US from 1984-1992. Taylor (1999), however, keeps β1 at 0.5 but
raises β2 to 1.0.
Taylor (1999) describes briefly how the Taylor rule can be derived from
the quantity equation of money (3.1). In deriving the money-supply rule the
velocity of money (V ) is assumed to be constant and the money supply (M)
is assumed to be a variable. In deriving the Taylor rule, however, Taylor
1Note that rt in Eq. (3.5) denotes the nominal rate and r¯ the equilibrium real rate.
One can also express Eq. (3.5) as
rt = r
∗ + (1 + β1)(pit − pi
∗) + β2yt,
where rt still denotes the nominal rate, but r
∗ denotes the equilibrium nominal rate rather
than the equilibrium real rate. Note that the Taylor rule is an “active” monetary policy
rule, because its response to the inflation deviation is 1+β1 (> 1). Leeper (1991) describes
a monetary policy as “active” if its response coefficient to the inflation is larger than one,
otherwise it is “passive”.
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assumes the money supply to be fixed or growing at a constant rate. The
velocity of money, on the contrary, is assumed to depend on the interest rate
r and real output or income (Y ). From the following paragraph one can get
a general idea of how Taylor derives the policy rule:
... First imagine that the money supply is either fixed or growing
at a constant rate. We know that velocity depends on the interest
rate (r) and on real output or income (Y ). Substituting for V
in the quantity equation one thus gets a relationship between the
interest rate, the price level (P ) and real output. If we isolate
the interest rate on the left-hand side of this relationship, we see
a function of two variables: the interest rate as a function of the
price level and real output. Shifts in this function would occur
when either velocity growth or money growth shifts. Note also
that such a function relating the interest rate to the price level
and real output will still emerge if the money stock is not growing
at a fixed rate, but rather responds in a systematic way to the
interest rate or to real output; the response of money will simply
change the parameters of the relationship.
The functional form of the relationship depends on many factors
including the functional form of the relationship between velocity
and the interest rate and the adjustment time between changes
in the interest rate and changes in velocity. The functional form I
use is linear in the interest rate and in the logarithms of the price
level and real output. I make the latter two variables station-
ary by considering the derivation of real output from a possibly
stochastic trend and considering the first difference of the log of
the price level—or the inflation rate. I also abstract from lags
in the response of velocity to interest rate or income. These as-
sumptions result in the following linear equation:
r = π + gy + h(π − π∗) + rf , (3.6)
where the variables are r =the short-term interest rate, π =the
inflation rate (percentage change in P ), and y=the percentage
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deviation of real output (Y ) from trend and the constants are g,
h, π∗, and rf ... (Taylor, 1999, p.322-323).
The π∗ is interpreted as the inflation target and rf is the central bank’s
estimate of the equilibrium real rate of interest.
Svensson (2003b, p.19-20) specifies the idea of a commitment to a simple
instrument rule such as the Taylor rule as three steps. The first step is to
consider a class of reaction functions in which the policy instrument is set as
a function of a subset of variables, I¯t, of the central bank’s information, It,
it = f(I¯t),
where it is the instrument (rt in the Taylor rule). Usually the instrument is
set as a linear function of target variables (inflation and output gap in the
Taylor rule) and the lagged instrument.2 The second step is to determine the
numerical values of its parameters (g, h, π∗, and rf in the Taylor rule, for
example). The third step is to commit to the particular simple instrument
rule chosen until a new rule is determined.
Comments on the Taylor Rule
Svensson (2003b, p.21) points out that the advantages of a commitment to
an interest-rate rule such as the Taylor rule are (1) the simplicity of the
instrument rule makes commitment technically feasible, and (2) simple in-
strument rules may be relatively robust. As regards robustness, he quotes
Levin, Wieland and Williams (1999) as an example, who find that a Taylor-
type rule with interest-smoothing is robust for different models of the US
economy.
2Some Taylor-type rules with interest-smoothing have been proposed in the literature,
with the example from Sack and Wieland (2000) being:
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ)[r¯ + pit + β1(pit − pi
∗) + β2yt],
where 0 < ρ < 1 is the smoothing parameter. Sack and Wieland (2000, p.209-210)
argue that interest-rate smoothing is desirable for at least three reasons: (a) forward-
looking behavior, (b) measurement error in macroeconomic variables, and (c) parameter
uncertainty.
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Svensson (2003b, p.22-25) also points out that such a simple instrument
rule may have some problems, three of which are: (a) other state variables
than inflation and output gap might also be important. Asset prices, for
instance, might play an important role in an economy. (b) New information
about the economy is not allowed for. (c) Such a rule does not seem to
describe the current monetary policy accurately.
The recent literature on monetary policy rules, moreover, has proposed
two further disadvantages of the Taylor rule.
The first disadvantage is that it has been mostly concerned with a closed
economy. Ball (1999), therefore, extends the Svensson (1997)-Ball (1997)
closed economy model to an open economy and explores how the optimal
policies may change. Ball (1999) finds that the optimal monetary policy rule
in an open economy is changed in two ways. First, the policy variable is
a combination of the short-term interest rate and the exchange rate, rather
than the interest rate alone. This finding supports using the “monetary con-
ditions index” (MCI) as the policy instrument as in the cases of Canada, New
Zealand and Sweden.3 Second, inflation in the Taylor rule is replaced by a
combination of inflation and the lagged exchange rate. Therefore, different
rules are required for closed and open economies because in open economies
monetary policy can influence the economy through the exchange rate chan-
nel.
The second disadvantage of the Taylor rule, as explored by Benhabib et
al. (2001), is that it may not prevent the economy from falling into a “defla-
tionary spiral”. Benhabib et al. (2001, abstract) argue that active interest-
rate rules can lead to “unexpected consequences” in the presence of the zero
bound on the nominal rate. That is, there might exist infinite trajectories
converging to a Liquidity Trap even if there is an unique equilibrium.
3Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report (April 1999, p.54) describes the MCI as “...
the MCI is, at a given time t, the weighted sum of the (relative) change in the effective real
exchange rate and the (absolute) change in the short-term real rate of interest compared
with a base period...” Some research on the MCI can also be found in Gerlach and Smets
(2000).
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Deriving the Interest-Rate Rule from a Dynamic Macroe-
conomic Model
As mentioned before, Taylor derives the simple Taylor rule from the Fisher
equation with the velocity of money defined as a function of the interest rate.
In fact, an interest-rate rule that is akin to the Taylor rule can be derived
from a simple dynamic macroeconomic model. Before deriving such a mone-
tary policy rule, I will discuss briefly the goal of monetary policy. There are
usually two types of objective functions in monetary policy models. Some
researchers claim that monetary policy should be pursued to maximize util-
ity functions of the households and firms. This type of objective function is
usually employed by the New Classical economists. The other researchers,
however, claim that the goal of monetary policy is to minimize a loss func-
tion of the monetary authority. This type of objective function is usually
employed by the Keynesian economists. But even if it is agreed that mon-
etary policy should be pursued to minimize a loss function of the central
bank, there is still disagreement on what kind of loss functions should be
minimized. This problem has been explored by Woodford (2003a) in detail.
There he finds that the maximization of a utility function of the households
can be shown to be consistent with the minimization of loss functions of the
central bank. Next, I will make a brief sketch of his analysis, the details can
be found in Woodford (2003a, Ch. 6).
The Goal of Monetary Policy In the basic analysis Woodford (2003a)
assumes that there are no monetary frictions. The level of the representative
household’s expected utility can be written as
E
{
∞∑
t=0
βtUt
}
, (3.7)
where β denotes the discount factor between 0 and 1, and Ut is the utility
function in period t, which is assumed to have the specific form
Ut = u(Ct; ξt)−
∫ 1
0
v(ht(i); ξt)di, (3.8)
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where Ct denotes the Dixit-Stiglitz consumption,
Ct ≡
[∫ 1
0
ct(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
,
where ct(i) denotes the consumption of differentiated goods i in period t.
θ(> 1) is the constant elasticity of substitution between goods. ξt is a vector
of preferences shocks and ht(i) is the supply of labor used in sector i. Letting
Gt denote the government purchase and yt(i) the production in period t of
differentiated goods i, and using Ct + Gt = Yt and yt(i) = Atf(ht(i)), one
can rewrite the utility function above as
Ut = u˜(Yt; ξ˜t)−
∫ 1
0
v˜(yt(i); ξ˜t)di, (3.9)
where At (> 0) is a time-varying exogenous technology factor and
u˜(Y ; ξ˜) ≡ u(Y −G; ξ) (3.10)
v˜(y; ξ˜) ≡ v(f−1(y/A); ξ), (3.11)
with ξ˜t denoting the complete vector of exogenous disturbances (ξt, Gt and
At) and
Yt ≡
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
. (3.12)
Assuming small enough fluctuations in the production, small disturbances
and small value of distortion in the steady-state output level and applying
the Taylor-series expansion, Woodford (2003a) finds that Ut can be approx-
imately written as
Ut = −
Y¯ uc
2
{(σ−1 + ω)(xt− x
∗)2 + θ(1 + ωθ)vari log pt(i)}+ t.i.p.+ o(‖ • ‖
3),
(3.13)
where xt denotes the output gap,
4 pt(i) is the price level of goods i and x
∗
denotes the efficient level of output gap. t.i.p. denotes the terms independent
4Note that the output gap defined by Woodford (2001, 2003a) is the gap between
actual output and the natural rate of output, not the same as in Taylor (1993). In Taylor
(1993) the output gap is measured by the real GDP relative to a deterministic trend.
Woodford (2001, p.234) defines “the natural rate of output as the equilibrium level of
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of policy. o(·) denotes higher-order terms.5 Woodford (2003a, p.396) further
claims that the approximation above “applies to any model with no frictions
other than those due to monopolistic competition and sticky prices.”
Considering alternative types of price-setting, Woodford (2003a) finds
that the approximation of the utility function above can be written as a
quadratic function of the inflation rate and output gap. Examples consid-
ered are:6
(1) Case 1: A fraction of goods prices are fully flexible, while the remaining
fraction must be fixed a period in advance. In this case Ut can be approxi-
mated as
Ut = −ΩLt + t.i.p.+ o(‖ • ‖
3),
where Ω is a positive constant and Lt is a quadratic loss function of the form
Lt = (πt − Et−1πt)
2 + λ(xt − x
∗)2, (3.14)
with πt denoting the inflation and E being the expectations operator. λ is
the weight of output-gap stabilization.
(2) Case 2: Discrete-time version of the Calvo (1983) pricing model. It turns
output that would obtain in the event of perfectly flexible prices”. Moreover, he claims
that “in general, this will not grow with a smooth trend, as a result of real disturbances
of many kinds.” Three other concepts concerning output are the steady-state level of
output, the efficient level of output and the equilibrium level of output. Let s(y, Y ; ξ˜)
denote the real marginal cost function, Woodford (2003a, p.393-394) defines the first two
concepts as follows. The steady-state level of output associated with zero inflation in the
absence of real disturbances (i.e. when ξ˜ = 0 at all times) is the quantity Y¯ that satisfies
s(Y¯ , Y¯ ; 0) = (1 − τ)/µ with τ being the constant proportional tax rate on sales proceeds
and µ the desired markup as a result of suppliers’ market power. The efficient level of
output is the quantity Y ∗ that satisfies s(Y ∗, Y ∗; 0) = 1. Woodford (2003a, p.151) defines
the equilibrium level of output Y nt as the quantity that satisfies s(Y
n
t , Y
n
t ; ξ˜t) = µ
−1. The
efficient level of output gap x∗ is the difference between the efficient level of output and
the natural rate of output (see also Woodford (2001)). As for the details of the economic
models, the reader is referred to Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 of Woodford (2003a).
5This is equation (2.13) in Woodford (2003a, p.396). The reader is referred to Woodford
(2003a, Ch.6) for the details of the other parameters and variables in Eq. (3.13).
6The reader is referred to Woodford (2003a, Ch. 6) for the details of the derivation of
these results.
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out that
∞∑
t=0
βtUt = −Ω
∞∑
t=0
βtLt + t.i.p.+ o(‖ • ‖
3), (3.15)
where Lt is given by
Lt = π
2
t + λ(xt − x
∗)2. (3.16)
(3) Case 3: Inflation Inertia. Eq. (3.15) now holds with Lt given by
Lt = (πt − γπt−1)
2 + λ(xt − x
∗)2.
In the basic analysis Woodford (2003a) also considers the case of habit per-
sistence in the preferences of the representative household and finds that Eq.
(3.13) can be modified to include a term of xt−1.
7 He further shows that the
modified equation can also be written in the form of quadratic functions of
the inflation rate, output gap and its lag.
While the models above are discussed in a cashless economy, in the exten-
sions of the basic analysis Woodford (2003a) considers the effect of transac-
tion frictions. Therefore, in the extended models interest rates will be taken
into account. The approximation of the representative household’s utility
function is, as a result, correspondingly modified. Under certain assump-
tions, for example, the approximation in Eq. (3.15) is changed with Lt now
given as follows
Lt = π
2
t + λx(xt − x
∗)2 + λi(ˆit − i
∗)2,
where iˆt denotes the nominal rate and i
∗ is an optimal nominal interest
rate. Woodford (2003a) extends the basic analysis by considering not only
transaction frictions, but also the zero-interest-rate bound, asymmetric dis-
turbances, sticky wages and prices and time-varying tax wedges or markups.
In all cases he finds that the utility function of the representative household
can be approximated with the Taylor-series expansion and, as a result, be
written in alternative forms of a quadratic loss function of the inflation rate,
output gap and interest rate. I will not present all of his analysis here, since
7The reader is referred to Woodford (2003a, Chapter 5, p.332-335) for the discussion
of habit persistence.
55
this requires much discussion and the reader can refer to Chapter 6 of his
book for details.
Recently, some researchers, Nobay and Peel (2003), for example, argue
that the loss function of the central bank may be asymmetric rather than
symmetric. Therefore, the quadratic loss functions proposed above may not
appropriately express the central bank’s preferences. Therefore, some re-
search has been done in the framework of an asymmetric loss function. A
typical asymmetric loss function is the so-called LINEX function.8 To be pre-
cise, it is argued that the central bank may suffer less loss when the inflation
is under its target than when it is above its target and the opposite is true of
the output gap. Dolado et al. (2001) show that most central banks show a
stronger reaction to the positive inflation deviation than to the negative one,
but no asymmetric behavior with respect to the output gap is found except
for the Federal Reserve.
Tambakis (1998), however, explores monetary policy with a convex Phillips
curve and an asymmetric loss function and finds that “for parameters esti-
mates relevant to the United States, the symmetric loss function dominates
the asymmetric alternative” (Tambakis, 1998, abstract). Schellekens and
Chadha (1998) also explore monetary policy with an asymmetric loss func-
tion and argue that asymmetries affect the optimal rule under both additive
and multiplicative uncertainty, but the policy rule is shown to be similar or
equivalent to that obtained in the case of a quadratic loss function. Moreover,
they further claim that the assumption of quadratic loss functions may not
be so drastic in monetary policy-making. Svensson (2002, p.5 and footnote
6) also claims that a symmetric loss function for monetary policy is very
intuitive, because too low inflation can be as great a problem as too high
inflation, since the former may lead to the problem of the Liquidity Trap
and deflationary spirals, as has happened in Japan. He further argues that
“asymmetric loss functions are frequently motivated from a descriptive rather
than perspective point of view,” and that a competent monetary policy com-
mittee should make decisions from a perspective point of view (Svensson,
8The graph of this function is shown in Figure 6.3.
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2002, p.5 and footnote 6).
Because of the literature mentioned above, in the research below I will as-
sume that the central bank pursues monetary policy to minimize a quadratic
loss function.
Derivation of an Interest-Rate Rule Next, I show how to derive an
interest-rate rule from a dynamic macroeconomic model. The simple model
reads
Min
{rt}∞0
∞∑
t=0
ρtLt (3.17)
with9
Lt = (πt − π
∗)2 + λy2t , λ > 0,
subject to
πt+1 = α1πt + α2yt, αi > 0 (3.18)
yt+1 = β1yt − β2(rt − πt), βi > 0, (3.19)
where πt denotes the deviation of the inflation rate from its target π
∗ (as-
sumed to be zero in the model), yt is the output gap, rt denotes the gap
between the short-term nominal rate Rt and the long-run level of the short-
term rate R¯, namely rt = Rt − R¯. ρ is the discount factor bounded between
0 and 1. (3.18) is the Phillips curve and (3.19) is the IS curve.10
Following Svensson (1997, 1999b), I will derive the optimal monetary
policy rule from the above model.11 Let’s ignore the state equation of yt at
the moment. The problem now turns out to be
V (πt) =Min
yt
[(π2t + λy
2
t ) + ρV (πt+1)] (3.20)
9If λ = 0, the model is referred to as “strict inflation targeting”, here I assume λ > 0,
therefore, it is “flexible inflation targeting”.
10In order for consistent expectations to exist, α1 is usually assumed to be 1. The loss
function here is similar to that in the second case of Woodford (2003a) shown above with
x∗ equaling zero. The discussion about x∗ = 0 can be found in Woodford (2003a, p.407).
11The reader can also refer to Svensson (1997) and the appendix of Svensson (1999b)
for the derivation below.
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subject to
πt+1 = α1πt + α2yt (3.21)
Equation (3.20) is the so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
and V (πt) is the value function, with yt being the control variable now. For
a linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem above, it is clear that the value
function must be quadratic. Therefore, I assume that the value function
takes the form
V (πt) = Ω0 + Ω1π
2
t , (3.22)
where Ω0 and Ω1 remain to be determined. The first-order condition turns
out to be
λyt + ρα2Ω1πt+1 = 0,
from which one has
πt+1 = −
λ
ρα2Ω1
yt. (3.23)
Substituting (3.23) into (3.19) gives
yt = −
ρα1α2Ω1
λ+ ρα22Ω1
πt, (3.24)
and after substituting this equation back into (3.23), one has
πt+1 =
α1λ
λ+ ρα22Ω1
πt. (3.25)
By applying (3.20), (3.22) and (3.24), the envelop theorem gives us the fol-
lowing equation
Vπ(πt) = 2
(
1 +
α21ρλΩ1
λ+ ρα22Ω1
)
πt,
and from (3.22), one has
Vπ(πt) = 2Ω1πt,
these two equations tell us that
Ω1 = 1 +
α21ρλΩ1
λ+ ρα22Ω1
.
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The right-hand side of this equation has the limit 1 +
α2
1
λ
α2
2
as Ω1 → ∞. The
root of Ω1 larger than one can therefore be solved from the equation
Ω21 −
[
1−
(1− ρα21)λ
ρα22
]
Ω1 −
λ
ρα22
= 0,
which gives the solution of Ω1:
Ω1 =
1
2

1− λ(1− ρα21)
ρα22
+
√(
1−
λ(1− ρα21)
ρα22
)2
+
4λ
ρα22

 . (3.26)
By substituting t+ 1 for t into (3.24), one has
yt+1 = −
ρα1α2Ω1
λ+ ρα22Ω1
πt+1. (3.27)
Substituting (3.18) and (3.19) into (3.27) with some computation, one obtains
the optimal decision rule for the short-term interest rate:
Rt = R¯ + f1πt + f2yt, (3.28)
with
f1 = 1 +
ρα21α2Ω1
(λ+ ρα22Ω1)β2
, (3.29)
f2 =
β1
β2
+
ρα22α1Ω1
(λ+ ρα22Ω1)β2
; (3.30)
Equation (3.28) shows that the optimal short-term interest rate should
be a linear function of the inflation rate and output gap. This is similar
to the Taylor rule presented before in the sense that the short-term interest
rate is a linear function of the output gap and inflation deviation. Note that
f1 > 1, indicating the optimal monetary policy should be “active”. That is,
there is a more than one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate with
the increase in inflation.
Simulation of the Model Next, I undertake some simulations with the
US quarterly data from 1961.1-99.4. The seemingly uncorrelated regression
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(SUR) estimation of the IS and Phillips curves reads12
πt+1 = 0.0007
(0.800)
+ 0.984
(59.406
πt + 0.066
(3.948)
yt, R
2 = 0.958, (3.31)
yt+1 = −0.0006
(0.529)
+ 0.960
(20.203)
yt − 0.157
(2.662)
{(Rt − πt)− R¯}, R
2 = 0.788. (3.32)
With the parameters estimated above and λ=0.1, ρ=0.985, one obtains
Ω1=4.93 and the following optimal policy reaction function
Rt = R¯ + 17.50πt + 7.22yt. (3.33)
Let both π0 and y0 be 0.03, the simulations with λ = 0.1 are presented in
Figure 3.1. Next, I undertake the simulation with a larger λ. Let λ=10, one
obtains Ω1=22.76 and the following optimal interest rate reaction function
Rt = R¯ + 1.92πt + 6.18yt, (3.34)
with the simulations presented in Figure 3.2. The response coefficients of the
inflation deviation and output gap are relatively large, because the estimate
of β1 is relatively larger than that of β2.
Figure 3.1A and 3.2A represent the path of the optimal interest rate,
Figure 3.1B-C and 3.2B-C are the optimal trajectories of πt and yt, and Figure
3.1D and 3.2D are the phase diagrams of the inflation deviation and output
gap with starting values (0.03, 0.03). Both Figure 3.1 and 3.2 show that the
optimal trajectories of the inflation deviation and output gap converge to
zero over time. As the inflation deviation and output gap converge to zero,
the optimal feedback rule converges to the long run equilibrium interest rate
R¯. From (3.19) one knows that as πt+1, πt , yt+1 and yt converge to zero,
Rt → R¯.
Next, I explore how the relative weight of output stabilization, λ, influ-
ences the optimal monetary policy rule. Denoting f = f1
f2
, one has
f =
1
Θ
[(λ+ ρα22Ω1)β2 + ρα
2
1α2Ω1], (3.35)
12I assume R¯ to be zero for simplicity. The inflation rate is measured by changes in the
CPI, the output gap is measured by the percentage deviation of the log of the Introduction
Production Index (base year: 1995) from its HP filtered trend. Rt is the federal funds
rate. Data source: International Statistical Yearbook.
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Figure 3.1: Simulation with λ=0.1
Figure 3.2: Simulation with λ=10
61
with Θ = (λ+ ρα22Ω1)β1 + ρα
2
2α1Ω1, and
df
dλ
=
1
Θ2
[ρα1α2Ω1(α2β2 − α1β1)]. (3.36)
It is clear that df
dλ
< 0 (> 0) if α2β2−α1β1 < 0 (> 0). As long as the inflation
and output are greatly influenced by their lags, as is usually true in estima-
tions, one has α2β2 − α1β1 < 0. This implies that if λ increases, namely, if
more emphasis is put on the output stabilization than on the inflation, the
ratio of the reaction coefficient on the output gap and that on the inflation
in the optimal monetary policy rule is correspondingly relatively larger. In
the simulation above f = 0.41 if λ = 0.1, and f = 3.22 if λ = 10.
Svensson (2003b, p.39), however, points out that such an interest-rate rule
may have the following problems: (a) the objectives may not be sufficiently
well specified. It is not clear, for example, what the relative weight on the
output-gap stabilization should be. (b) Such discretionary optimization is
argued not to be fully optimal in a situation with forward-looking variables.
Another interesting topic concerning money-supply and interest-rate rules
is price-level (in)determinancy. This problem originated fromWicksell (1898)
as follows
At any moment and in every economic situation there is a certain
level of the average rate of interest which is such that the general
level of prices has no tendency to move either upwards or down-
wards. This we call the normal rate of interest. Its magnitude is
determined by the current level of the natural capital rate, and
rises and falls with it.
If, for any reason whatever, the average rate of interest is set and
maintained below this normal level, no matter how small the gap,
prices will rise and will go on rising; or if they were already in
process of falling, they will fall more slowly and eventually begin
to rise.
If, on the other hand, the rate of interest is maintained no matter
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how little above the current level of the natural rate, prices will
fall continuously and without limit (Wicksell, 1898, p.120).13
This problem has been discussed by numerous researchers, see Sargent and
Wallace (1975), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000), Benhabib et al. (2001) and
Woodford ( 2001, 2003a), for example. Sargent andWallace (1975) argue that
while money-supply rules lead to a determinate rational-expectations equi-
librium, none of the interest-rate rules do. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) also
show that money-growth rules can produce real determinacy and interest-
rate rules may not necessarily do so. As mentioned before, Benhabib et al.
(2001) argue that even active interest-rate rules can lead to indeterminancy.
Woodford (1994) specify sufficient conditions for price-level determinancy for
both money-supply and interest-rate rules in a cash-in-advance model.
Woodford (2003a) discusses the problem of price-level determinancy in
detail and claims that interest-rate rules can lead to price-level determinancy
when some conditions are satisfied. Woodford (2003a, Ch. 2) analyzes both
local and global price-level determinacy in a model, assuming that prices
are completely flexible and the supply of goods is given by an exogenous
endowment. There he finds that interest-rate rules can lead to price-level de-
terminancy locally if certain conditions are satisfied. Moreover, he finds that
interest-rate rules can lead to global price-level determinancy under certain
fiscal-policy regimes. Woodford (2003a, Ch. 4) discusses this problem fur-
ther in the so-called “neo-Wicksellian” model and specify conditions under
which price-level determinancy can be obtained.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the money-supply rule and the interest-
rate rule, with more attention given to the latter. The European Central
13Wicksell (1898, p.102) describes the natural rate of interest as “There is a certian rate
of interest on loans which is neutral in respect to commodity prices, and tends neither to
raise nor to lower them.” Woodford (2003a, p.248) defines it explicitly as the equilibrium
real rate of return in the case of fully flexible prices.
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Bank (ECB) originally followed the money-supply rule. It had been argued
that the German Bundesbank had achieved a solid reputation in keeping the
inflation rate down with monetary targeting (Semmler, 2003, p.12). Interest-
rate rules have, however, attracted more attention since the 1990s. The
stabilizing properties of these two monetary policy rules are studied in a
macroeconomic framework in Flaschel, Semmler and Gong (2001), where
it is found that, by and large, the interest-rate rule has better stabilizing
properties in both stable and unstable cases. In the medium run, with the
Taylor rule, employment, inflation, expected inflation and output experience
smaller fluctuations than with the money-supply rule. In line with most
recent research on monetary policy rules, this dissertation focuses on the
interest-rate rules in the following chapters.
Chapter 4
Time-Varying Monetary Policy
Rules
4.1 Introduction
As shown in the previous chapter, interest-rate rules propose that the short-
term interest rate can be determined as a function of the output gap and the
deviation of the inflation rate from its target. A monetary policy rule can be
referred to as “active” or “passive”, depending on whether the coefficient of
the inflation rate is larger or smaller than one. Up to now I have assumed the
coefficients in the interest-rate rule to be invariant. In practice, however, the
coefficients can be state-dependent and time-varying. It is obvious that the
reaction coefficients of the inflation rate and output gap in the instrument
rule derived from the dynamic macroeconomic model (3.17)-(3.19) depend
on the parameters in the IS and Phillips curves and the loss function of the
central bank. Therefore, the reaction coefficients in the optimal interest-rate
rule change with the changes of the parameters in the IS and Phillips curves
and the loss function of the central bank.
The empirical evidence of the time-varying Phillips curve in Chapter 2, as
a result, indicates that the coefficients in the policy reaction function may be
time-varying rather than invariant. Greiner and Semmler (2002), moreover,
claim that the weight of output stabilization (λ) in the central bank’s loss
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function can be state-dependent. The change of λ, as a result, can also induce
the change of the response coefficients in the optimal monetary policy rule.
As quoted in Chapter 3, Taylor (1999) states that shifts in the monetary
policy reaction function relating the interest rate and the price level and
real output would occur when either velocity growth or money growth shifts.
Therefore, he suggests different values of parameters in the Taylor rule for
different periods.
This chapter presents some empirical evidence on structural changes in
the coefficients in the monetary policy reaction function in the past decades in
several OECD countries. In Section 2 I will first present the OLS estimation
of an interest-rate rule and undertake the Chow break-point tests to study
structural changes in the coefficients. While the Chow break-point tests can
only explore structural changes at certain predetermined points, the Kalman
filter can explore all possible changes in the coefficients. Therefore, in the
third section I will estimate the interest-rate rule by employing the Kalman
filter. In Section 4 I will explore whether the monetary policy was too tight
in the Euro-area in the 1990s by undertaking some simulations, assuming
that the time-varying US monetary policy rule had been followed by the
Euro-area.
4.2 The OLS Regression and Chow Break-
Point Tests of the Interest-Rate Rule
Let us write the interest-rate rule as:
rt = βc + βππt + βyyt, (4.1)
where rt is the short-term interest rate, πt is the deviation of the inflation
rate from its target and yt denotes the output gap. Because the inflation tar-
gets are unavailable, I will take it as a constant and refer to the research of
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) (CGG98) who estimate the inflation target
for several countries. yt is the output gap which is measured by the percent-
age deviation of the Industrial Production Index (IPI, base year: 1995) from
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its HP-filtered trend. There are alternative methods to measure the output
gap, a discussion of this problem can be found in Orphanides and van Nor-
den (2002). I find that the potential output measured with the Band-Pass
filter is not essentially changed from that computed with the HP filter. The
countries to be examined include Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Japan and
the US.
Germany CGG98 explore monetary policy rules under the assumption
that, while making monetary policy the monetary authorities take into ac-
count the expected inflation rate rather than the lagged inflation rate or
the current inflation rate. A by-product of their model is the inflation tar-
get. Their estimate of the German target inflation rate from 1979-1993 is
1.97 percent. This seems consistent with the official German target inflation
rate, which is usually declared to be 2 percent. Therefore, in the estimation
below I assume the inflation target of Germany to be 2 percent.1 The short-
term interest rate (3 month FIBOR, denoted by r), inflation rate (denoted
by inf, measured by changes in the CPI) and output gap (denoted by gap)
of Germany are shown in Figure 4.1 (Data Source: International Statistical
Yearbook).
1The inflation target does not affect the regression much as long as it is assumed to be
a constant.
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Figure 4.1: Inflation Rate, Output Gap and Short-Term Interest Rate of
Germany
The estimation results of the policy reaction function for Germany from
1960-1998 are shown in Table 4.1. I will, for simplicity, not present the
estimate of βc.
Table 4.1: OLS Estimation of the Interest-Rate Rule of Germany
βπ βy
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1960.1-69.4 0.052 0.181 0.372 1.300 0.070
1970.1-79.4 1.170 6.028 1.937 5.140 0.660
1980.1-89.4 1.086 14.414 0.713 2.179 0.148
1990.1-98.2 1.201 5.905 1.766 3.723 0.579
1960.1-98.2 0.841 10.337 0.972 4.480 0.494
The estimates above indicate some changes in the coefficients for different
subperiods. The inflation rate seems to have played a more important role
in monetary policy-making in the 1970s and 1980s than the output, while in
68
the 1960s and 1990s the output may have had larger effects on the monetary
policy. This is consistent with the fact that the inflation rate was relatively
low in the 1960s and has been decreasing since the beginning of the 1990s. In
order to explore whether there are structural changes in the policy reaction
function, I will undertake the Chow break-point test for the regression. I
choose 1979 and 1990 as two break-points, when the EMS started and the re-
unification of Germany took place. The F-Statistics of the break-point tests
for 1979.4 and 1989.2 are 15.913 and 4.044 respectively, significant enough
to indicate structural changes around these two points (the critical value at
5 percent level of significance lies between 2.60 and 2.68).
Japan The estimate of CGG98 of the inflation target of Japan for the
period from 1979.4-94.12 is 2.03 percent. I will, therefore, assume it to be
2 percent in the estimation below, since the average inflation rate of the
period from 1960-1997 is not higher than that of the period from 1979-1994.
The short-term interest rate (call money rate), inflation rate (changes in the
CPI) and output gap of Japan are presented in Figure 4.2 (Data Source:
International Statistical Yearbook).
The estimation for Japan from 1960.1-1997.4 is shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: OLS Estimation of the Interest-Rate Rule of Japan
βπ βy
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1960.1-64.4 0.075 0.377 0.740 2.493 0.269
1965.1-69.4 0.334 1.206 0.738 4.576 0.560
1970.1-79.4 0.430 4.825 0.344 1.234 0.376
1980.1-89.4 0.598 4.676 2.171 4.976 0.472
1990.1-97.4 0.405 2.128 1.398 2.541 0.494
1960.1-1997.4 0.216 4.055 0.657 3.008 0.131
The changes in βπ are not very significant, but the changes in βy, however,
are relatively large. It was smaller than one before 1980, but higher than one
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Figure 4.2: Inflation Rate, Output Gap and Short-Term Interest Rate of
Japan
after 1980, especially in the 1980s. Next, I will undertake the Chow break-
point test for 1974.4 and 1980.4 around which there were great changes in
both the inflation rate and interest rate. The F-Statistics are 43.492 and
33.944 respectively, significant enough to indicate structural changes around
these two points (the critical value at 5 percent level of significance lies
between 2.60 and 2.68). I have also undertaken the Chow break-point test
for 1965.1 and the F-Statistic is 28.400, significant enough to indicate a
structural change at this point.
The US The estimate by CGG98 of the US inflation target is 4.04 percent
for the period from 1979-1994. As stated by the authors, a target of 4
percent seems to be too high for the US, given a sample average real rate of
3.48 percent. In the estimation below I therefore simply assume the target
inflation to be 2.5 percent, a little higher than that of Germany. The short-
term interest rate (the federal funds rate), inflation rate (changes in the
CPI) and output gap of the US are presented in Figure 4.3 (Data Source:
International Statistical Yearbook) and the estimation results of the policy
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reaction function for different periods are shown in Table 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Inflation Rate, Output Gap and Short-Term Interest Rate of the
US
Table 4.3: OLS Estimation of the Interest-Rate Rule of the US
βπ βy
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1960.1-69.4 1.047 14.913 0.443 2.965 0.903
1970.1-79.4 0.643 9.975 0.808 5.245 0.825
1980.1-84.4 0.489 3.152 0.723 1.053 0.493
1985.1-89.4 -0.027 0.097 2.230 2.439 0.481
1990.1-98.2 0.854 5.034 2.389 3.965 0.556
1960.1-98.2 0.772 13.117 0.527 2.333 0.562
One can observe some significant changes in the coefficients for the US.
In the middle of the 1980s the coefficient of the inflation rate changed even
from positive to negative. In the first half of the 1980s βπ was much larger
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than βy with a significant T-Statistic, but in the second half of the 1980s
βπ became negative with an insignificant T-Statistic of 0.097. This indicates
that the inflation rate may have played a more important role in monetary
policy-making in the first half than in the second half of the 1980s. This
should not be surprising, since the US experienced very high inflation rate in
the first half of the 1980s and the interest rate was raised to deal with this
problem after Volcker was appointed the chair of the Fed.
Next, I undertake the Chow break-point test for 1982.1 because there
were significant changes in the inflation rate and interest rate around this
point. The F-Statistic is 18.920, significant enough to indicate a structural
change at this point (the critical value at 5 percent level of significance lies
between 2.60 and 2.68).
France CGG98 fail to obtain a reasonable estimate of the inflation target
for France and it is then assumed it to be 2 percent for the period 1983-1989.
Since the data used here cover a much longer period (1970-96) than that
of CGG98, I assume the inflation target to be 2.5 percent for France, since
France experienced a high inflation rate from the beginning of the 1970s to
the middle of the 1980s, with the average rate higher than 8 percent. The
inflation rate (changes in the CPI), short-term interest rate (3-month treasury
bill rate) and output gap of France are presented in Figure 4.4 (Data Source:
International Statistical Yearbook). The output gap was quite smooth during
the whole period except a relatively significant change in the middle of the
1970s. The inflation rate was quite high before the middle of the 1980s and
decreased to a relatively lower level around 1985. The regression results are
shown in Table 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Inflation Rate, Output Gap and Short-Term Interest Rate of
France
Table 4.4: OLS Estimation of the Interest-Rate Rule of France
βπ βy
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1970.1-79.4 0.603 6.257 0.835 2.391 0.523
1980.1-89.4 0.570 12.842 0.180 0.280 0.822
1990.1-96.3 2.345 4.142 0.778 0.832 0.507
1970.1-96.3 0.425 8.207 0.365 0.930 0.395
One can observe a significant change in the βπ. It was about 0.60 before
1990, but rose to 2.345 in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the estimate of βy has
insignificant T-Statistics most of the time. This may suggest either model
misspecification or problems in the output gap measurement. The Chow
break-point test for 1979.4 has an F-Statistic of 29.143, significant enough
to indicate a structural change at this point (the critical value at 5 percent
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level of significance is about 2.70). One can observe some large changes in
the interest rate and inflation rate around this point in Figure 4.4.
The UK CGG98 are also unable to obtain a reasonable estimate of the
inflation target for the UK. I assume it to be 2.5 percent in the estimation
for the period from 1960.1-1997.4. The short-term interest rate (3-month
treasury bill rate), inflation rate (changes in the CPI) and output gap of
the UK are presented in Figure 4.5 (Data Source: International Statistical
Yearbook). The regression results of the interest-rate rule are shown in Table
4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Inflation Rate, Output Gap and Short-Term Interest Rate of the
UK
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Table 4.5: OLS Estimation of the Interest-Rate Rule of the UK
βπ βy
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1960.1-69.4 0.440 4.072 0.644 2.045 0.409
1970.1-79.4 0.322 5.496 1.790 4.812 0.520
1980.1-89.4 0.453 10.075 0.886 2.319 0.745
1990.1-97.4 1.144 16.596 -1.252 2.858 0.910
1960.1-97.4 0.358 9.151 0.802 2.391 0.363
It is surprising that βy was negative with a significant T-Statistic in the
1990s. This may be due to model misspecification or the computation of
the output gap. The βy seems to have experienced more significant changes
than the βπ. I undertake the Chow break-point test for 1979.1 and obtain
an F-Statistic of 72.900, significant enough to indicate a structural change
at this point (the critical value at 5 percent level of significance lies between
2.60 and 2.68).
Italy CGG98 explore the monetary policy of Italy for the period from 1981-
89 and fail to obtain a reasonable inflation target. My estimation covers the
period from 1970-98. The inflation rate was quite high during this period,
evolving between 1.18 percent and 24.75 percent with the average value being
9.72 percent. Therefore, I assume the target inflation to be 3.0 percent, a
little higher than those of the other European countries. I present the short-
term interest rate (official discount rate), inflation rate (changes in the CPI)
and output gap of Italy in Figure 4.6 (Data Source: International Statistical
Yearbook) and the regression results in Table 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Inflation Rate, Output Gap and Short-Term Interest Rate of
Italy
Table 4.6: OLS Estimation of the Interest-Rate Rule of Italy
βπ βy
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1970.1-79.4 0.401 5.937 0.468 1.294 0.513
1980.1-89.4 0.354 8.120 0.073 0.184 0.707
1990.1-98.2 1.361 7.730 0.696 1.593 0.729
1970.1-98.2 0.340 5.889 0.301 0.700 0.248
The F-Statistic of the Chow break-point test for 1979.4 is 67.473, signifi-
cant enough to indicate a structural change at this point (the critical value
at 5 percent level of significance is about 2.50).
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4.3 Estimation of the Time-Varying Interest-
Rate Rule with the Kalman Filter
From the OLS regression and Chow break-point tests one finds that there are
some structural changes in the monetary reaction function. The drawback
of the Chow break-point test is that one can only explore whether there are
structural changes at some predetermined points. This approach is not of
much help if one wants to explore all structural changes or wants to obtain
the path of a time-varying parameter. In order to explore how the coefficients
in the monetary policy reaction function may have changed over time, I will
estimate the time-varying interest-rate rule with the Kalman filter in this
section. In Chapter 2 I have estimated the time-varying Phillips curve with
the Kalman filter, assuming that the coefficient in the Phillips curve follows
a random-walk path.
Somewhat different from the estimation in Chapter 2, however, I will
employ the so-called “Return-to-Normality” (mean-reversion) model in this
section, that is, I assume that the time-varying parameters are stationary
and evolve around a mean. If the parameter is found to be non-stationary, I
will give up the mean-reversion model and resort to the random-walk model
as in Chapter 2. A brief introduction to the “Return-to-Normality” model
is shown in the appendix of Chapter 2.
Empirical Evidence
Let’s define the variables as follows:
xt =


1
πt
yt

 and βt =


βct
βπt
βyt

 .
In the “Return-to-Normality” model the time-varying coefficients are as-
sumed to be generated by a stationary multivariate AR(1) process. The
interest-rate rule can then be written in the following State-Space form
rt = x
′
tβt + ǫt, t = 1, ..., T,
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βt − β¯ = φ(βt−1 − β¯) + ηt,
where ǫt ∼ NID(0, H), and ηt ∼ NID(0, Q). The coefficients are stationary
and evolve around the mean, β¯. After arranging the interest-rate rule in
an SSM one can use the Kalman filter to estimate φ, β¯, βt and, as a result,
obtains a path of αt. The estimation results of Germany, France, Italy, Japan,
the UK and the US are presented below. If the elements of the matrix φ are
larger than one in absolute value, the “Return-to-Normality” model has to
be abandoned and the random-walk model should be employed.
Germany The German data from 1960-98 generate the φ as

0.935 0 0
0 0.892 0
0 0 0.925

 .
All elements of φ are smaller than one, indicating that the coefficients are
stationary. The β¯ is


0.052
0.260
0.294

 , indicating that βc evolves around 0.052, βπ
around 0.260 and βy around 0.294. The paths of βπ and βy are shown in
Figure 4.7A-B. The path of βc is not shown here just for simplicity.
As shown in Figure 4.7A, βπ experiences significant changes. Comparing
Figure 4.7A with Figure 4.1, one finds that the switching of βπ was similar
to that of πt, except in the 1960s. That is, when the inflation rate was high,
βπ was also high and vice versa. In 1970, 1974 and 1981, βπ reached some
peaks, when the interest rate and inflation rate were also at their peaks. In
the 1960s βπ and πt evolved in opposite directions most of the time, especially
from 1965-1970. The fact that the changes of βπ and πt are inconsistent with
each other in the 1960s may be caused by the initial startup idiosyncracies of
the Kalman filter algorithm. From 1960-1965 βπ was below zero most of the
time, consistent with the OLS regression (βπ = −0.804 from 1960.1-1964.4).
Figure 4.7A shows that βπ experienced a significant structural change around
1979 and a small change around 1989, consistent with the Chow break-point
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Figure 4.7: Time-Varying βπ and βy of Germany
tests in the previous section. βy experienced significant changes around 1970
and 1984.
France The French data from 1970-96 generate the φ as

0.967 0 0
0 0.826 0
0 0 0.575


with all elements smaller than one, indicating that the return-to-normality
model is the right choice. β¯ equals


0.064
0.631
0.091

 , indicating that βc, βπ and βy
evolve around 0.064, 0.631 and 0.091 respectively. The paths of the βπ and
βy are presented in Figure 4.8A-B.
Figure 4.8A shows that βπ experienced significant changes in the 1970s
and has been staying at a relatively stable level since the middle of the 1980s.
It decreased to the lowest point in 1979 and reached the highest point in
1981, when the interest rate also reached the highest point. βπ remained at a
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Figure 4.8: Time-Varying βπ and βy of France
relatively high level after the 1980s, even if the inflation rate has been quite
low since the middle of the 1980s, which may indicate the effect of the EMS
on the monetary policies of member countries. βy also experienced a change
in 1979. This is consistent with the conclusion of the Chow break-point test
in the previous section. Note that βy had a negative mean (−0.153) in the
1990s and decreased to the lowest point of −1.867 in 1993, consistent with
the fact that βy in the OLS regression was negative in the 1990s.
The UK The UK data from 1960-97 generate the φ as

0.956 0 0
0 0.931 0
0 0 0.049


with all elements smaller than one. Note that the last element is very small
(0.049), indicating that βy may not have experienced significant structural
changes. β¯ is


0.069
0.353
0.330

 , indicating that βc, βπ and βy evolve around 0.069,
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Figure 4.9: Time-Varying βπ and βy of the UK
0.353 and 0.330 respectively. The paths of βπ and βy are presented in Figure
4.9A-B respectively.
Figure 4.9A shows that βπ experienced significant changes in the 1970s
and remained at a relatively high and stable level afterwards. Note that the
switching of βπ is similar in France and the UK: it experienced similar changes
in the 1970s and then stayed at a relatively high level without significant
changes after the 1980s.
Figure 4.9B shows that βy did not experience such significant changes as
those of the other European countries. This is consistent with the fact that
the last element in φ is not large (0.049).
Italy The Italian data from 1970-98 generate the φ as

0.992 0 0
0 1.021 0
0 0 0.400


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Figure 4.10: Time-Varying βπ and βy of Italy
and β¯ as


0.066
0.059
0.238

 . Because the second diagonal element of φ is larger than
one, βπ is therefore non-stationary and I have to employ the random-walk
model instead of the “Return-to-Normality” model. The paths of βπ and βy
estimated with the random-walk model are presented in Figure 4.10A-B.
Figure 4.10A shows that βπ has been increasing since the middle of the
1970s. It experienced a structural change in 1979 and then increased to a
relatively stable and high level, similar to the cases of France and the UK.
βy of Italy also experienced a large decrease around 1993, similar to the case
of France.
Japan The data of Japan from 1960-97 generate the φ as

1.013 0 0
0 0.935 0
0 0 0.715

 .
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Figure 4.11: Time-Varying βπ and βy of Japan
One element of φ is larger than one and the other two are smaller than one.
This implies that βc is non-stationary, but βπ and βy are stationary. Because
the intercept is not of much interest, I stick to the “Return-to-Normality”
model. β¯ is


−0.258
0.177
0.674

 , implying that βc evolves around −0.258, βπ around
0.177 and βy around 0.674. The paths of βπ and βy are presented in Figure
4.11A-B. βπ experienced large changes around 1974 and 1980, attaining the
highest point of about 0.55. This is consistent with the switching of the in-
terest rate and inflation rate, which also attained their highest values around
these two points.
In the previous section I have undertaken the Chow break-point test for
1974.4 and 1980.4 when there were great changes in the interest rate and
conclude that there are indeed structural changes in the model. Figure 4.11A-
B confirm this conclusion: βπ attained its second highest value around 1974
and βy also increased to a high value. Figure 4.11A-B also show that there
were structural changes in both coefficients between 1980 and 1981, when
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the interest rate and inflation increased to some large values. In 1964 there
were also break-points in both βπ and βy, consistent with the conclusion of
the Chow break-point test.
The US The US data from 1960-98 generate the φ as

0.991 0 0
0 0.893 0
0 0 0.674

 ,
with all elements smaller than one, indicating that the coefficients are all
stationary. β¯ is


0.050
0.448
0.705

 , indicating that βc evolves around 0.050, βπ around
0.448 and βy around 0.705. The paths of βπ and βy are presented in Figure
4.12A-B respectively.
A B
Figure 4.12: Time-Varying βπ and βy of the US
Figure 4.12A shows that the switching of βπ is very similar to that of the
inflation rate and interest rate. That is, when the inflation rate was high βπ
was also high.
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Above I have estimated the time-varying coefficients in the interest-rate
rule and find that there do exist some structural changes. One may propose
that the policy reaction coefficients of the inflation rate and output gap are
state-dependent. That is, the changes of the economic environment may have
caused the changes in the coefficients. One observes that the changes in the
coefficients seem to have been more or less consistent with the changes in
the corresponding economic variables, the inflation rate and output gap. In
order to explore whether there is some empirical evidence for this argument,
I will estimate the following two equations, taking the US as an example:
βπ = c1 + c2πt, (4.2)
βy = τ1 + τ2yt. (4.3)
The estimation results for different subperiods are shown in Table 4.7 and
4.8.
Table 4.7: State-Dependent Evidence of the US βπ
c1 c2
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1960.1-69.4 0.615 41.781 13.989 13.790 0.833
1970.1-74.4 0.584 6.799 1.468 0.765 0.032
1975.1-79.4 -0.217 2.474 5.528 3.932 0.462
1980.1-89.4 0.423 5.651 4.180 2.385 0.130
1990.1-98.2 0.255 15.458 6.575 4.750 0.414
1960.1-98.2 0.428 14.278 1.303 1.584 0.016
The state-dependent evidence of βπ seems more obvious than that of βy,
since the estimates of Eq. (4.2) usually have more significant T-Statistics
and higher R2 than those of Eq. (4.3). In fact, comparing Figure 4.12 and
Figure 4.3 one can find some similar evidence. The change of the βπ seems
to be more consistent with the change of the inflation rate than the βy with
the output gap.
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Table 4.8: State-Dependent Evidence of the US βy
τ1 τ2
Sample Estimate T-St. Estimate T-St. R2
1960.1-69.4 0.667 52.160 3.217 1.728 0.073
1970.1-79.4 0.654 21.442 4.821 1.854 0.083
1980.1-89.4 0.768 33.552 11.201 3.353 0.228
1990.1-94.4 0.772 38.250 3.586 0.679 0.025
1995.1-98.2 0.716 56.978 5.363 0.648 0.034
1960.1-98.2 0.650 36.000 4.500 1.600 0.070
Comparison of E3-Countries
CGG98 refer to France, Italy and the UK as the E3 countries, in contrast
to the so-called G3 countries of Germany, Japan and the US whose central
banks have virtually autonomous control over the domestic monetary policies.
Above I have presented the estimation results of the time-varying coefficients
in the interest-rate rule of the E3 countries. As mentioned before, the changes
in the coefficients in the monetary reaction function in the case of these three
countries are, to some extent, similar. I will analyze this problem briefly
below. βπ of the three countries are shown in Figure 4.13. The βπ of the UK
is presented from 1970-98, so that it is consistent with the time period of the
estimation of the other two countries.
Figure 4.13 shows that the βπ of the three countries experienced some
significant changes in the 1970s and then remained at a relatively stable and
high level after the middle of the 1980s. This indicates that the inflation
deviation may have played an important role in the three countries’ policy
making after 1980. Moreover, the switching of βπ in the cases of the UK
and France is very similar before 1985, though the βπ of France stayed at a
higher level than that of the UK in this period. I also present the inflation
rates of the three countries in Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14 shows that the inflation rates of the three countries also ex-
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Figure 4.13: βπ of E3 Countries
Figure 4.14: Inflation Rates of E3 Countries
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Figure 4.15: βy of E3 Countries
perienced some similar changes: they increased to the highest value around
1975, went down at the end of the 1970s, increased to another high point at
the beginning of the 1980s and then decreased persistently with some small
increases around 1990 and 1995. The similarity of the inflation rates among
the three countries may explain the consistency of βπ to some extent. But
the EMS may also have some common effects on the monetary policy of the
three countries. I present βy of the three countries in Figure 4.15.
The switching of the βy in Italy and France is also similar most of the
time. That is, both decreased to the lowest point between 1992 and 1993
when the crisis of the EMS occurred. The βy of the UK is very smooth, as
mentioned before. The output gaps for the three countries are presented in
4.16.
Figure 4.16 shows that the output gaps of the three countries also expe-
rienced some similar changes, especially in the cases of the UK and France.
This evidence seems to indicate some consistency between the monetary poli-
cies of the E3 countries. One can observe that for all three countries the re-
sponse coefficient of the inflation deviation moved up and stayed high in the
1990s and that the response coefficient of the output gap is almost constant
except when Germany raised the interest rate after the German reunifica-
tion and the other countries had to raise the interest rate too, in spite of a
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Figure 4.16: Output Gaps of E3 Countries
negative output gap.
4.4 Euro-Area Monetary Policy Effects Us-
ing the Time-Varying US Monetary Pol-
icy Rule
It is well known that in the 1990s the economy of the Euro-area has performed
worse than the US economy. The difference in the growth and unemployment
performance of the Euro-area and the US may be seen to have been caused by
differences in monetary policies. Difference in the interest rates can be seen
in Figure 4.17. Similar to Peersman and Smets (1998), I use the German call
money rate to study the monetary policy in the Euro-area.2 The aggregate
inflation rate and output gap of the Euro-area are measured respectively by
the GDP-weighted sums of the inflation rates and output gaps of Germany,
France and Italy (referred to as the EU3). In particular, before 1994 the
interest rate of the US was much lower (4.9 percent on average) than that of
the Euro-area (8.5 percent on average). For the whole decade of the 1990s the
2Peersman and Smets (1998) justify using the German day-to-day rate to measure the
monetary policy in the Euro-area.
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Figure 4.17: Interest Rates of the US and Euro-Area
average rate of the US was 5.1 percent, while that of the Euro-area was 6.1
percent. One finds similar results for the real interest rate. The real interest
rate of the US in the 1990s was 1.8 percent, while that of the Euro-area was
3.2 percent. So an interesting question is: what would have happened if the
Euro-area had followed the monetary policy rule of the US in the 1990s? In
this section I will undertake some simulation of the Euro-area economy with
the time-varying US monetary policy rule estimated in the previous section.
I will simulate the inflation rate and output gap for the Euro-area from
1990-98, assuming that the Euro-area had followed the monetary policy of the
US. A similar counterfactual study has been undertaken by Taylor (1999) us-
ing the pre-Volcker policy interest rate reaction function to study the macroe-
conomic performance of the Volcker and post-Volcker periods.
Let us write the interest-rate rule with time-varying response coefficients
as:
rt = r¯ + βπtπt + βytyt, (4.4)
where r¯ is the long-run equilibrium interest rate, and other variables are
interpreted the same as in the previous sections. The time-varying paths of
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Figure 4.18: Actual and Simulated Interest Rates of the Euro-Area
βπ and βy of the US are presented in Figure 4.12A-B.
Next, I assume that the Euro-area follows the monetary policy of the US
by determining the interest rate according to the HP-filtered trends of βπt and
βyt of the US instead of the exact paths of βπt and βyt, since I assume that the
Euro-area had followed only approximately the US monetary policy rule. I
simulate the Euro-area interest rate with equation (4.4) by measuring r¯ with
the average real interest rate of the Euro-area of the 1990s and substituting
the US βπt and βyt trends for βπt and βyt. The inflation target is assumed to
be 2.5 percent. The simulated Euro-area interest rate is presented in Figure
4.18, together with the actual Euro-area interest rate. The simulated rate is
much lower (3.56 percent on average before 1995) than the actual rate in the
first half of the 1990s and close to the actual rate after 1994. The average
value of the simulated rate is 3.39 percent from 1990-98. The simulations
of the Euro-area inflation rate and output gap will be undertaken with the
IS-Phillips curves:3
πt = a1 + a2πt−1 + a3πt−2 + a4πt−3 + a5yt−1, (4.5)
yt = b1 + b2yt−1 + b3yt−2 + b4(rt−1 − πt−1), (4.6)
3The lags of the inflation rate and output gap with insignificant T-Statistics are ex-
cluded. This model is similar to that of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
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where all variables have the same interpretations as in equation (4.4). In
order to simulate the πt and yt from equation (4.5)-(4.6), one needs to know
the values of the coefficients, ai and bi, which will be generated by estimating
equation (4.5)-(4.6) by way of the SUR with the quarterly data from 1990-
98. The estimation results for this system are presented as follows, with
T-Statistics in parentheses:4
πt = −0.0006
(0.254)
+ 0.984
(6.165)
πt−1 − 0.291
(1.307)
πt−2 + 0.286
(1.743)
πt−3 + 0.149
(1.014)
yt−1
R2 = 0.852
yt = 0.0002
(0.277)
+ 1.229
(7.841)
yt−1 − 0.403
(2.467)
yt−2 − 0.008
(0.334)
(rt−1 − πt−1)
R2 = 0.799.
The determinant residual covariance is 6.82 × 10−11. After substituting the
simulated interest rate into these equations, one obtains the simulations of πt
and yt.
5 The simulated output gap is presented in Figure 4.19. It is clear that
the simulated output gap declined very rapidly at the beginning of the 1990s
and increased a little in 1994. The simulated and actual output gaps are
presented in Figure 4.20. Unlike the actual output gap, which experienced
significant decreases during 1992-94 and 1995-97, the simulated output gap is
4The T-Statistics of the last terms of these two equations are unfortunately insignifi-
cant. The results seem sensitive to the period studied and how potential output is com-
puted. If one uses the linear quadratic trend of the log value of the Industrial Production
Index as the potential output, for example, one can obtain the following results with the
data from 1986-98:
pit = 0.004
(1.806)
+ 1.117
(8.150)
pit−1 − 0.341
(1.719)
pit−2 + 0.072
(0.556)
pit−3 + 0.184
(1.934)
yt−1
R2 = 0.830
yt = 0.001
(1.772)
+ 1.254
(9.376)
yt−1 − 0.275
(1.835)
yt−2 − 0.045
(1.714)
(rt−1 − pit−1)
R2 = 0.909
with the determinant residual covariance being 6.44× 10−11. The T-Statistics of the last
terms are now more significant. Since the T-Statistics significance of these terms has little
effect on the simulations below, I do not discuss how output gap should be defined here.
5As for the 3 initial lags of inflation rate and 2 initial lags of output gap, I just take
the actual inflation rate from 1989.2-89.4 and output gap from 1989.3-89.4.
92
Figure 4.19: Simulated Output Gap of the Euro-Area
always positive and smoother than the actual one. The simulated and actual
inflation rates are presented in Figure 4.21. One finds that the simulated
inflation rate is almost a straight line and lower than the actual inflation
rate most of the time.
The simulation above suggests that if the Euro-area had followed the US
monetary policy rule in the 1990s, the output would not have experienced
such significant decreases and moreover, the simulated inflation is very sim-
ilar to the actual inflation. The monetary policy in the Euro-area seems to
have been too tight in the 1990s. Many observers, of course, would argue
that lowering the interest rate was not a feasible policy since this would have
led to an accelerated depreciation of the European currencies and later of
the Euro. However, as shown by Semmler (2002), the Euro-area has large
net foreign assets and thus large foreign currencies reserves, so that an accel-
erated depreciation would not have occurred. Moreover, as recently shown
by Corsetti and Pesenti (1999) the high value of the dollar is strongly posi-
tively correlated with the growth differentials of the US and Euro economies.
One might conjecture that a lower interest rate and thus a higher expected
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Figure 4.20: Actual and Simulated Output Gaps of the Euro-Area
Figure 4.21: Actual and Simulated Inflation Rates of the Euro-Area
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growth rate of the Euro-area would have attracted capital inflows into the
Euro-area, and would have also prevented the Euro from being depreciated.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents some empirical evidence of a time-varying monetary
policy reaction function. Both the Chow break-point tests and the Kalman
filter estimation indicate that there are really some structural changes in the
interest-rate rule in the countries studied.6 This is consistent with the esti-
mation of the time-varying Phillips curve in Chapter 2, since time-varying
parameters in the Phillips curve may indicate time-varying behaviors in mon-
etary policy rules. In addition, this chapter undertakes some simulation of
the Euro-area economy, assuming that the Euro-area had followed the time-
varying US monetary policy rule in the 1990s. The simulation suggests that
the Euro-area would not have experienced so significant a decrease in the
output if the US monetary policy had been followed.
6The OLS and time-varying-parameter estimations show that βpi may be smaller than
one in practice. This seems to be inconsistent with the optimal interest-rate rule derived
from the dynamic model shown in Chapter 3 and the original Taylor rule presented in
footnote 1 of Chapter 3. This problem has been briefly discussed by Woodford (2003a,
p.93).
Chapter 5
Monetary Policy Rules Under
Uncertainty
5.1 Introduction
In the profession it has increasingly been recognized that formal modelling of
monetary policy faces great challenges because of many kinds of uncertainties
such as model uncertainty, shock uncertainty and data uncertainty. Recent
studies dealing with these uncertainties can be found in Isard et al. (1999),
So¨derstro¨m (1999), Giannoni (2002), Meyer et al. (2001), Wieland (2000),
Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), Orphanides and Williams (2002), Svens-
son (1999b) and Martin and Salmon (1999).1 Those papers explore, usually
theoretically, how certain kinds of uncertainties may affect the decisions of
the central banks or regulatory agencies.2
Empirical work on parameter uncertainty and how to capture them by
modelling and estimating parameter shifts can be found in Cogley and Sar-
gent (2001) who study the inflation dynamics of the US after WWII by way
of Bayesian VAR with time-varying parameters without stochastic volatil-
1Several contributions to this problem can also be found in Macroeconomic Dynamics,
No. 6, 2002.
2For a study of the effect of model uncertainty in the context of ecological management
problem, see Brock and Xepapadeas (2003).
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ity. Yet, Sims (2001b) points out that the monetary policy behavior may
not have experienced such a sharp change as shown by Cogley and Sargent
(2001). Sims and Zha (2002) also study parameter shifts in estimates of the
US economy and find more evidence in favor of stable dynamics with unsta-
ble variance of the disturbance than of clear changes in model structure. In
contrast to Sims (2001b), Cogley and Sargent (2002) study the drifts and
volatilities of the US monetary policies after WWII through a Bayesian VAR
with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility and claim to have
found regime changes.
Thus, given such evidence on model and shock uncertainties, economic
agents (central banks for example) may resort to different strategies: they
may either reduce uncertainty by learning or just seek a policy robust to
model uncertainty without learning. As to the former, among the important
research, the work by Sargent (1993, 1999) has attracted much attention.
Although Sargent (1999) explores monetary policy rules with the adaptive
learning in an optimal control framework, he assumes that once the uncertain
parameter is updated, the government pretends that the updated parameters
will govern the dynamics forever. His analysis is undertaken in the traditional
LQ framework. With such an approach there may exist convergence to an
ergodic distribution in a stochastic model and convergence w.p.1 in a non-
stochastic model. But, as mentioned by Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2003),
the above problem in Sargent’s assumption represents an inconsistency in his
adaptive learning mechanism.
Because of this problem in Sargent’s approach it is a challenge to explore
the learning algorithm in an appropriate manner. Therefore, in this chapter
I will study monetary policy rules under uncertainty with adaptive learning
by using a dynamic programming algorithm recently developed by Gru¨ne
(1997) and Gru¨ne and Semmler (2002). Different from Sargent’s approach, I
am able to endogenize the learning of uncertain parameters and explore the
problem with a dynamic-programming algorithm with adaptive grids which
can deal with nonlinear constraints.
As stated above, the alternative for monetary authorities is to resort to a
monetary policy rule robust to uncertainty. This is a strategy different from
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adaptive learning. In this approach the central bank considers the economic
model only as an approximation to another model that it cannot specify.
With a so-called robustness parameter it pursues a monetary policy rule al-
lowing for a “worst case” scenario. While adaptive learning considers mainly
parameter uncertainty, robust control might consider more general uncer-
tainties. The robustness parameter, as stated by Gonzalez and Rodriguez
(2003), can be considered as a measure of uncertainty and may affect the
robust monetary policy.
The important question concerning monetary policy under uncertainty
is whether uncertainty requires caution. Brainard (1967), for example, pro-
poses that parameter uncertainty should imply a more “cautious” policy.
This argument has been supported by the recent research of Martin and
Salmon (1999) who explore the monetary policy of the UK employing a VAR
model with and without parameter uncertainty. They find that the optimal
rule in the presence of parameter uncertainty implies a less aggressive path
for official interest rates than when no parameter uncertainty is considered.
Other researchers, Gonzalez and Rodriguez (2003) and Giannoni (2002), for
example, however, argue that uncertainty does not necessarily require cau-
tion. I will also study this problem using robust control theory, obtaining
similar results to Giannoni (2002).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the second sec-
tion I present some empirical evidence of model and shock uncertainties in the
IS and Phillips curves by way of a State-Space model with Markov-Switching.
In Section 3 I explore monetary policy rules under model uncertainty with
adaptive learning. Section 4 explores monetary policy rules with robust con-
trol and Section 5 concludes this chapter.
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5.2 Empirical Evidence of Uncertainty: A State-
Space Model with Markov-Switching
Consider an economic model
Min
{ut}∞0
E0
∞∑
t=0
ρtL(xt, ut), (5.1)
subject to
xt+1 = f(xt, ut, εt), (5.2)
where ρ is the discount factor bounded between 0 and 1, L(xt, ut) denotes a
loss function of an economic agent (central bank for instance), xt is a vector of
state variables, ut is a vector of control variables, εt is a vector of shocks and
E0 denotes the mathematical expectation operator upon the initial values of
the state variables. This kind of model represents the basic monetary control
model employed by Svensson (1997, 1999b), Beck and Wieland (2002) and
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) and others, where the constraint equations
are usually the IS and Phillips curves. Given the loss function L(x, u) and the
state equation (5.2), the problem is to derive a path of the control variable, ut,
to satisfy (5.1). The question arising is, however, whether the state equation
(5.2) can be correctly specified with time series estimates. The uncertainty
of the state equation can be caused by the uncertainty in the shock εt and
uncertainty in parameters and data. Following Svensson (1997, 1999b), in
Chapter 3 I have shown how to derive an optimal monetary policy rule from
an optimal control problem similar to the model above and find that the
optimal monetary policy rule is greatly affected by the estimated parameters
of the model. Therefore, if the parameters in the model are uncertain, the
derived optimal monetary policy rule may not be very reliable. The empirical
evidence of a time-varying Phillips curve and a monetary policy rule has been
shown in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.
As has been done in Chapter 2, one can estimate time-varying parameters
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of the traditional Phillips curve with the following State-Space model:
πt = v
′
tβt + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε) (5.3)
βt = βt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0, σ
2
η) (5.4)
where πt denotes the inflation rate and vt is a vector of the lags of the inflation
rate and output gap. βt is a vector of time-varying parameters. Note that in
this model it is assumed that the shocks have constant variances and only βt is
uncertain. Cogley and Sargent (2001) study the inflation dynamics of the US
after WWII by way of Bayesian VAR with time-varying parameters without
stochastic volatility. Sims (2001b), however, claims that the monetary policy
behavior may not have experienced such a sharp change as demonstrated by
Cogley and Sargent (2001). Sims and Zha (2002) also study macroeconomic
switching of the US policy and find more evidence in favor of stable dynamics
with unstable disturbance variance than of clear changes in model dynamics.
Therefore, Cogley and Sargent (2002) modify the model by considering both
time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility and claim to have found
regime switching.
A drawback of the traditional State-Space model such as (5.3) and (5.4) is
that the changes of the time-varying parameters may be exaggerated, because
the shocks are assumed to have constant variances. This is the reason why
Cogley and Sargent (2002) assume stochastic volatility. Therefore, in the re-
search below I assume that εt has a state-dependent variance. This is similar
to the assumption of Cogley and Sargent (2002). But unlike Cogley and Sar-
gent (2002), who assume the variances of the shocks to change from period
to period, I assume that there are only two states of disturbance variance
with Markov property. This is, to some extent, similar to the assumption
of Sims and Zha (2002) who assume that there are three states of economy.
With such an assumption one can explore the probability of regime switch-
ing. Another advantage of the State-Space model with Markov-Switching is
that, as will be seen below, it can explore not only parameter uncertainty
but also shock uncertainty.
Following Kim and Nelson (1999), I simply assume that εt in (5.3) has
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two states of variance with Markov property,3 namely,
εt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε,St
), (5.5)
with
σ2ε,St = σ
2
ε,0 + (σ
2
ε,1 − σ
2
ε,0)St, σ
2
ε,1 > σ
2
ε,0,
and
Pr[St = 1|St−1 = 1] = p,
Pr[St = 0|St−1 = 0] = q,
where St = 0 or 1 indicates the states of the variance of εt and Pr stands for
probability. In the research below I explore uncertainty in the IS and Phillips
curves, since these two curves form the core of a monetary policy model.
Evidence of Uncertainty in the Traditional IS and Phillips
Curves
I will first explore uncertainty in the traditional IS and Phillips curves which
have often been taken as constraints in an optimal control model such as
(5.1) and (5.2). In order to reduce the dimension of the model, I estimate
the Phillips and IS curves with only one lag of the inflation rate and output
gap:
πt = α1t + α2tπt−1 + α3tyt−1 + επ,t, (5.6)
yt = β1t + β2tyt−1 + β3t(Rt−1 − πt−1) + εy,t, (5.7)
where πt is the inflation rate, yt is the output gap, Rt denotes the short-
term nominal interest rate, and επ,t and εy,t are shocks subject to Gaussian
3Va´zquez (2003) estimates an augmented Taylor rule with a Markov-Switching VAR
model with the US data from 1967-2002 and finds that there is no essential difference
between the model with two regimes and three regimes and therefore the model with two
regimes can accurately describe the economy.
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distributions with zero mean and Markov-Switching variances.4 The β3t is
expected to be negative. Let rt denote the real interest rate, namely, rt =
Rt − πt, the model can be rewritten in a State-Space form as follows:
Yt = Xtφt + εt, (5.8)
φt = Φ¯St + Fφt−1 + ηt, (5.9)
where Yt denotes the dependent variables (πt, yt) andXt denotes the indepen-
dent variables (πt−1, yt−1 and rt−1). φt denotes the time-varying parameters
αn,t and βn,t (n = 1, 2, 3). Φ¯St (St=0 or 1) is the drift of φt and F is a
diagonal matrix with constant elements to be estimated from the model. ηt
has the distribution shown in Eq. (5.4). εt is now assumed to have the dis-
tribution presented in Eq. (5.5).5 A brief sketch of the State-Space model
with Markov-Switching is presented in Appendix A of this chapter.6
The estimation will be undertaken with the US quarterly data from
1964.1-2003.1. The inflation rate is measured by changes in the GDP defla-
tor, the output gap is measured by the percentage deviation of the Industrial
Production Index (IPI, base year: 1995) from its fourth-order polynomial
trend.7 Rt is the federal funds rate. The data source is the International
Statistical Yearbook 2003. The estimates of the hyperparameters are shown
4Forward-looking behaviors have been frequently taken into account in the Phillips
curve, as explored in Chapter 2. Because it is quite difficult to estimate a State-Space
model with forward-looking behaviors, I just consider backward-looking behaviors in this
section. A justification of the above type of backward-looking model can be found in
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
5Theoretically, the elements of F and the variance of ηt may also have Markov property,
but since there are already many parameters to estimate, I just ignore this possibility to
improve the efficiency of estimation. Note that if the elements of F are larger than 1 in
absolute value, that is, if the time-varying parameters are non-stationary, the transition
equation should be altered into the form of Eq. (5.4). Because the Phillips and IS curves
contain only lags of variables and have uncorrelated noise, I can estimate the Phillips and
IS curves separately. In this case, φt, Φ¯St (St = 0 or 1) and ηt are 3× 1 vectors and εt is
a scalar.
6As for the details of the State-Space model with Markov-Switching, the reader is
referred to Kim and Nelson (1999, Ch. 5). The program applied below is based on the
Gauss Programs developed by Kim and Nelson (1999).
7The IPI has also been used by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) to measure the output
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in Table 5.1. σεπ,1 (0.0021) is almost twice as large as σεπ,0 (0.0011). The
difference between σεy,0 (0.0000) and σεy,1 (0.0199) is still more significant.
The difference between Φ¯α2,1 (0.4704) and Φ¯α2,0 (0.6406) is less significant
than that between Φ¯α3,1 (0.0502) and Φ¯α3,0 (0.0021). The difference between
Φ¯β3,0 (0.0873) and Φ¯β3,1 (−0.3364) is obvious not only in magnitude and T-
Statistics but also in signs. Therefore the estimation results confirm a state
of economy with high volatility (state 1) and a state with low volatility (state
0). The fact that all the elements of F are smaller than 1 indicates that the
time-varying parameters are stationary and therefore justifies the adoption
of Eq. (5.9).
The paths of α2t are shown in Figure 5.1A. I leave aside the paths of the
intercepts in the IS and Philips curves just for simplicity. In Figure 5.1A,
“Alpha 2t,0” and “Alpha 2t,1” denote the paths of α2t when [St = 0|ψt]
(namely α2t,0) and [St = 1|ψt] (namely α2t,1) respectively. “Alpha 2t” denotes
the weighted sum of α2t,0 and α2t,1. That is,
α2t = Pr[St = 0|ψt]α2t,0 + Pr[St = 1|ψt]α2t,1.
The paths of α3t are shown in Figure 5.1B, where “Alpha 3t,0” and “Alpha 3t,1”
denote the paths of α3t when [St = 0|ψt] (namely α3t,0) and [St = 1|ψt]
(namely α3t,1) respectively. Similarly, “Alpha 3t” denotes the weighted sum
of α3t,0 and α3t,1. Figure 5.1C represents the path of Pr[St = 1|ψt]. It
is clear that the economy was probably in state 0 most of the time, since
Pr[St = 1|ψt] was very low except at the beginning of the 1970s. Therefore
α2t is relatively close to α2t,0 and α3t relatively close to α3t,0 most of the time.
α2t experienced some significant changes between 1970 and 1975 and at the
beginning of the 1980s. α3t also experienced significant changes in the first
for Germany, France, the US, the UK, Japan and Italy. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
use the quadratic trend of the IPI to measure the potential output for the US of the
period 1979-1993. I use the fourth-order trend of the IPI as the potential output because
my research covers a much longer period and the fourth-order trend fits the data better
than the quadratic one. As surveyed by Orphanides and van Norden (2002), there are
many approaches to measure the output gap.
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Table 5.1: Estimates of Hyperparameters in the Time-Varying Phillips and
IS Curves
Phillips Curve IS Curve
Parameter Estimate S.D. Parameter Estimate S.D.
σεπ,0 0.0011 0.0021 σεy,0 0.0000 0.0024
σεπ,1 0.0021 0.0018 σεy,1 0.0199 0.0064
σηα1 0.0020 0.0013 σηβ1 0.0073 0.0007
σηα2 0.0434 0.0106 σηβ2 0.0000 0.0334
σηα3 0.0000 0.0069 σηβ3 0.0000 0.0196
Φ¯α1,0 0.0005 0.0005 Φ¯β1,0 -0.0003 0.0010
Φ¯α1,1 0.0080 0.0052 Φ¯β1,1 0.0023 0.0026
Φ¯α2,0 0.6406 0.2208 Φ¯β2,0 0.5893 0.3372
Φ¯α2,1 0.4704 0.2183 Φ¯β2,1 0.7272 0.3836
Φ¯α3,0 0.0021 0.0020 Φ¯β3,0 0.0873 0.1881
Φ¯α3,1 0.0502 0.0337 Φ¯β3,1 −0.3364 0.1809
fα1 0.3677 0.3710 fβ1 0.7688 0.0810
fα2 0.3431 0.2205 fβ2 0.2455 0.4093
fα3 0.8757 0.0644 fβ1 -0.5817 0.2662
p 0.9875 0.0147 p 0.8451 0.1589
q 0.7586 0.2323 q 0.9591 0.0248
Likelihood -660.6778 Likelihood -472.5914
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Figure 5.1: Empirical Evidence of Uncertainty in the Phillips Curve
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half of the 1970s, increasing from about 0.02 to 0.20. One can also illustrate
these structural changes by way of the Chow break-point test of the following
regression (T-Statistics in parentheses):
πt = 0.001
(1.591)
+ 1.396
(16.566)
πt−1 − 0.316
(2.197)
πt−2 − 0.171
(1.181)
πt−3 + 0.066
(0.805)
πt−4 + 0.023
(3.036)
yt−1
with R2 = 0.979 and DW = 2.026. The F-Statistics of the Chow break-
point test for 1971.4 and 1981.4 are 2.325 and 4.712 respectively, significant
enough to indicate structural changes at these two points (the critical value
at 5 percent level of significance lies between 2.10 and 2.19).
The estimation result of the IS curve is demonstrated in Figure 5.2. The
paths of β2t and β3t are presented in Figure 5.2A and 5.2B. It is clear that β3t
is lower than zero most of the time. Figure 5.2C is the path of Pr[St = 1|ψt].
From Figure 5.2C one finds that the IS curve has probably been in state 0
since the middle of the 1980s. Therefore, β2t was close to β2t,0 after 1984. The
same is true of β3t. Both β2t and β3t experienced some significant structural
changes in the 1970s and small changes around 1990. It is also obvious that
the time-varying parameters show some structural changes at the beginning
of the 1980s which coincides with the beginning of the post-Volcker period.
Then, after that, for the period from 1984-1990 the time-varying parameters
seem to be relatively stable.8
Evidence of Uncertainty in a Convex Phillips Curve
In the previous subsection I have explored uncertainty in the traditional IS
and Phillips curves. The 1990s, however, has seen the development of the
literature on the so-called nonlinear Phillips curve. Dupasquier and Ricketts
(1998a) survey several models of the nonlinearity in the Phillips curve. The
five models surveyed are the capacity constraint model, the mis-perception or
signal extraction model, the costly adjustment model, the downward nominal
wage rigidity model and the monopolistically competitive model. As men-
tioned by Akerlof (2002), the nonlinearity of the Phillips curve has been an
8The differences of the monetary policy rules of the US across periods have also been
explored by Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000).
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important issue of macroeconomics. Aguiar and Martins (2002), for exam-
ple, test three kinds of nonlinearities (quadratic, hyperbole and exponential)
in the Phillips curve and Okun’s law with the aggregate Euro-area macroe-
conomic data and find that the Phillips curve turns out to be linear, but
the Okun’s law is nonlinear. Many empirical studies have been undertaken
to explore the Phillips-curve nonlinearity. Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998a)
explore nonlinearity in the Phillips curve for Canada and the US and con-
clude that there is stronger evidence in favor of nonlinearity for the US than
for Canada. Other studies on the nonlinearity of the Phillips curve include
Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998b) and Bean (2000). Monetary policy with
a nonlinear Phillips curve has also been explored by numerous researchers,
see Schaling (1999), Tambakis (1998), and Semmler and Zhang (2003), for
example. Since monetary policy with a linear Phillips curve can be different
from that with a nonlinear Phillips curve, I will explore uncertainty in such
a Phillips curve below.
As discussed by Aguiar and Martins (2002), there may be different forms
of nonlinearity in the Phillips curve. Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1998)
explore alternative shapes (concave, linear and convex) of the US Phillips
curve and argue that the Fed should assume the convex form. To be precise,
it is argued that the negative output gap may be less deflationary than the
positive output gap is inflationary. Therefore, I just follow Schaling (1999)
and assume that the nonlinear form of the output gap in the Phillips curve
reads as9
f(yt) =
αyt
1− αβyt
, α > 0, 1 > β ≥ 0, (5.10)
where yt denotes the output gap and the parameter β indexes the curvature of
the curve. When β is very small, the curve approaches a linear relationship.
Assuming α=10 and β=0.99, I present f(yt) with the US quarterly data
in Figure 5.3. It is obvious that when the actual output is lower than the
potential output, the curve of f(yt) is flatter. From this figure one finds that
9Note that this function is not continuous with a breaking point at yt =
1
αβ
. When
yt <
1
αβ
, f ′′(yt) > 0 and if yt >
1
αβ
, f ′′(yt) < 0. In the research below I choose appropriate
values of α and β so that with the US output gap data, one has f ′′(yt) > 0.
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Figure 5.3: An Example of f(yt) with the US Data from 1964-2003
this function describes very well the idea that the negative output gap is less
deflationary than the positive output gap is inflationary.
Substituting f(yt) for yt in the Phillips curve, one has now
πt = α1t + α2tπt−1 + α3tf(yt−1) + επ,t. (5.11)
Following the same procedure in the previous subsection, I present the esti-
mation results of the State-Space model of Eq. (5.11) in Table 5.2 and Figure
5.4.
In Figure 5.4 one also observes some structural changes in the coefficients.
The difference between the traditional Phillips curve and the convex one
can be obviously seen in the paths of Pr(St = 1|ψt) and α3t. With the
traditional Phillips curve one finds that the economy was in state 0 most of
the time except around 1973, while the convex one shows that the economy
was probably in state 1 most of the time except in the middle of the 1970s
and the 1990s. The time-varying paths of α2t and α3t in the traditional and
convex Phillips curves are shown in Figure 5.5. The main difference lies
in α3t: although it experienced some changes in both cases in almost the
same periods, the changes in the traditional Phillips curve are much more
significant than those in the convex one: α3t evolves between 0.01 and 0.19
in the former case and between 0 and 0.02 in the latter case. The differences
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C
Figure 5.4: Empirical Evidence of Uncertainty in the Convex Phillips Curve
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Table 5.2: Estimates of the Hyperparameters in the Convex Time-Varying
Phillips Curve
Parameter Estimate S.D. Parameter Estimate S.D.
σεπ,1 0.0026 0.0003 σεπ,0 0.0009 0.0003
σηα1 0.0000 0.0005 σηα2 0.0419 0.0071
σηα3 0.0000 0.0003 Φ¯α1,1 0.0017 0.0015
Φ¯α1,0 0.0050 0.0019 Φ¯α2,1 0.3382 0.1388
Φ¯α2,0 0.3245 0.1350 Φ¯α3,1 0.0007 0.0006
Φ¯α3,0 0.0110 0.0032 fα1 -0.5193 0.2683
fα2 0.6481 0.1393 fα3 -0.2419 0.3699
p 0.9756 0.0187 q 0.9313 0.0425
Likelihood -662.5140
between the α2t in the two Phillips curves are not so large as those of the α3t
.
Traditional
Convex
Traditional
Convex
Figure 5.5: α2t and α3t in the Traditional and Convex Phillips Curves
Above I have explored model and shock uncertainties in the IS-Phillips
curves with the US data. The results are consistent with the line of research
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that maintains that there were regime changes in the US economy.10 Overall,
the uncertainty of parameters and shocks, and their impact on monetary
policy rules suggest exploring monetary policy rules with learning and robust
control.
5.3 Monetary Policy Rules with Adaptive Learn-
ing
The question arising is, what is the optimal monetary policy rule in case
some parameters or shocks in an economic model as presented by Eq. (5.1)-
(5.2) are uncertain? Recently numerous papers have been contributed to
this topic. Svensson (1999b), Orphanides and Williams (2002), Tetlow and
von zur Muehlen (2001), So¨derstro¨m (1999), Beck and Wieland (2002) and
McGough (2003), for example, explore optimal monetary policy rules un-
der the assumption that the economic agents learn the parameters in the
model through a certain mechanism. One approach is that the economic
agents may learn the parameters using the Kalman filter. This approach
has been pursued by Tucci (1997) and Beck and Wieland (2002). Another
learning mechanism which is also applied frequently is the recursive least
squares (RLS) algorithm. This kind of learning mechanism has been applied
by Sargent (1999) and Orphanides and Williams (2002). By intuition one
would expect that economic agents reduce uncertainty and therefore improve
economic models by learning over time using all information available.
Beck and Wieland (2002) and Orphanides and Williams (2002) have ex-
plored monetary policy with adaptive learning. Besides the difference in the
learning algorithm they use, another difference between Beck and Wieland
(2002) and Orphanides and Williams (2002) is that the former do not con-
sider the role of expectations in the model, while the latter take into account
expectations in the Phillips curve. Unlike Beck and Wieland (2002), Or-
phanides and Williams (2002) do not employ an intertemporal framework.
They provide a learning algorithm with a constant gain but do not use a
10See Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2002), for example.
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discounted loss function. Moreover, Orphanides and Williams (2002) assume
that the government knows the true model, but the private agents do not
know the true model and have to learn the parameters with the RLS al-
gorithm. In their case the government and the private agents are treated
differently.
Among the research of monetary policy with adaptive learning, the work
of Sargent (1999) has attracted much attention. Sargent (1999) employs
both a learning algorithm as well as a discounted loss function, but in an
LQ model. Yet, Sargent (1999) constructs his results in two steps. First,
assuming the RLS learning algorithm with a decreasing or constant gain,
the agents estimate a model of the economy using the latest available data
and update parameter estimates from period to period. Second, once the
unknown parameter is updated, an optimal policy is derived from an LQ
control model under the assumption that the updated parameter will govern
the dynamics forever. As remarked by Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2003),
however, the two steps are inconsistent with each other.
Because of this problem in Sargent’s approach, it is required to explore
such models by employing appropriate solution techniques. Therefore in this
section I will explore monetary policy with adaptive learning by using a
recently developed dynamic programming algorithm.11 In order to overcome
the problem of Sargent (1999) I will endogenize the changing parameters in
a nonlinear optimal control problem and explore how my conclusion may be
different from that of Sargent (1999).
Thus, the difference of my model from that of Beck and Wieland (2002)
can be summarized in three points: (a) I consider both linear and nonlinear
Phillips curves. (b) I take into account expectations. This is consistent with
the model of Orphanides and Williams (2002). (c) I employ the RLS learning
algorithm instead of the Kalman filter algorithm. In fact, Harvey (1989) and
Sargent (1999) prove that RLS is a specific form of the Kalman filter.
11Evans and Honkapohja (2001) analyze expectations and learning mechanisms in
macroeconomics in detail.
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RLS Learning in a Linear Phillips Curve
Orphanides and Williams (2002) assume that the current inflation rate is not
only affected by the lagged inflation rate but also by inflation expectations.
Following Orphanides and Williams (2002), I assume that the linear Phillips
curve takes the following form:
πt = γ1πt−1 + γ2π
e
t + γ3yt + εt, ε ∼ iid(0, σ
2
ε), (5.12)
where πet denotes the agents’ (including the central bank) expected inflation
rate based on the time t information, γ1, γ2 ∈ (0,1), γ3 > 0 and ε is a serially
uncorrelated innovation. In order to simplify the analysis, I further assume
the IS equation to be deterministic in the following form:12
yt = −θrt−1, θ > 0, (5.13)
where rt denotes the real interest rate. Substituting Eq. (5.13) into (5.12),
one has
πt = γ1πt−1 + γ2π
e
t − γ3θrt−1 + εt, ε ∼ iid(0, σ
2
ε). (5.14)
In the case of rational expectations, namely, πet = Et−1πt, one obtains
Et−1πt = γ1πt−1 + γ2Et−1πt − γ3θrt−1,
that is,
Et−1πt = a¯πt−1 + b¯rt−1,
with
a¯ =
γ1
1− γ2
(5.15)
b¯ = −
γ3θ
1− γ2
. (5.16)
With these results one obtains the rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
πt = a¯πt−1 + b¯rt−1 + εt. (5.17)
12This is the same as Orphanides and Williams (2002), except that they include a noise
in the equation.
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Now suppose that the agents believe the inflation rate follows the process
πt = aπt−1 + brt−1 + εt,
corresponding to the REE, but that a and b are unknown and have to be
learned. Suppose that the agents have data on the economy from periods
i = 0, ..., t − 1. Thus the time-(t-1) information set is {πi, ri}
t−1
i=0. Further
suppose that agents estimate a and b by a least squares regression of πi on
πi−1 and ri−1. The estimates will be updated over time as more information is
collected. Let (at−1, bt−1) denote the estimates through time t-1, the forecast
of the inflation rate is then given by
πet = at−1πt−1 + bt−1rt−1. (5.18)
The standard least squares formula gives the equations(
at
bt
)
=
(
t∑
i=1
z′izi
)−1( t∑
i=1
z′iπi
)
, (5.19)
where zi =
(
πi−1 ri−1
)′
.
Defining ct =
(
at
bt
)
, one can also compute Eq. (5.19) using the stochastic
approximation of the recursive least squares equations
ct = ct−1 + κtV
−1
t zt(πt − z
′
tct−1), (5.20)
Vt = Vt−1 + κt(ztz
′
t − Vt−1), (5.21)
where ct and Vt denote the coefficient vector and the moment matrix for
zt using data i = 1, ..., t. κt is the gain. To generate the least squares
values, one must set the initial values of ct and Vt approximately.
13 The gain
κt is an important variable. According to Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
the assumption that κt = t
−1 (decreasing gain) together with the condition
13Evans and Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 2, footnote 4) explain how to set the starting values
of ct and Vt as follows. Assuming Zk = (z1, ...zk)
′ is of full rank and letting pik denote
pik = (pi1, ..., pik)
′, the initial value ck is given by ck = Z
−1
k pi
k and the initial value Vk is
given by Vk = k
−1
∑k
i=1 ziz
′
i.
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γ2 < 1 ensures the convergence of ct as t → ∞. That is, as t → ∞, ct → c¯
with probability 1, with c¯ =
(
a¯
b¯
)
and therefore πet → REE.
As indicated by Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), if κt
is a constant, however, there might be difficulties of convergence to the REE.
If the model is non-stochastic and κt sufficiently small , π
e
t converges to REE
under the condition γ2 < 1. However, if the model is stochastic and γ2 < 1,
the belief does not converge to REE, but to an ergodic distribution around
it. Here I follow Orphanides and Williams (2002) and assume that agents
are constantly learning in a changing environment. The assumption of a
constant gain implies that the agents believe the Phillips curve might exhibit
structural changes and allocate larger weights to the recent observations of
the inflation rate than to the earlier ones. Orphanides and Williams (2002)
denote the case of κt =
1
t
as “infinite memory” and the case of a constant
κt as “finite memory”. Following Svensson (1997, 1999b) I assume that
the central bank pursues a monetary policy by minimizing a quadratic loss
function. The problem reads as
Min
{rt}∞0
E0
∞∑
t=0
ρtL(πt, rt), L(πt, rt) = (πt − π
∗)2, (5.22)
subject to eqs. (5.14), (5.18), (5.20) and (5.21). π∗ is the target inflation
rate which is assumed to be zero.14
As mentioned above, if the unknown parameters are adaptively estimated
by way of the RLS learning algorithm with a small and constant gain, they
will converge in distributions in a stochastic model and converge w.p.1 in a
non-stochastic model. But an optimal control problem such as (5.22) with
nonlinear state equations, embedded in eqs. (5.14), (5.18), (5.20) and (5.21),
is difficult to solve, and using appropriate solution techniques indicates that
the model will not necessarily converge even if the state equations are non-
stochastic.
Next, I undertake an appropriate numerical study of the model. Though
the return function is quadratic and the Phillips curve is linear, the problem
14In order to simplify the problem I assume strict inflation targeting, that is, the central
bank is concerned only with the inflation stabilization.
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falls outside the scope of LQ optimal control problems, since some parame-
ters in the Phillips curve are time-varying and follow nonlinear paths. The
problem cannot be solved analytically and numerical solutions have to be
explored. In the numerical study below I resort to the algorithm developed
by Gru¨ne (1997), who applies adaptive rather than uniform grids.15 The nu-
merical study is undertaken for the deterministic case. In order to simplify
the numerical study, I assume that at = a¯ and only bt has to be learned
in the model. In this case one has ct = bt and zi = ri−1. As mentioned
by Beck and Wieland (2002), the reason for focusing on the unknown pa-
rameter b is that this parameter is multiplicative to the decision variable rt
and therefore central to the trade-off between current control and estimation.
Numerical Study
In this numerical study I assume γ1 = 0.6, γ2 = 0.4, γ3 = 0.5, θ =
0.4, ρ = 0.985 and κt = 0.05. The initial values of πt, bt and Vt are 0.2,
−0.6 and 0.04. The paths of πt, bt, Vt and rt are shown in Figure 5.6A-D
respectively. Figure 5.6E is the phase diagram of πt and rt. Neither the
state variables nor the control variable converges. In fact, they fluctuate
cyclically. I explore solution paths with many different initial values of the
state variables and smaller κt (0.01 for example) and find that in no case do
the variables converge. Similar results are obtained with different values for
γ1 (e.g. 0.9 and 0.3) and γ2 (e.g. 0.1 and 0.7).
Given the above parameters, one has a¯ = 1, b¯ = −0.33, therefore the
REE is
πt = πt−1 − 0.33rt−1 + εt. (5.23)
In the case of RLS learning, however, one has
πt = πt−1 + b˜trt−1 + εt,
with
b˜t = γ2bt−1 − γ3θ.
15A less technical description and economic applications of this algorithm can be found
in Gru¨ne and Semmler (2002).
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Figure 5.6: Simulations of RLS Learning (solid line) and Benchmark Model
(dashed line) with Linear Phillips Curve
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Figure 5.7: Path of b˜t (solid line) in the Linear Phillips Curve
The path of b˜t is presented in Figure 5.7. b˜t evolves at a higher level than b¯.
Simulations are undertaken with different initial values of the state variables
and similar results for b˜t are obtained.
If there is perfect knowledge, namely, the agents have rational expecta-
tion, πt can converge to its target value π
∗ (zero here), since the model then
becomes a typical LQ control problem which has converging state and con-
trol variables in a non-stochastic model. I define this case as the benchmark
model. The results of the benchmark model are shown in Figure 5.6A and
5.6D with dashed lines. Note that the benchmark model contains only one
state variable, namely πt, with dynamics denoted by (5.23). In the non-
stochastic benchmark model the optimal monetary policy rule turns out to
be rt = 3.00πt and the optimal trajectory of πt is πt = 0.01πt−1. From Figure
5.6A and 5.6D one observes that πt and rt converge to zero over time in the
benchmark model.
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RLS Learning in Nonlinear Phillips Curve
As surveyed in Section 2, the Phillips curve can be convex. Given such a
convex Phillips curve, Eq. (5.12) reads as,
πt = γ1πt−1 + γ2π
e
t + γ3f(yt) + εt, ε ∼ iid(0, σ
2
ε), (5.24)
with f(yt) given by Eq. (5.10). Substituting Eq. (5.13) into Eq. (5.10), and
then (5.10) into (5.24), one obtains the following nonlinear Phillips curve
πt = γ1πt−1 + γ2π
e
t − γ3g(rt−1) + εt, ε ∼ iid(0, σ
2
ε), (5.25)
where
g(rt) =
αθrt
1 + αβθrt
.
The REE turns out to be
πt = a¯πt−1 + b¯g(rt−1) + εt, (5.26)
where a¯ is defined in (5.15) but b¯ is changed to be − γ3
1−γ2
. The forecast of
the inflation rate is now given by
πet = at−1πt−1 + bt−1g(rt−1). (5.27)
The RLS learning mechanism is the same as the case of the linear Phillips
curve, except that zi is now modified as
zi =
(
πi−1 g(ri−1)
)′
.
The optimal control problem (5.22) now turns out to have constraints (5.25),
(5.27), (5.20) and (5.21).
Numerical Study
In this version I assume α = 10 and β = 0.99. The solution paths with
the same starting values of the state variables as in the previous subsection
are presented in Figure 5.8A-D. Figure 5.8A represents the path of πt, 5.8B
is the path of bt, 5.8C is the path of Vt and 5.8D is the path of rt. The
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Figure 5.8: RLS Learning with Linear (solid line) and Nonlinear (dashed
line) Phillips Curves
results of this subsection (nonlinear Phillips curve) are presented by dashed
lines, while the results from the previous subsection (linear Phillips curve)
are indicated by solid lines.16
One finds that the state variables also do not converge in the optimal
control problem with the nonlinear Phillips curve. Similar to the case of
the linear Phillips curve, the state and control variables fluctuate cyclically.
Experiments with many different initial values of state variables were un-
16In order to see the differences of the simulations clearly, I just present the results from
t=6 on.
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Table 5.3: Mean and S.D. of State and Control Variables (L and NL stand
for linear and nonlinear Phillips curves respectively).
pit bt Vt rt
L NL L NL L NL L NL
Mean 0.0102 0.0135 0.0181 0.0243 0.0037 0.0049 -0.0101 -0.0135
S.D. 0.0016 0.0022 0.0069 0.0077 0.0060 0.0064 0.0174 0.0190
dertaken and in no case are the state variables found to converge. But the
difference between the simulations with linear and nonlinear Phillips curves
cannot be ignored. Figure 5.8 indicates that both πt (Figure 5.8A) and bt
(Figure 5.8B) evolve at a higher level in the case of a nonlinear Phillips curve
than in the case of a linear one. The mean and standard deviation of πt,
bt, Vt and rt from the two experiments are shown in Table 5.3. The S.D.
and absolute values of the mean of these variables are larger in the case of
the nonlinear Phillips curve than in the case of the linear one. As in the
previous subsection the experiments are undertaken with different γ1 and
γ2 and the results are found to be similar. The fact that the inflation rate
has a higher mean and experiences larger changes in the nonlinear Phillips
curve than in the linear one seems to be consistent with the research of Tam-
bakis (1998) who analyzes the single-period Barro-Gordon optimal monetary
problem with a convex Phillips curve and an asymmetric loss function. Tam-
bakis (1998) finds that, both symmetric and asymmetric loss functions with
a convex Phillips curve yield a positive expected inflation bias.
Next, I show the b˜ in the nonlinear Phillips curve in Figure 5.9. b˜ in the
nonlinear Phillips curve equals γ2bt−1−γ3. The b˜ and b¯ from the simulations
with the linear Phillips curve are also shown in Figure 5.9, from which one
finds that the b˜ evolves at a higher level than b¯ in both linear and nonlinear
Phillips curves.
Above I have explored optimal monetary policy rules with adaptive learn-
ing. The simulations indicate that the state variables do not converge no
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Figure 5.9: Paths of b˜t and b¯ in Linear and Nonlinear Phillips Curves (NL
stands for nonlinear)
matter whether the linear or nonlinear Phillips curve is employed. This is
different from the conclusion of Sargent (1999), who claims that the state
variables can converge in such a non-stochastic model. The problem of Sar-
gent (1999), as mentioned before, is that he employs two assumptions which
turn out to be inconsistent with each other. This is because he explores
the problem in a traditional LQ framework which fails to endogenize the
uncertain parameter.
5.4 Monetary Policy Rules with Robust Con-
trol
A disadvantage of adaptive learning analyzed in the previous section is that
I have considered only parameter uncertainty. Monetary authorities have to
guard against uncertainties such as model misspecification in a more general
way. For this purpose robust control theory has been applied. Robust control
induces the economic agents to seek a strategy for the “worst case” and
can deal with more general uncertainties than the adaptive learning does.
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On the basis of some earlier papers (see Hansen and Sargent 1999, 2001a,
2001b), Hansen and Sargent (2002) explore robust control in macroeconomics
in detail. Cagetti, Hansen, Sargent and Williams (2002) also employ robust
control in macroeconomics. Svensson (2000) applies the idea of robust control
in a simpler framework. Giordani and So¨derlind (2002) and Giannoni (2002),
however, extend the robust control theory by considering forward-looking
behaviors.
The interesting question concerning monetary policy under uncertainty
is whether the central bank should show a stronger or weaker response to the
fluctuations of economic variables than when no uncertainty exists. Brainard
(1967), for example, proposes that parameter uncertainty should incur a more
“cautious” policy. This argument has been supported by recent research of
Martin and Salmon (1999) who explore the monetary policy of the UK, em-
ploying a VAR model with and without parameter uncertainty. They find
that the optimal rule in the presence of parameter uncertainty incurs a less ag-
gressive path for official interest rates than when no parameter uncertainty is
considered. Other researchers, Gonzalez and Rodriguez (2003) and Giannoni
(2002), for example, however, argue that uncertainty does not necessarily re-
quire caution. Following Hansen and Sargent (2002), in this section I will
explore this problem with robust control and take up the problem of central
bank’s response under uncertainty with respect to model misspecification.17
The research undertaken below is based on the framework of Hansen and
Sargent (2002). A brief sketch of the robust control theory developed by
Hansen and Sargent (2002) is presented in Appendix B of this chapter. Note
that the so-called robustness parameter θ plays an important role. It reflects
the agents’ preferences of robustness and plays an important role in the prob-
lem’s solution. If θ is +∞, the problem collapses to the traditional optimal
control without model misspecification. Gonzalez and Rodriguez (2003) ex-
plore how the robustness parameter θ affects the control variable and prove
17Brock et al. (2003) and Brock and Xepapadeas (2003) also explore policy in an
uncertain economic environment. Whereas they have discussed how changes of parameters
in a model may affect the policy response, here I discuss how the so-called robustness
parameter may influence the policy rules.
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that in a one-state and one-control model, the response is characterized by a
hyperbolic function with a discontinuity at θ. Namely, the response presents
a concave shape on the right side of the discontinuity and a convex one on
the left.
Related to the above is the concept of a detection error probability. It
is a statistic concept designed by Hansen and Sargent (2002, Ch. 13) to
spell out how difficult it is to tell the approximating model apart from the
distorted one. The larger the detection error probability, the more difficult
to tell the two models apart. The design and interpretation of the detection
error probability are shown in the appendix.
Semmler, Greiner and Zhang (2003) estimate the IS and Phillips curves
with the US quarterly data for the period 1961-1999.18 Next I will undertake
some simulations of the robust control with the parameters estimated by
Semmler, Greiner and Zhang (2003). Let A11 be the sum of the coefficients
of the lagged inflation rates in the Phillips curves (0.965) and A22 be the sum
of the coefficients of the lagged output gaps in the IS curve (0.864), one has
A =
(
0.965 0.045
0.074 0.864
)
, B =
(
0
−0.074
)
, xt =
(
πt
yt
)
,
and ut = rt with πt, yt and rt being the inflation rate, output gap and
deviation of the interest rate from its long-run equilibrium level (assumed to
be zero in the simulation below) respectively. The problem then turns out
to be
Max
{Rt}∞t=0
Min
{ωt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
ρt
[
−(π2t + λy
2
t ) + ρθω
′
t+1ωt+1
]
subject to
xt+1 = Axt +Brt + C(ǫt+1 + ωt+1).
With the parameters above and the starting values of π0 and y0 both being
0.02, λ = 1, ρ = 0.985 and C =
(
0.01 0
0 0.01
)
, the detection error probability
18The data source is the International Statistical Yearbook. The output gap is measured
by the percentage deviation of the IPI from its HP-filtered trend. The inflation rate is
measured by changes in the GDP deflator and the short-term interest rate is measured by
the federal funds rate.
125
Figure 5.10: Detection Error Probability
is shown in Figure 5.10.19 If one wants a detection error probability of about
0.15, then σ = −33, that is θ = 0.03. With θ = 0.03, one has
F =
(
10.462 12.117
)
, K =
(
5.291 0.247
4.737× 10−7 5.486× 10−7
)
,
and the value function turns out to be
V (π, y) = 16.240π2 + 1.033y2 + 1.421πy + 0.113.
If one wants a higher detection error probability, 0.40 for example, one has
σ = −11 (θ = 0.091), and
F =
(
7.103 11.960
)
, K =
(
1.173 0.055
1.072× 10−7 1.805× 10−7
)
,
and V(π,y) = 11.134 π2+1.022y2+0.945πy+0.080. In case θ = +∞, one
has F =
(
6.438 11.929
)
and V(π, y) = 10.120π2+1.020y2 +0.850πy+0.073.
Comparing the elements in F obtained with different values of θ, one finds
that the lower the θ, the higher the coefficients of the inflation rate and
output gap in the interest-rate rule. That is, the farther the distorted model
19The numerical studies in this section are done with the algorithms developed by
Hansen and Sargent (2002). In the computation of the detection error probability, T
(number of periods) is set to be 150 and 5000 simulations are undertaken here.
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stays away from the approximating one, the stronger the response of the
interest rate to the inflation and output gap. This is consistent with the
conclusion of Gonzalez and Rodriguez (2003) who deal with a one-state and
one-control model and prove that more uncertainty with respect to model
misspecification requires a stronger response of the control variable. This
is also consistent with the conclusion of Giannoni (2002) who shows that
uncertainty does not necessarily require caution in a forward-looking model
with robust control.
I present the paths of the inflation rate, output gap and interest rate with
different values of θ in Figure 5.11A-C. One finds that the lower the θ, the
larger the volatility of the state and control variables. The standard devia-
tions of the state and control variables are shown in Table 5.4, which indicates
that the standard deviations of the state and control variables increase if θ
decreases.
Table 5.4: Standard Deviations of the State and Control Variables with
Different Values of θ
θ S.D. of πt S.D. of yt S.D. of rt
0.03 0.038 0.028 0.223
0.09 0.032 0.017 0.186
+∞ 0.030 0.015 0.179
Next, I come to a special case, namely the case of zero shocks. What
do the state and control variables look like and how can the robustness pa-
rameter θ affect the state variables and the value function? According to
the certainty equivalence principle, the optimal rules of the robust control
with zero shocks are the same as when there are non-zero shocks. That is, F
and K in Eq. (5.48) and (5.49) do not change no matter whether there are
shocks or not. The difference lies in the value function. The simulations for
zero shocks and with the same parameters as in the case of non-zero shocks
are shown in Figure 5.12. Figure 5.12A-C present the paths of the state and
control variables with different θ respectively. In Figure 5.12 one finds that
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B: Output Gap
C: Interest Rate
A: Inflation Rate
Period
Period
Period
Figure 5.11: Simulation of the Robust Control with π0 = 0.02 and y0 = 0.02
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the state variables converge to their equilibria zero no matter whether the
robustness parameter is small or large. But in the case of a small robustness
parameter, the state variables evolve at a higher level and converge more
slowly to zero than when the robustness parameter is large. The simulations
tell us that the larger the robustness parameter θ, the lower the πt, yt and
rt, and moreover, the faster the state variables converge to their equilibria.
And in case θ = +∞, the state variables reach their lowest values and attain
the equilibria at the highest speed.
In sum, I have shown that uncertainty with respect to model misspecifi-
cation might not necessarily require caution. Though robust control can deal
with problems that cannot be solved with the classical optimal control theory,
some researchers have cast doubt on robust control. Chen and Epstein (2000)
and Epstein and Schneider (2001), for example, criticize the application of
the robust control theory for problems of time-inconsistency in preferences.
Therefore, Hansen and Sargent (2001b) discuss the time-consistency of the
alternative representations of preferences that underlie the robust control
theory. An important criticism of robust control comes from Sims (2001a).
He criticizes the robust control approach on conceptual grounds. As pointed
out by Sims (2001a), there are major sources of more fundamental types of
uncertainties that the robust control theory does not address.20 One major
uncertainty is the extent to which there is a medium run trade-off between
inflation and output. Sims (2001a) shows that long run effects of inflation on
output may not need to be completely permanent in order to be important.
On the other hand, deflation may have strong destabilizing effects while in-
terest rates are already very low. Thus, there may, in fact, be a long-run
non-vertical Phillips curve.21 Yet, the robust control approach developed
so far seems to follow the neutrality postulate, implying a vertical long-run
Phillips curve.
20Moreover, steady states might not be optimal, if multiple steady states exist, see
Greiner and Semmler (2002).
21See Graham and Snower (2002) and Blanchard (2003b), for example.
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Figure 5.12: Results of the Robust Control with Zero Shocks
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter is concerned with monetary policy rules under uncertainty. I
have first presented some empirical evidence of uncertainty using a State-
Space model with Markov-Switching. The empirical model using the US
data indicates that there have been regime changes in both parameters and
shocks. Based on this empirical evidence I have then explored two approaches
to deal with monetary policy under uncertainty: (a) adaptive learning, and
(b) robust control. In the former case the central bank is assumed to improve
its knowledge of economic models by learning from the information available.
While the adaptive learning considers mainly parameter uncertainty, robust
control admits more general uncertainties.
As regards adaptive learning, in contrast to Sargent (1999), who explores
monetary policy with adaptive learning in a two-step decision process, I have
endogenized the uncertain parameter and employed a dynamic programming
algorithm with adaptive grids, which can deal with nonlinear state equations,
so that I have solved the model appropriately. With such an approach I
was able to overcome the problem of inconsistency in the two-step decision
process of Sargent (1999). Yet, different from the results of Sargent (1999),
I show that, when the learning of coefficients is fully endogenized, the state
variables do not necessarily converge even in a non-stochastic model with
adaptive learning.
As regards robust control, which is a more general approach to guard pol-
icy against uncertainty, I have focused on model misspecification and shock
uncertainty and explored whether uncertainty requires caution. Different
from the common view that monetary policy under uncertainty should be
more cautious as compared to no uncertainty, my research indicates that the
robust policy rule may respond more strongly to the economic variables in
the presence of uncertainty and therefore implies that uncertainty does not
necessarily require caution.
Finally I want to note that there might exist other kinds of uncertainties,
among which the data uncertainty has attracted much attention. The usu-
ally discussed data uncertainty is concerned with the output gap or NAIRU
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uncertainty. A discussion of the unreliability of output gap estimated with
real-time data can be found in Orphanides and van Norden (2002). The effect
of data uncertainty on monetary policy may be different from those of model
and shock uncertainties.22 In contrast to my above results on robust control,
in the research on data uncertainty it is frequently found that the central
bank should respond with greater caution to a variable estimated with error
than it would in the absence of data uncertainty.23 More research on data
uncertainty and more succinct results are surely expected to be forthcoming
in the future.
22Jenkins (2002) claims that, the policy to be pursued may not be affected by pure data
uncertainty in the case of additive-shock uncertainty. But in case the central bank follows
an interest-rate rule that is a function of a small number of variables, the monetary policy
rule may be largely affected by data uncertainty.
23Rudebusch (2001), for example, shows that an increase in output-gap uncertainty may
reduce the coefficient on the output gap in the best simple rule.
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Appendix A: State-Space Model with Markov-
Switching
Below I make a brief sketch of the State-Space model with Markov-Switching
explored by Kim and Nelson (1999, Ch. 5).
Let ψt−1 denote the vector of observations available as of time t−1. In
the usual derivation of the Kalman filter in a State-Space model without
Markov-Switching, the forecast of φt based on ψt−1 can be denoted by φt|t−1.
Similarly, the matrix denoting the mean squared error of the forecast can be
written as
Pt|t−1 = E[(φt − φt|t−1)(φt − φt|t−1)
′|ψt−1],
where E is the expectation operator.
In the State-Space model with Markov-Switching, the goal is to form a
forecast of φt based not only on ψt−1 but also conditional on the random
variable St taking on the value j and on St−1 taking on the value i (i and j
equal 0 or 1):
φ
(i,j)
t|t−1 = E[φt|ψt−1, St = j, St−1 = i],
and correspondingly the mean squared error of the forecast is
P
(i,j)
t|t−1 = E[(φt − φt|t−1)(φt − φt|t−1)
′|ψt−1, St = j, St−1 = i].
Conditional on St−1 = i and St = j (i, j = 0, 1), the Kalman filter
algorithm for our model is as follows:
φ
(i,j)
t|t−1 = Φ¯j + Fφ
i
t−1|t−1, (5.28)
P
(i,j)
t|t−1 = FP
i
t−1|t−1F
′ + σ2η, (5.29)
ξ
(i,j)
t|t−1 = Yt −Xtφ
(i,j)
t|t−1, (5.30)
ν
(i,j)
t|t−1 = XtP
(i,j)
t|t−1X
′
t + σ
2
ε,j, (5.31)
φ
(i,j)
t|t = φ
(i,j)
t|t−1 + P
(i,j)
t|t−1X
′
t[ν
(i,j)
t|t−1]
−1ξ
(i,j)
t|t−1, (5.32)
P
(i,j)
t|t = (I − P
(i,j)
t|t−1X
′
t[ν
(i,j)
t|t−1]
−1Xt)P
(i,j)
t|t−1, (5.33)
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where ξ
(i,j)
t|t−1 is the conditional forecast error of Yt based on information up to
time t−1 and ν(i,j)
t|t−1 is the conditional variance of the forecast error ξ
(i,j)
t|t−1. In
order to make the above Kalman filter algorithm operable, Kim and Nelson
(1999) develop some approximations and manage to collapse φ
(i,j)
t|t and P
(i,j)
t|t
into φj
t|t and P
j
t|t respectively.
Because the Phillips and IS curves contain only lags of variables and have
uncorrelated noise, one can estimate the two equations separately. For the
Phillips curve one has the following State-Space model
Yt = πt, Xt = (1 πt−1 yt−1), φt = (α1t α2t α3t)
′, εt = επt,
with
επt ∼ N(0, σ
2
επ,St
),
σ2επ,St = σ
2
επ,0 + (σ
2
επ,1 − σ
2
επ,0)St, σ
2
επ,1 > σ
2
επ,0,
and
ηt = (ηα1t ηα2t ηα3t)
′,
σ2η = (σ
2
ηα1
σ2ηα2 σ
2
ηα3
)′,
Φ¯St = (Φ¯α1,St Φ¯α2,St Φ¯α3,St)
′,
F =


fα1 0 0
0 fα2 0
0 0 fα3

 ,
and similarly for the IS curve, one has
Yt = yt, Xt = (1 yt−1 rt−1), φt = (β1t β2t β3t)
′, εt = εyt,
with
εyt ∼ N(0, σ
2
εy,St
),
σ2εy,St = σ
2
εy,0 + (σ
2
εy,1 − σ
2
εy,0)St, σ
2
εy,1 > σ
2
εy,0,
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and
ηt = (ηβ1t ηβ2t ηβ3t)
′,
σ2η = (σ
2
ηβ1
σ2ηβ2 σ
2
ηβ3
)′,
Φ¯St = (Φ¯β1,St Φ¯β2,St Φ¯β3,St)
′
F =


fβ1 0 0
0 fβ2 0
0 0 fβ3

 .
Appendix B: A Brief Sketch of Robust Control
Here I present a brief sketch of the robust control theory developed by Hansen
and Sargent (2002). Let the one-period loss function be L(y,u)=−(x′Qx +
u′Ru), with Q being positive semi-definite and R positive definite matrices.
The optimal linear regulator problem without model misspecification is
Max
{ut}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
ρtL(xt, ut), 0 < ρ < 1, (5.34)
subject to the so-called approximating model24
xt+1 = Axt +But + Cǫˇt+1, x0 given, (5.35)
where {ǫˇ} is an iid Gaussian vector process with mean zero and identity
contemporaneous covariance matrix. If there is some model misspecification,
the policy maker will not regard the model above as true but only as a good
approximation to another model that cannot be specified. In order to express
the misspecification which cannot be depicted by ǫˇ because of its iid nature,
24The matrices A, B, Q and R are assumed to satisfy the assumptions stated in Hansen
and Sargent (2002, Ch. 3).
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Hansen and Sargent (2002) take a set of models surrounding Eq. (5.35) of
the form (the so-called distorted model)
xt+1 = Axt +But + C(ǫt+1 + ωt+1), (5.36)
where {ǫt} is another iid Gaussian process with mean zero and identity co-
variance matrix and ωt+1 a vector process that can feed back in a general
way on the history of x:
ωt+1 = gt(xt, xt−1, ...), (5.37)
where {gt} is a sequence of measurable functions. When Eq. (5.36) generates
the data, the errors ǫˇ in (5.35) are distributed as N (ωt+1, I) rather than as
N (0,I). Hansen and Sargent (2002) further restrain the approximation errors
by
E0
∞∑
t=0
ρt+1ω′t+1ωt+1 ≤ η0. (5.38)
to express the idea that Eq. (5.35) is a good approximation when Eq. (5.36)
generates the data. In order to solve the robust control problem (5.34) subject
to Eq. (5.36) and (5.38), Hansen and Sargent (2002) consider two kinds of
robust control problems, the constraint problem and the multiplier problem,
which differ in how they implement the constraint (5.38). The constraint
problem is
Max
{ut}∞t=0
Min
{ωt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
ρtU(xt, ut), (5.39)
subject to Eq. (5.36) and (5.38). Given θ ∈ (θ, +∞) with θ > 0, the
multiplier problem can be presented as
Max
{ut}∞t=0
Min
{ωt+1}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
ρt{U(xt, ut) + ρθω
′
t+1ωt+1}, (5.40)
subject to Eq. (5.36). Hansen and Sargent (2002, Ch. 6) prove that under
certain conditions the two problems have the same outcomes. Therefore,
solving one of the two problems is sufficient.
The robustness parameter θ reflects the agents’ preferences of robust-
ness and plays an important role in the problem’s solution. If θ is +∞, the
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problem collapses to the traditional optimal control without model misspeci-
fication. In order to find a reasonable value for θ, Hansen and Sargent (2002,
Ch. 13) design a detection error probability function by a likelihood ratio.
Consider a fixed sample of observations on the state xt, t = 0, ..., T − 1, and
let Lij be the likelihood of that sample for model j assuming that model i
generates the data, the likelihood ratio is
ri ≡ log
Lii
Lij
, (5.41)
where i 6= j. When model i generates the data, ri should be positive. Define
pA = Prob(mistake|A) = freq(rA ≤ 0),
pB = Prob(mistake|B) = freq(rB ≤ 0).
Thus pA is the frequency of negative log likelihood ratios rA when model A is
true and pB is the frequency of negative log likelihood ratios rB when model
B is true. Attach equal prior weights to model A and B, the detection error
probability can be defined as
p(θ) =
1
2
(pA + pB). (5.42)
When a reasonable value of p(θ) is chosen, a corresponding value of θ can be
determined by inverting the probability function defined in (5.42). Hansen
and Sargent (2002, Ch. 7) find that θ can be defined as the negative inverse
value of the so-called risk-sensitivity parameter σ, that is θ = − 1
σ
.
Note the interpretation of the detection error probability. As seen above,
it is a statistic concept designed to spell out how difficult it is to tell the
approximating model apart from the distorted one. The larger the detec-
tion error probability, the more difficult to tell the two models apart. In
the extreme case, when it is 0.5 (θ = +∞), the two models are the same.
So a central bank can choose a θ according to how large a detection error
probability it wants. If the detection error probability is very small, that
means, if it is quite easy to tell the two models apart, it does not make much
sense to design a robust rule. As stated by Anderson, Hansen and Sargent
(2000), the aim of the detection error probability is to eliminate models that
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are easy to tell apart statistically. Note that the higher the θ, the lower the
robustness, not the opposite.
Next, I present the solution of the multiplier problem.25 Define
D(P ) = P + PC(θI − C ′PC)−1C ′P, (5.43)
F(Ω) = ρ[R + ρB′ΩB]−1B′ΩA, (5.44)
T (P ) = Q+ ρA
(
P − ρPB(R + ρB′PB)−1B′P
)
A. (5.45)
Let P be the fixed point of iterations on T ◦ D:
P = T ◦ D(P ),
then the solution of the multiplier problem (5.40) is
u = −Fx, (5.46)
ω = Kx, (5.47)
with
F = F ◦ D(P ), (5.48)
K = θ−1(I − θ−1C ′PC)−1C ′P [A−BF ]. (5.49)
It is obvious that in case θ = +∞, D(P ) = P and the problem collapses into
the traditional LQ problem.
25See Hansen and Sargent (2002, Ch. 6) for details.
Chapter 6
Monetary Policy Rules with
Financial Markets
6.1 Introduction
It is clear that the inflation rates in the industrial countries in the 1990s
remained relatively stable and low, while the prices of equities, bonds, and
foreign exchanges experienced a strong volatility with the liberalization of
financial markets. Some central banks, therefore, have become concerned
with such volatility and doubt whether it is justifiable on the basis of eco-
nomic fundamentals. The question has arisen whether a monetary policy
should be pursued that takes into account financial markets and asset price
stabilization. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to model the
relationship between asset prices and the real economy. An early study of
this type can be found in Blanchard (1981) who has analyzed the relation
between the stock value and output in “good news” and “bad news” cases.
Recent examples include Bernanke and Gertler (2000), Smets (1997), Kent
and Lowe (1997), Chiarella et al. (2001), Mehra (1998), Vickers (1999),
Filardo (2000), Okina, Shirakawa and Shirats (2000) and Dupor (2001).
Among these papers, the research by Bernanke and Gertler (2000) has
attracted much attention. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) employ a macroeco-
nomic model and explore how the macroeconomy may be affected by alter-
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native monetary policy rules which may, or may not, take into account the
asset-price bubble. There they conclude that it is desirable for central banks
to focus on underlying inflationary pressures and “asset prices become rele-
vant only to the extent they may signal potential inflationary or deflationary
forces” (Bernanke and Gertler, 2000, abstract).
The shortcomings of the position by Bernanke and Gertler (2000) may,
however, be expressed as follows. First, they do not derive monetary policy
rules from certain estimated models, but instead design artificially alternative
monetary policy rules which may or may not consider asset-price bubbles and
then explore the effects of these rules on the economy. Second, Bernanke and
Gertler (2000) assume that the asset-price bubble always grows at a certain
rate before breaking. However, the asset-price bubble in reality might not
break suddenly, but may instead increase or decrease at a ceratin rate before
becoming zero. Third, they assume that the bubble can exist for a few periods
and will not occur again after breaking. Therefore, they explore the effects of
the asset-price bubble on the real economy in the short-run. Fourth, they do
not endogenize the probability that the asset-price bubble will break in the
next period because little is known about the market psychology. Monetary
policy with endogenized probability for bubbles to break may be different
from that with an exogenous probability.
The difference between my model below and that of Bernanke and Gertler
(2000) consists in the following points. First, I employ an intertemporal
framework to explore what the optimal monetary policy should be with and
without the financial markets taken into account. Second, I assume that
the bubble does not break suddenly and does not have to always grow at
a certain rate; on the contrary, it may increase or decrease at a certain
rate with some probability. The bubble does not have to break in certain
periods and moreover, it can occur again even after breaking. Third, I assume
that the probability that the asset-price bubble will increase or decrease in
the next period can be endogenized. This assumption has also been made
by Kent and Lowe (1997). They assume that the probability for an asset-
price bubble to break is a function of the current asset-price bubble and
the monetary policy. The drawback of Kent and Lowe (1997), however,
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is that they explore only positive bubbles and assume a linear probability
function, which is not bounded between 0 and 1. Following Bernanke and
Gertler (2000), I consider both positive and negative bubbles and employ a
nonlinear probability function which lies between 0 and 1.
What, however, complicates the response of monetary policy to asset
price volatility is the relationship of asset prices and product prices, the lat-
ter being mainly the concern of the central banks. Low asset prices may be
accompanied by low or negative inflation rates. Yet, there is a zero bound
on the nominal interest rate. The danger of deflation and the so-called “Liq-
uidity Trap” has recently attracted much attention because there exists, for
example, a severe deflation and recession in Japan and monetary policy seems
to be of little help since the nominal rate is almost zero and can hardly be low-
ered further. On the other hand, the financial market of Japan has also been
in a depression for a long time. Although some researchers have discussed
the zero interest-rate bound and Liquidity Trap in Japan, little attention has
been paid to the asset price depression in the presence of a zero bound on the
nominal rate. I will explore this problem with some simulations of a simple
model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2 I set
up the basic model under the assumption that central banks pursue mone-
tary policy to minimize a quadratic loss function. I will derive a monetary
policy rule from the basic model by assuming that the output can be affected
by the asset-price bubbles. The probability for the asset-price bubble to in-
crease or decrease in the next period is assumed to be a constant. Section
3 explores evidence of the monetary policy with asset price in the Euro-area
with a model set up by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998). Section 4 extends
the model by assuming that the probability that the asset-price bubble will
increase or decrease in the next period is influenced by the size of the bubble
and the current interest rate. Section 5 explores how the asset price may
affect the real economy in the presence of the danger of deflation and a zero
bound on the nominal rate. The last section concludes this chapter.
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6.2 The Basic Model
Monetary Policy Rule from a Traditional Model
Let’s rewrite the simple model explored in Chapter 3:
Min
{rt}∞0
∞∑
t=0
ρtLt
with
Lt = (πt − π
∗)2 + λy2t , λ > 0,
subject to
πt+1 = α1πt + α2yt, αi > 0 (6.1)
yt+1 = β1yt − β2(rt − πt), βi > 0, (6.2)
where πt denotes the deviation of the inflation rate from its target π
∗ (as-
sumed to be zero here), yt is output gap, and rt denotes the gap between the
short-term nominal rate Rt and the long-run level of the short-term rate R¯
(i.e. rt = Rt − R¯). ρ is the discount factor bounded between 0 and 1. In
order for consistent expectations to exist, α1 is usually assumed to be 1.
From Chapter 3 one knows the optimal policy rule reads
rt = f1πt + f2yt, (6.3)
with
f1 = 1 +
ρα21α2Ω1
(λ+ ρα22Ω1)β2
, (6.4)
f2 =
β1
β2
+
ρα22α1Ω1
(λ+ ρα22Ω1)β2
; (6.5)
and
Ω1 =
1
2

1− λ(1− ρα21)
ρα22
+
√(
1−
λ(1− ρα21)
ρα22
)2
+
4λ
ρα22

 . (6.6)
Equation (6.3) shows that the optimal short-term interest rate is a linear
function of the inflation rate and output gap. It is similar to the Taylor rule
(Taylor, 1993). The simulations undertaken in Chapter 3 show that the state
and control variables converge to zero over time.
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Monetary Policy Rule with Asset-Price Bubbles
The model explored above does not take asset prices into account. Recently,
however, some researchers argue that the financial markets can probably
influence the inflation and output. Filardo (2000), for example, surveys
some research which argues that the stock price may influence the infla-
tion. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) explore how asset-price bubbles can affect
the real economy with alternative monetary policy rules. Smets (1997) de-
rives an optimal monetary policy rule from an intertemporal model under
the assumption that the stock price can affect output. In the research below
I also take into account the effects of the financial markets on the output
and explore what the monetary policy rule should be. Before setting up the
model I will explain some basic concepts.
In the research below I assume that the stock price st consists of the
fundamental value s˜t and the asset-price bubble bt. I will not discuss how to
compute the asset-price bubble or the fundamental value here, because this
requires much work which is out of the scope of this chapter.1 The stock
price reads
st = s˜t + bt.
I further assume that if the stock price equals its fundamental value, the
financial market exacts no effects on the output gap, that is, the financial
market affects the output gap only through the asset-price bubbles. The
asset-price bubble can be either positive or negative. The difference be-
tween the bubble in my research and those of Blanchard and Watson (1982),
Bernanke and Gertler (2000), and Kent and Lowe (1997) is briefly stated
below.
The so-called “rational bubble” defined by Blanchard and Watson (1982)
cannot be negative because a negative bubble can lead to negative expected
stock prices. Another difference between the bubble in this chapter and a
rational bubble is that the latter always increases before breaking. Therefore,
a rational bubble is non-stationary. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) also define
1Alternative approaches have been proposed to compute the fundamental value and
bubbles of the asset price. One example can be found in Shiller (1984).
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the bubble as the gap between the stock price and its fundamental value. It
can be positive or negative. The reason that they do not assume a rational
bubble is that the non-stationarity of a rational bubble leads to technical
problems in their framework. Kent and Lowe (1997) explore only positive
bubbles.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) and Kent and Lowe (1997), however, have
something in common: they all assume that the bubble will break in a few
periods (4 or 5 periods) from a certain value to zero suddenly rather than
gradually. Moreover, if the bubble is broken, it will not occur again. This is,
in fact, not true in practice, because in reality the bubble does not necessarily
break suddenly from a large or low value, but may decrease or increase step
by step before becoming zero rapidly or slowly. Especially, if the bubble is
negative, it is implausible that the stock price will return to its fundamental
value suddenly. A common assumption of the rational bubble and those
definitions of Bernanke and Gertler (2000) and Kent and Lowe (1997) is that
they all assume that the bubble will grow at a certain rate before it bursts.
Although I also define the asset-price bubble as the deviation of the asset
price from its fundamental value, the differences between the bubble in this
chapter and those mentioned above are obvious. To be precise, the bubble
in my research below has the following properties: (a) it can be positive or
negative, (b) it can increase or decrease before becoming zero or may even
change from a positive (negative) one to a negative (positive) one and does
not have to burst suddenly, (c) nobody knows when it will burst and, (d)
it can occur again in the next period even if it becomes zero in the current
period. Therefore, I assume the asset-price bubble evolves in the following
way
bt+1 =

bt(1 + g1) + εt+1, with probability pbt(1− g2) + εt+1, with probability 1− p (6.7)
where g1, g2 (≥ 0) are the growth rate or decrease rate of the bubble. g1 can,
of course, equal g2. εt is an iid noise with zero mean and a constant variance.
Eq. (6.7) indicates that if the asset-price bubble bt is positive, it may increase
at rate g1 with probability p and decrease at rate g2 with probability 1− p in
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the next period. If the bubble is negative, however, it may decrease at rate g1
with probability p and increase at rate g2 with probability 1 − p in the next
period. The probability p is assumed to be a constant in this section, but
state-dependent in the fourth section. From this equation one finds that even
if the bubble is zero in the current period, it might not be zero in the next
period.
Before exploring the monetary policy with asset-price bubbles theoreti-
cally, I explore some empirical evidence of the effects of the share bubbles on
output gap. To be precise, I estimate the following equation by way of the
OLS with the quarterly data of several OECD countries:
yt = c0 + c1yt−1 + c2bt−1 + ǫt, ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ǫ ) (6.8)
with yt denoting the output gap. Following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998)
I use the Industrial Production Index (IPI) to measure the output. The
output gap is measured by the percentage deviation of the IPI (base year:
1995) from its Band-Pass filtered trend.2 Similarly the asset-price bubble is
measured by the percentage deviation of the share price index (base year:
1995) from its Band-Pass filtered trend just for simplicity. The estimation
of Eq. (6.8) is shown in Table 6.1 with T-Statistics in parentheses. The
estimate of c0 is not shown just for simplicity. The estimation is undertaken
for two samples: (a) 1980-1999, and (b) 1990-1999.
From Table 6.1 one finds that c2 is significant enough in most cases. For
the sample from 1990-99 it is significant enough in the cases of all countries
except the US, but for the sample from 1980-99 it is significant enough in the
case of the US. For the sample from 1980-99 it is insignificant in the cases
of France and Italy, but significant enough in the cases of both countries in
the period from 1990-99. It is significant enough in both samples of Japan.
In short, the evidence in Table 6.1 does show some positive relation between
2The reader is referred to Baxter and King (1995) for the Band-Pass filter. As surveyed
by Orphanides and van Norden (2002), there are many methods to measure the output
gap. I find that filtering the IPI using the Band-Pass filter leaves the measure of the
output gap essentially unchanged from the measure with the HP-filter. The Band-Pass
filter has also been used by Sargent (1999).
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Table 6.1: Estimation of Eq. (6.8)
Para. Sample US UK∗ France Germany Italy Japan
80.1-99.1 0.902
(22.218)
0.827
(16.821)
0.879
(19.170)
0.855
(19.313)
0.912
(22.024)
0.865
(18.038)
c1 90.1-99.1 0.925
(15.790)
0.918
(22.362)
0.836
(12.153)
0.808
(16.267)
0.843
(11.666)
0.864
(12.889)
80.1-99.1 0.064
(5.158)
0.050
(2.898)
0.005
(0.713)
0.021
(2.506)
0.002
(0.385)
0.045
(3.505)
c2 90.1-99.1 0.0005
(0.035)
0.099
(5.517)
0.032
(2.328)
0.075
(6.085)
0.020
(1.921)
0.063
(3.220)
80.1-99.1 0.875 0.824 0.845 0.864 0.869 0.835
R2 90.1-99.1 0.886 0.953 0.849 0.928 0.819 0.858
*The estimation of the UK is undertaken for 80.1-97.1 and 90.1-97.1 because the
share price index after 1997 is unavailable. Data source: International Statistical
Yearbook.
the share bubbles and the output gap.
In the estimation above I have considered only the effect of the lagged
asset-price bubble on output for simplicity, but in reality the expectation of
financial markets may also influence the output. As regards how financial
variables may influence the output, the basic argument is that the changes
of the asset price may influence consumption (see Ludvigson and Steindel
(1999), for example) and investment, which may in turn affect the inflation
and output. The investment, however, can be affected by both current and
forward-looking behaviors.
Therefore, in the model below I assume that the output gap can be in-
fluenced not only by the lagged asset-price bubble but also by expectations
of asset-price bubbles formed in the previous period, that is,
yt+1 = β1yt − β2(rt − πt) + β3bt + (1− β3)Ebt+1|t, 1 > β3 > 0, (6.9)
where Ebt+1|t denotes the expectation of bt+1 formed at time t. From Eq.
(6.7) and Eεt+1|t = 0 one knows
Ebt+1|t = [1− g2 + p(g1 + g2)]bt. (6.10)
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As a result, Eq. (6.9) turns out to be
yt+1 = β1yt − β2{rt − πt}+ {1 + (1− β3)[p(g1 + g2)− g2]}bt. (6.11)
One can follow the same procedure as in Chapter 3 to solve the optimal
control problem, since the bubble is taken as an exogenous variable. After
replacing Eq. (6.2) with Eq. (6.11) one obtains the following monetary policy
rule for the central bank
rt = f1πt + f2yt + f3bt, (6.12)
with f1 and f2 given by (6.4)–(6.5) and
f3 =
1
β2
{1 + (1− β3)[p(g1 + g2)− g2]}. (6.13)
This rule is similar to the one obtained before except that there is an addi-
tional term of the bubble. The effect of p on the monetary policy rule can
be explored from the following derivative
df3
dp
=
1
β2
[(1− β3)(g1 + g2)] ≥ 0. (6.14)
The interpretation of (6.14) depends on whether the bubble is positive or
negative. If the bubble is positive, a larger p leads to a higher f3 and as
a result, a higher rt. This is consistent with intuition, because in order
to eliminate a positive bubble which is likely to continue to increase, it is
necessary to raise the interest rate, since it is usually argued that there exists
a negative relation between the interest rate and stock price.
Some empirical evidence on the effects of interest rate on the stock price
can be obtained from the estimation of the following equation
bt = γ0 + γ1bt−1 + γ2rt + ξt, γ2 < 0, ξt ∼ N(0, σ
2
ξ ). (6.15)
The estimation results with the quarterly data of several OECD countries
are shown in Table 6.2 with T-Statistics in parentheses. From Table 6.2 one
finds that the estimates of γ2 always have the correct sign with relatively
significant T-Statistics except Italy. If one tries the sample from 1990-99 for
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Table 6.2: Estimation of Eq. (6.15)
Parameter US UK France Germany Italy Japan
γ1 0.902
(21.877)
0.874
(20.125)
0.909
(24.227)
0.898
(23.050)
0.921
(25.636)
0.858
(17.429)
γ2 −0.288
(2.738)
−0.450
(2.591)
−0.363
(2.583)
−0.339
(2.067)
−0.070
(0.410)
−0.353
(1.712)
R2 0.809 0.815 0.838 0.831 0.854 0.728
Data source: International Statistical Yearbook. Sample 1970.1-99.1 (UK 70.1-
97.1). The short-term interest rates of the US, the UK, France, Germany, Japan
and Italy are the federal funds rate, the treasury bill rate (UK and France), call
money rate (Germany and Japan) and official discount rate respectively.
Italy, however, one obtains a significant T-Statistic (2.923) of γ2 with the
correct sign.3
If the bubble is negative, however, a larger p also leads to a higher f3
but a lower rt, since bt is negative. That is, in order to eliminate a negative
bubble which is likely to continue to decrease further, the interest rate should
be decreased because of the negative relation between the interest rate and
asset price. As stated before, although p may be state-dependent, I do not
consider this possibility in this section.
6.3 Monetary Policy Rule in Practice: The
Case of the Euro-Area
So far I have explored theoretically the monetary policy rule with the asset
price volatility considered. The question is then whether asset-price bub-
bles have been taken into account in practice. This section presents some
3I have also estimated Eq. (6.15) with rt−1 instead of rt and find that the estimates
of γ2 have correct signs but with smaller T-Statistics than those shown in Table 6.2, lying
between 1.51 and 2.59 for all countries except Italy. The empirical evidence above sug-
gests that the asset-price bubble can be an endogenous variable rather than an exogenous
one. I will not discuss this possibility below, since this may make the model much more
complicated to analyze.
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empirical evidence on this problem.
Following Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) (CGG98 for short), Smets
(1997) estimates the monetary reaction function of Canada and Australia by
adding three financial variables into the CGG98 model, namely, the nomi-
nal trade-weighted exchange rate, ten-year nominal bond yield and a broad
stock market index. His conclusion is that an appreciation of the exchange
rate induces a significant change in the interest rates of the Bank of Canada.
Moreover, he finds that changes in the stock market index also induces sig-
nificant changes in the policy reaction function. The response coefficients in
the case of Australia are, however, insignificant.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) also follow CGG98 by adding stock returns
into the model to test whether interest rates respond to stock returns in the
US and Japan. Their conclusion is that the federal funds rate did not show
a significant response to stock returns from 1979-97. For Japan, however,
they find different results. To be precise, for the whole period 1979-97, there
is little evidence that the stock market played a role in the interest-rate
setting, but for the two subperiods, 1979-89 and 1989-97, the coefficients of
stock returns have enough significant T-Statistics, but with different signs.
Rigobon and Sack (2001), however, claim that the US monetary policy has
reacted significantly to stock market movements.
In this section I also follow CGG98 to test whether the Euro-area mone-
tary policy shows a significant response to the stock market.4
CGG98 assume that the short-term interest rate has the following path:
Rt = (1− κ)R
∗
t + κRt−1 + vt, (6.16)
where Rt denotes the short-term interest rate, R
∗
t is the target interest rate, vt
denotes an iid noise with zero mean and a constant variance, and κ captures
the degree of interest-rate smoothing. The target interest rate is assumed to
be determined in the following way:
R∗t = R¯ + β(E[πt+n|Ωt]− π
∗) + γ(E[yt|Ωt]− y
∗
t ),
4The aggregation of data is the same as in Chapter 2.
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where R¯ is the long-run equilibrium nominal rate, πt+n is the rate of inflation
between periods of t and t+n, yt is the real output, and π
∗ and y∗ are targets
of the inflation and output respectively. E is the expectation operator and
Ωt is the information available to the central bank at the time it sets the
interest rate. After adding the stock market into the equation above one
obtains
R∗t = R¯+β(E[πt+n|Ωt]−π
∗)+γ(E[yt|Ωt]−y
∗
t )+θ(E[st+n|Ωt]− s˜t+n), (6.17)
where st+n is the asset price in period t+n and s˜t denotes the fundamental
value of the asset price. θ is expected to be positive, since I assume that
central banks try to stabilize the stock market with the interest rate as the
instrument. Define α = R¯−βπ∗, xt = yt−y
∗ and bt+n = st+n− s˜t+n (namely
the asset-price bubble), Eq. (6.17) can be rewritten as
R∗t = α+ βE[πt+n|Ωt] + γE[xt|Ωt] + θE[bt+n|Ωt], (6.18)
after substituting Eq. (6.18) into (6.16), one has the following path for Rt:
Rt = (1− κ)α+ (1− κ)βE[πt+n|Ωt] + (1− κ)γE[xt|Ωt]
+ (1− κ)θE[bt+n|Ωt] + κRt−1 + vt. (6.19)
After eliminating the unobserved forecast variables from the expression, one
obtains the following presentation:
Rt = (1−κ)α+(1−κ)βπt+n+(1−κ)γxt+(1−κ)θbt+n+κRt−1+ηt, (6.20)
where ηt = −(1 − κ){β(πt+n − E[πt+n|Ωt]) + γ(xt − E[xt|Ωt]) + θ(bt+n −
E[bt+n|Ωt])}+vt is a linear combination of the forecast errors of the inflation,
output gap, asset-price bubbles and the iid vt. Let µt be a vector of variables
within the central bank’s information set at the time it chooses the interest
rate that are orthogonal to ηt, one has
E[Rt− (1− κ)α− (1− κ)βπt+n− (1− κ)γxt− (1− κ)θbt+n− κRt−1|µt] = 0.
(6.21)
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Table 6.3: GMM Estimation of Eq. (6.21) with Different n for bt+n
Estimates
Parameter n=0 n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4
κ 0.813
(19.792)
0.811
(18.561)
0.894
(30.224)
0.833
(15.870)
0.832
(17.089)
α 0.030
(4.581)
0.028
(3.920)
0.007
(0.466)
0.020
(1.918)
0.021
(2.074)
β 0.748
(5.446)
0.777
(5.343)
1.522
(3.921)
0.940
(4.410)
0.890
(4.567)
γ 2.046
(5.679)
2.011
(5.300)
1.626
(3.234)
2.345
(3.990)
2.363
(4.203)
θ 0.014
(0.509)
0.030
(0.927)
0.240
(2.328)
0.081
(1.264)
0.082
(1.100)
R2 0.914 0.913 0.930 0.904 0.904
J − Stat. 0.088 0.087 0.111 0.069 0.074
Following CGG98 and the estimation in Chapter 2 I use the GMM to estimate
this equation with the EU3 quarterly data.5 Let πt+n = πt+4, as for bt+n I will
try the estimation with different n (0,1,..4).6 The estimates with different n
of bt+n are presented in Table 6.3, with T-Statistics in parentheses.
As shown in Table 6.3, β and γ always have the correct signs and sig-
nificant T-Statistics, indicating that the inflation and output always play
important roles in the interest-rate setting. As for θ, one finds that it always
has the correct sign, but the T-Statistics are not always significant enough.
When n=0 and 1, it is insignificant, when n=3 and 4, it is not enough signifi-
cant, but when n=2 it is significant enough. Therefore, one may say that the
asset price may have played a role (although not necessarily an important
5In order to get the initial estimates of the parameters, I estimate the equation with
traditional non-linear 2SLS methods first. The instruments include the 1-4 lags of the out-
put gap, inflation rate, German call money rate, asset-price bubbles, nominal USD/ECU
exchange rate and a constant. The instruments are pre-whitened before the estimation.
Data source: International Statistical Yearbook.
6Correction for MA(4) autocorrelation is undertaken, and J-statistics are presented
to illustrate the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. A brief explanation of the
J-statistic is given in footnote 3 in Chapter 2.
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Figure 6.1: Actual and Simulated Interest Rates of EU3 (1978.1-98.4)
one) in the interest-rate setting in the Euro-area. The simulated interest rate
with bt+n = bt+2 is presented together with the actual interest rate in Figure
6.1. It is clear that the two rates are close to each other, especially after the
second half of the 1980s.
6.4 Endogenization of P and a Nonlinear Mon-
etary Policy Rule
Up to now I have explored monetary policy with a constant probability for
the asset-price bubble to increase or decrease in the next period. This is, in
fact, a simplified assumption. Monetary policy and other economic variables
can probably influence the path of p. Bernanke and Gertler (2000) take it as
an exogenous variable because so little is known about the effects of policy
actions on p that it is hard to endogenize p. Kent and Lowe (1997), however,
endogenize the probability for the bubble to break as follows:
pt+1 = φ0 + φ1bt + φ2rt, φi > 0. (6.22)
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This function implies that the probability for the asset-price bubble to break
in the next period depends on three factors: (a) an exogenous probability
φ0, (b) the size of the current bubble, and (c) the level of the current interest
rate. The larger the size of the current bubble and the higher the current
interest rate, the larger the probability for the bubble to break in the next
period. Note that, as mentioned before, Kent and Lowe (1997) analyze only
positive asset-price bubbles. Kent and Lowe (1997) describe the effect of the
size of the current bubble on p as follows:
... as the bubble becomes larger and larger, more and more peo-
ple identify the increase in asset prices as a bubble and become
increasingly reluctant to purchase the asset; this makes it more
likely that a correction will occur (Kent and Lowe, 1997, p.16).
The effect of the current interest rate level on p is clear. That is, as the
interest rate increases, the economic agents may expect the asset price to
decrease, which raises the probability that the bubble will break in the next
period.
In this section I will endogenize the p. Although the function given by
Eq. (6.22) seems to be a reasonable choice, I will not employ it below for the
following reasons: (a) as stated above, Kent and Lowe (1997) explore only
positive bubbles, while I consider both positive and negative ones. When the
asset-price bubble is positive, Eq. (6.22) is a reasonable choice. If the bubble
is negative, however, this function has problems. (b) A probability function
should be bounded between 0 and 1, but Eq. (6.22) is an increasing function
without bounds. (c) Eq. (6.22) is a linear function, indicating that p changes
proportionally to the changes of the bubble size and the interest rate. This
may not be true in reality. (d) The p in our model describes the probability
that the bubble will increase (if the bubble is positive) or decrease (if the
bubble is negative) in the next period, while that in the model of Kent and
Lowe (1997) describes the probability that the positive bubble will break in
the next period.
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Figure 6.2: h(x)
Before designing the probability function, I introduce a function h(x) that
will be used below. To be precise, define
h(x) =
1
2
[1− tanh(x)]. (6.23)
It is clear that dh(x)
dx
= − 1
2 cosh2(x)
< 0, with lim
x→∞
h(x) = 0 and lim
x→−∞
h(x) = 1.
The function h(x) is shown in Figure 6.2.
Next, I define the probability function pt+1 as
pt+1 =
1
2
{1− tanh[ϑ(bt, rt)]}, (6.24)
with
ϑ(bt, rt) = φ1f(bt) + φ2sign(bt)rt, φi > 0,
where sign(bt) is the sign function which reads
sign(bt) =


1, if bt > 0;
0, if bt = 0;
−1, if bt < 0,
(6.25)
and f(bt) is the so-called LINEX function which is nonnegative and asym-
metric around 0. The LINEX function, which can be found in Varian (1975)
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Figure 6.3: The LINEX Function
and Nobay and Peel (2003), reads
f(x) = κ[eϕx − ϕx− 1], κ > 0, ϕ 6= 0. (6.26)
κ scales the function and ϕ determines the asymmetry of the function. An
example of f(x) with κ = 0.1 and ϕ = ±1.2 is shown in Figure 6.3. In the
work below I take κ = 1 and ϕ > 0. The function f(x) with a positive ϕ is
flatter when x is negative than when x is positive.
It is clear that
∂pt+1
∂bt
= −
φ1ϕ(e
ϕbt − 1)
2 cosh2[ϑ(bt, rt)]

< 0, if bt > 0,> 0, if bt < 0. (6.27)
Therefore, the probability function given by Eq. (6.24) indicates that the
effects of the current asset-price bubble bt on pt+1 depends on whether the
bubble is positive or negative. In fact, the probability function defined above
is asymmetric around bt = 0. If it is positive, a larger bubble in the current
period implies a lower probability that it will increase in the next period. This
is consistent with the implication of the model of Kent and Lowe (1997):
as more and more economic agents realize the bubble, they will become
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reluctant to buy the asset as the stock price becomes higher and higher.
This in turn prevents the stock price from increasing further. Note that if
the bubble is negative, p represents the probability that bt will decrease in the
next period. In the case of a negative bubble, Eq. (6.27) indicates that the
lower the stock price (but the larger the absolute value of the bubble in this
case), the lower the probability that the (negative) bubble will continue to
decrease in the next period. The justification is the same as for the positive
bubble. As the stock price becomes lower and lower, it is also closer and
closer to its lowest point (stock price does not decrease without end!) and
may, therefore, be more and more likely to increase in the future. But I
assume that the negative bubble does not influence pt+1 as strongly as a
positive one, because in reality economic agents are usually more pessimistic
in a bear market than optimistic in a bull market.
Moreover, it seems more difficult to activate a financial market when it
is in recession than to hold it down when it is booming. This is what the
function f(bt) implies. It is flatter when bt < 0 than when bt is positive. An
example of pt+1 with φ1 = 0.4, ϕ = 10 and rt = 0 is shown in Figure 6.4, it is
flatter when bt is negative than when bt is positive. Note that in Figure 6.4
one finds if bt = 0, then pt+1 = 0.5. From the process of the bubble one knows
if bt = 0 and rt = 0, bt+1 is εt+1 which can be either positive or negative.
Because little is known about the sign of the noise εt+1, the economic agents
then expect it to be positive or negative with an equal probability of 0.5.
The effect of rt on pt+1 can be seen from below:
∂pt+1
∂rt
= −
φ2sign(bt)
2 cosh2[ϑ(bt, rt)]

< 0, if bt > 0,> 0, if bt < 0. (6.28)
This indicates that if the asset-price bubble is positive, an increase in the
interest rate will lower the probability that the bubble will increase in the next
period. If the bubble is negative, however, an increase in rt will increase the
probability that the bubble will decrease in the next period. This is consistent
with the analysis in the previous section that an increase in the interest rate
will lower the stock price. The probability function with φ1 = 0.4, φ2 = 0.8
and ϕ = 10 is shown in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6.4: An Example of pt+1 with rt = 0
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Figure 6.5: pt+1 with φ1 = 0.4, φ2 = 0.8 and ϕ = 10
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With the probability function defined by Eq. (6.24) one knows that
Ebt+1|t = [1− g2 +
1
2
{1− tanh[ϑ(bt, rt)]}(g1 + g2)]bt. (6.29)
Following the same procedure as in Section 2, one finds that the optimal
monetary policy rule must satisfy the following equation
rt = f1πt+f2yt+
1
2β2
{2+(1−β3)〈g1−g2−(g1+g2)tanh[ϑ(bt, rt)]〉}bt, (6.30)
with f1 and f2 given by (6.4) and (6.5). Different from the monetary policy
rule given by (6.12), in which the optimal interest-rate rule is a linear function
of the inflation rate, output gap and asset-price bubble, rt is now a nonlinear
function of πt, yt and bt. Moreover, the effects of πt, yt and bt on rt are
much more complicated than in the previous section. rt can be affected not
only by parameters such as g1 and g2, but also by the parameters, φ1, φ2
and ϕ which measure the effects of the size of the bubble and the interest
rate on the probability function. Because rt is nonlinear in πt, yt and bt,
there might exist multiple equilibria in such a model. It is difficult to obtain
an analytical solution of the optimal interest-rate rule from (6.30), I will,
therefore, undertake some numerical computation.
Assuming πt = yt = 0 just for simplicity, Figure 6.6 presents Eq. (6.30)
with alternative values of the parameters with the horizontal axis denoting
the asset-price bubble and the vertical axis denoting the interest rate. It
is clear that the response of rt to bt changes with the parameters. rt is
a monotonic function of bt when the parameters are assigned some values
(see Figure 6.6-(5) and (6)). When the parameters are assigned some other
values, however, rt can be a non-monotonic function of bt. In Figure 6.6-(1)
and 6.6-(4) the curve cuts the horizontal axis three times, indicating that
there may exist multiple equilibria in the model. The parameters for Figure
6.6 are set as follows: β2 = 0.30, φ1 = 1.0, φ2 = 0.80 and ϕ = 10. The
other parameters of β3, g1 and g2 are assigned different values in different
figures as follows: (1) β3 = 0.005, g1 = 0.001 and g2 = 1.05; (2) β3 = 0.10,
g1 = 0.01 and g2 = 0.90; (3) β3 = 0.005, g1 = 0.001 and g2 = 0.95; (4)
β3 = 0.005, g1 = 0.001 and g2 = 1.50; (5) β3 = 0.25, g1 = 0.10 and g2 = 6.50;
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(6) β3 = 0.25, g1 = 0.01 and g2 = 0.70. The effects of g1 and g2 on rt can be
seen from 6.6-(3) and 6.6-(4). With other parameters unchanged, the values
of g1 and g2 may determine the direction of how rt moves.
This section endogenizes the probability that the asset-price bubble will
increase or decrease in the next period. Defining p as a function of the asset-
price bubble and the current interest rate, one finds that the monetary policy
turns out to be a nonlinear function of the inflation rate, output gap and
asset-price bubble, and there might exist multiple equilibria in the economy.
Recently, some researchers argue that the linear interest-rate rules may
not have captured the truth of monetary policy. Meyer (2000), for exam-
ple, claims that nonlinear monetary policy rules are likely to arise under
uncertainty. He argues that “... a nonlinear rule could be justified by non-
linearities in the economy or by a non-normal distribution of policymakers’
prior beliefs about the NAIRU.” Meyer et al. (2001) provide a theoretical
justification for this argument and show some empirical evidence on the rel-
ative performance of linear and nonlinear rules. Nonlinear monetary policy
rules can also be induced by a nonlinear Phillips curve and a non-quadratic
loss function of central banks. Monetary policy with nonlinear Phillips curves
have been studied by Semmler and Zhang (2003) and Dolado et al. (2002),
for example. Dolado et al. (2002) find that the US monetary policy can
be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979.
Kim et al. (2002), however, find that the US monetary policy rule has been
nonlinear before 1979 and little evidence of nonlinearity has been found for
the period after 1979. My research above shows that a nonlinear monetary
policy rule can also arise in a model with financial markets, assuming an
endogenous probability for the asset-price bubble to increase or decrease in
the next period.
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Figure 6.6: The Response of rt to bt with Alternative Values of Parameters
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6.5 The Zero Bound on the Nominal Interest
Rate
Above I have discussed the monetary policy rule with asset prices consid-
ered. In the case of a constant probability (p) for the asset-price bubble to
increase or decrease in the next period, the optimal monetary policy turns
out to be a linear function of the inflation, output gap and asset-price bub-
bles, similar to the simple Taylor rule except that the asset-price bubble is
added as an additional term. However, if p is assumed to be an endogenous
variable depending on the monetary policy and the asset-price bubble size,
the monetary policy rule turns out to be a nonlinear function of the inflation
rate, output gap and asset-price bubble.
A drawback of the Taylor rule, and also of the monetary policy discussed
above, is that the monetary policy instrument—the short-term interest rate—
is assumed to be able to move without bounds. This is, however, not true in
practice and one example is the so-called Liquidity Trap in which a monetary
policy cannot be of much help because the short-term nominal interest rate
is almost zero and cannot be lowered further. This problem has recently
become important because of the Liquidity Trap in Japan and the low interest
rate in the US. If, furthermore, there is deflation, the real interest rate will
rise. Considering the zero bound on the short-term interest rate and the
possibility of deflation at very low interest rates, the monetary policy can be
very different from that without bounds on the interest rate.
Benhabbib and Schmitt-Grohe´ (2001), for example, argue that once the
zero bound on nominal interest rates is taken into account, the active Tay-
lor rule can easily lead to “unexpected consequences”. To be precise, they
find that there may exist an infinite number of trajectories converging to a
Liquidity Trap even if there exist a unique equilibrium.
Kato and Nishiyama (2001) analytically prove and numerically show that
the optimal monetary policy in the presence of the zero bound is highly
nonlinear even in a linear-quadratic model. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003)
simulate an economy with zero bound on the interest rate and argue that
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monetary policy will be effective only if interest rates can be expected to
persistently stay low in the future. Coenen and Wieland (2003) explore the
effect of a zero-interest-rate bound on the inflation and output in Japan in
the context of an open economy. Ullersma (2001) surveys several researchers’
views on the zero lower bound.
Most of the recent research on the Liquidity Trap has been concerned
with deflation, namely the decrease of the price level in the product markets.
Yet most literature has ignored the depression in the financial markets. The
depression of the financial markets can also be a problem in practice, if
the financial markets can influence the output and, as a result, affect the
inflation rate. Take Japan as an example, the share price index was about
200 in 1990 and decreased to something below 80 in 2001. The Industrial
Production Index was about 108 in 1990 and fluctuated between 107 and 92
afterwards. The inflation rate (changes in the CPI), IPI and share price index
of Japan are shown in Figure 6.7A-C (Data source: International Statistical
Yearbook). The depression in the share markets seems to be as serious as
the deflation. One finds that the correlation coefficient between the IPI and
share price index was as high as 0.72 from 1980-2001 and the correlation
coefficient between the IPI and the two-quarter lagged share price index was
even as high as 0.80. Moreover, the estimates of c2 in Eq. (6.8) have enough
significant T-Statistics (3.505 for the sample from 1980.1-1999.1 and 3.220
for the sample from 1990.1-1999.1). This seems to suggest that the influence
of the financial markets on the output should not be overlooked.
Let us now return to the Liquidity Trap problem. The main difference of
my research from that of others is that I will explore the zero bound on the
nominal interest rate with depression in the financial markets as well as in
the product markets (namely deflation).
Let’s define rt = Rt− R¯, with Rt being the nominal rate and R¯ denoting
the long-run level of Rt. In the research below I assume R¯ = 0 for simplicity.
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Figure 6.7: The Inflation Rate, IPI and Share Price Index of Japan, 1980.1-
2001.4
In the presence of the zero bound on the nominal rate, I then assume7
rt =

ro, if ro ≥ 0;0, if ro < 0; (6.31)
where ro denotes the optimal monetary policy rule derived from the models
in the previous sections. The equation above implies that if the optimal
monetary policy rule is nonnegative, the central bank will adopt the optimal
rule, if the optimal rule is negative, however, the nominal rate is set to zero,
since it cannot be negative.8
I will first undertake some simulations without asset prices considered, as
the simple model (6.1)-(6.2). The parameters are set as follows:9 α1 = 0.8,
7This is similar to the assumption of Coenen and Wieland (2003) who analyze the effect
of a zero-interest-rate bound on inflation and output in Japan in the context of an open
economy.
8There are some exceptional cases with negative nominal rates, see Cecchetti (1988),
for example, but I will ignore these exceptional cases here.
9In order for consistent expectations to exist, α1 is usually assumed to be 1. The
simulations with α1 = 1 are found essentially unchanged from those with α1 = 0.8.
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Figure 6.8: Simulation without Asset Price
α2 = 0.3, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.3, λ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.97. In order to explore
the effect of the zero bound of the nominal rate on the economy, I assume
there exists deflation. The starting values of πt and yt are set as −0.08 and
0.1 respectively. The optimal monetary policy rule from the basic model is
given by Eq. (6.3). The simulations with and without the zero-interest-rate
bound are shown in Figure 6.8. In Figure 6.8A I show the simulation of the
inflation, output gap and rt without the zero bound on the nominal rate.
Therefore rt is always set in line with (6.3). It is clear that all three variables
converge to zero over time. The loss function can, as a result, be minimized
to zero. Figure 6.8B shows the simulation with a zero-interest-rate bound.
One finds that the optimal nominal rate, which is negative as shown in Figure
6.8A, cannot be reached and has to be set to zero. The inflation and output
gaps, as a result, do not converge to zero, but instead evolve into a recession.
The deflation becomes more and more severe and the output gap changes
from positive to negative and continues to go down over time. Figure 6.8C
shows the loss function π2+λy2 with and without a zero-interest-rate bound.
One observes that in the case of no zero-interest-rate bound the loss function
converges to zero as πt and yt goes to zero. In the presence of a zero-interest-
rate bound, however, the loss function increases rapidly over time because of
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the recession.
The simulation undertaken above does not consider the effects of asset
prices on the inflation and output. The simulation below assumes that the
asset prices can influence the output as Eq. (6.9) and the asset-price bubble
has the path (6.7). In order to simplify the simulation I just take bt+1 =
Ebt+1|t, therefore with an initial value of the bubble one can obtain a series of
bt. With other parameters assigned the same values as above, the remainder
of the parameters are assigned the following values: g1 = 0.1, g2 = 0.2,
p = 0.5 and β3 = 0.5. The initial values of πt and yt are the same as
above. The initial value of bt is −0.02, indicating a depression in the financial
markets. The optimal rate ro is given by Eq. (6.12). The simulations with
and without a zero-interest-rate bound are shown in Figure 6.9A-C. In Figure
6.9A I show the simulation without a zero bound on rt, this is similar to the
case in Figure 6.8A where all three variables converge to zero except that rt in
Figure 6.9A is lower and converges more slowly than in Figure 6.8A. Figure
6.9B shows the simulation with a zero bound on rt. Again one finds that the
optimal rate cannot be reached and rt has to be set to zero. The economy
experiences a recession. This is similar to the case in Figure 6.8B, but the
recession in Figure 6.9B is more severe than that in Figure 6.8B. In Figure
6.8B πt and yt decrease to about −0.06 with t = 20, but in Figure 6.9B,
however, πt and yt experience larger and faster decreases and go down to
about −0.8 in the same period. This is because the output is affected by the
depression in the financial markets (negative bt) which also accelerates the
deflation through the output. In Figure 6.9C I show the loss function with
and without a zero bound on rt. The loss function when no zero-interest-rate
bound exists converges to zero over time but increases rapidly when there
exists a zero-interest-rate bound. But the loss function with a zero-interest-
rate bound in Figure 6.9C is higher than that in 6.8C because of the more
severe recession in Figure 6.9B caused by the financial market depression.
Next, I assume that the financial market is not in depression but instead
in a boom, that is, the asset-price bubble is positive. I set b0 = 0.02 and ob-
tain a series of positive bubbles. The simulation with the same parameters as
above is shown in Figure 6.9D-F. In Figure 6.9D all three variables converge
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Figure 6.9: Simulation with Asset Price
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to zero when no zero bound on rt is implemented. In Figure 6.9E, however,
all three variables also converge to zero over time even if there exists a zero
bound on the nominal rate. This is different from the cases in Figure 6.8B
and 6.9B where a severe recession occurs. The reason is that in Figure 6.9E
the asset-price bubble is positive and the optimal interest rate turns out to be
positive. The zero-interest-rate bound is therefore not binding. As a result,
Figure 6.9E is exactly the same as Figure 6.9D. The two loss functions with
and without a zero-interest-rate bound are therefore also the same, as shown
in Figure 6.9F.
The simulations in this section indicate that in the presence of a zero-
interest-rate bound, a deflation can become more severe and the economy
may go into a severe recession. Moreover, the recession can be worse if the
financial market is also in a depression, because the asset price depression
can then decrease the output and as a result makes the deflation more severe.
Facing the zero-interest-rate bound and a Liquidity Trap, some researchers
have proposed some policy actions, see Clouse et al. (2000), for example.
The simulations above indicate that policy actions that aim at escaping a
Liquidity Trap should not ignore the asset prices, since the financial market
depression can make the real-economy recession worse.
On the other hand, a positive asset-price bubble can make the zero-
interest-rate bound non-binding, since the optimal rate which takes the fi-
nancial markets into account may be higher than zero even if there exists
deflation. This case has been shown in Figure 6.9E.
Note that the simulations undertaken above are based on the simple
model in which the probability (p) that the asset-price bubbles will increase
or decrease in the next period is assumed to be exogenous. If p is taken as
an endogenous variable, however, the analysis can be more complicated. In
the basic model one finds that the optimal monetary policy rule turns out
to be a linear function of bt, but in the model with an endogenous p, the
monetary policy rule turns out to be nonlinear in the inflation rate, output
gap and asset-price bubble. This has been shown in the simulations in Figure
6.6. In the case of a linear rule it is clear that a negative asset-price bubble
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lowers the optimal policy rule and therefore enlarges the possibility of the
zero-interest-rate bound being binding, while a positive asset-price bubble
increases the optimal nominal rate and therefore reduces the possibility of
the zero-interest-rate bound being binding. When the optimal policy rule is a
nonlinear function of the asset price, however, a positive bubble may enlarge
the possibility of the zero-interest-rate bound being binding, since the opti-
mal rule can be lowered (or become negative) even if the bubble is positive.
On the other hand, a negative bubble may reduce the possibility of the zero-
interest-rate bound being binding because the optimal rule can be increased
(or become positive) even if the bubble is negative. An example of the linear
and nonlinear policy rules in the presence of a zero-interest-rate bound is
shown in Figure 6.10A-B. Figure 6.10B looks similar to Figure 6.6-(1). In
Figure 6.10 I set the optimal rule to be zero if it is negative. In some cases,
an endogenous p can make the optimal policy rule very different from that
with a constant p. Figure 6.6-(5) is a good example: unlike the linear rule
which is an increasing function of the asset-price bubble, rt in Figure 6.6-(5)
is a decreasing function of bt and the effect of the zero-interest-rate bound
on the economy through the channel of financial markets can, therefore, be
greatly changed.
InterestRate
Bubble
A
B
0 0
Figure 6.10: An Example of Linear and Nonlinear Policy Rules in the Pres-
ence of the Zero-Interest-Rate Bound
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6.6 Conclusion
A dynamic model has been set up to explore monetary policy with asset
prices in this chapter. If the probability for the asset-price bubble to increase
or decrease in the next period is assumed to be a constant, the monetary
policy turns out to be a linear function of the state variables. However, if
such a probability is endogenized as a function of the asset-price bubble and
interest rate, the policy reaction function becomes nonlinear in the inflation
rate, output gap and asset-price bubble. Some empirical evidence has shown
that the monetary policy rule in the Euro-area has, to some extent, taken
into account the financial markets in the past two decades. I have also
explored the effect of a zero-interest-rate bound on the real economy with
financial markets considered. The simulations indicate that a depression of
the financial markets can make a recession economy worse in the presence of
a lower bound on the nominal rate. Therefore policy actions which aim at
escaping a Liquidity Trap should not ignore the financial markets. I have also
shown that the effect of the zero-interest-rate bound on the economy can be
greatly changed if the probability for the asset price to increase or decrease
in the next period is an endogenous variable rather than an exogenous one.
Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
This dissertation is mainly concerned with monetary policy rules (to be pre-
cise, the interest-rate rules) with time-varying behaviors, uncertainty and
financial markets at both theoretical and empirical levels. Empirical evi-
dence and numerical studies have been undertaken using the data of some
OECD countries.
Because the IS and Phillips curves have become the baseline model of
monetary policy, I have shown some empirical evidence of the two curves with
both backward- and forward-looking behaviors. The estimation for several
OECD countries indicates some significant relations between the inflation
rate and output gap, and between the output gap and real interest rate. I
have also estimated a time-varying Phillips curve with the Kalman filter and
find that the response coefficient of the unemployment gap has experienced
some structural changes, which imply regime changes in the economy.
Based on the empirical evidence of the IS and Phillips curves I have
then discussed briefly the advantages and potential problems of the Taylor
rule, and derived an interest-rate rule from a dynamic macroeconomic model
with a quadratic loss function of the central bank. One observes that this
interest-rate rule is akin to the simple Taylor rule in that they both are
linear functions of the inflation rate and output gap. Moreover, the interest-
rate rule can be greatly affected by the parameters in the macroeconomic
model which consists of the IS and Phillips curves and the central bank’s
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loss function. The empirical evidence of a time-varying Phillips curve, as a
result, implies that the monetary policy rule may be time-varying rather than
invariant. Therefore, I have estimated a time-varying interest-rate rule and
found some empirical evidence of state-dependence. That is, the monetary
policy rule is, to some extent, sensitive to the economic environment.
Employing the estimated time-varying US monetary policy rule, I have
then undertaken some simulation of the IS and Phillips curves of the Euro-
area, assuming that the Euro-area had followed the US monetary policy rule
in the 1990s. The simulation results indicate that the monetary policy of the
Euro-area was too tight in the 1990s.
What may complicate the monetary policy more than time-varying be-
haviors is uncertainty. Besides parameter uncertainty in economic models,
there exist still other kinds of uncertainties such as data uncertainty and
shock uncertainty. Employing a State-Space model with Markov-Switching I
have explored some empirical evidence of uncertainties in the IS and Phillips
curves—not only parameter uncertainty but also shock uncertainty. To be
precise, the parameters are time-varying and, at the same time, they may
have more than one state. The shocks in the model may also have state-
dependent variances. Based on this empirical evidence, I have then explored
monetary policy rules under uncertainty with two approaches: (a) the adap-
tive learning algorithm, and (b) robust control. While the former assumes
that the central bank improves its knowledge of economic models by learning
in a certain mechanism, the latter assumes that the central bank seeks an
optimal policy rule from the “worst case”.
The research employing the RLS learning algorithm indicates that neither
the state variables nor the control variable converge, even in a deterministic
model. This is different from the conclusion of Sargent (1999) who employs
an LQ framework and presumes that the central bank pretends that the time-
varying parameter will remain invariant forever after it is updated. This is, in
fact, inconsistent with the implication of the adaptive learning algorithm. In
this dissertation, however, I have taken the time-varying parameter as an en-
dogenous variable and employed a recently developed dynamic programming
algorithm which can solve dynamic optimization problems with nonlinear
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state equations using adaptive rather than uniform grids.
The robust control theory can, however, deal with more general uncer-
tainties than the adaptive learning algorithm. The simulation with the US
data suggests that uncertainty does not necessarily require caution. This is
consistent with the conclusion of Gonzalez and Rodriguez (2003) and Gian-
noni (2000). The former analyze the effect of the robust parameter on the
optimal feedback rule with one-state and one-control model, and the latter
explores the robust optimal rule with forward-looking behaviors.
While most of the literature on monetary policy rules is concerned mainly
with the real economy, some researchers argue that attention should also be
given to the financial markets. This problem has arisen due to the stable
and low inflation rate in the developed countries in the 1990s. The financial
markets have, however, experienced some significant fluctuations. Therefore,
I have explored monetary policy rules with the asset prices. That is, I have
set up a dynamic model with both the real economy—the inflation rate and
the output gap—and the financial markets taken into account. A monetary
policy rule with the asset prices has been derived. The most important dif-
ference between my model and those of others, consists in the fact that I have
endogenized the probability for the asset-price bubble to grow or decrease in
the next period as a nonlinear function of the interest rate and the size of the
asset-price bubble. Other researchers, such as Bernanke and Gertler (2000)
and Smets (1997), either take such a probability as a constant or assume it to
be a linear function of the policy instrument and the size of the bubble. The
drawback of a linear probability function is that it is not bounded between
zero and one, and it can only consider positive bubbles. The endogenization
of such a probability in my model overcomes these problems. Moreover, such
a probability function is found to lead to nonlinear monetary policy rules.
Another problem concerning the monetary policy rules and financial mar-
kets is the zero bound on the nominal interest rate. This problem has arisen
mainly because of the Liquidity Trap, deflation and financial depression in
Japan in the past decade. My simulation in the presence of a zero bound on
the nominal rate suggests that policy actions that aim at escaping a Liquidity
Trap should not ignore the effects of the asset prices, since the depression in
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the financial markets can make the recession of the real economy worse.
Finally I want to note that this dissertation is mainly concerned with
monetary policy rules in a closed economy. Monetary policy rules in open
economies, as mentioned in Chapter 1, can be different from those in closed
economies since exchange rate may play crucial roles in monetary policy-
making. Svensson (1998), for example, points out that inflation targeting
with exchange rate may have several important consequences:
First, the exchange rate allows additional channels for the trans-
mission of monetary policy. ... Second, as an asset price, the
exchange rate is inherently a forward-looking and expectations-
determined variable. This contributes to making forward-looking
behavior and the role of expectations essential in monetary pol-
icy. Third, some foreign disturbances will be transmitted through
the exchange rate, for instance, changes in foreign inflation, for-
eign interest rates and foreign investors’ foreign-exchange risk pre-
mium ... (Svensson, 1998, p.4).
Ball (1999) finds that the monetary policy rule in an open economy is dif-
ferent from that in a closed economy in two aspects: (a) the policy variable
is a combination of the short-term interest rate and exchange rate, rather
than the interest rate alone, and (b) the inflation rate in the Taylor rule is
replaced by a combination of inflation and the lagged exchange rate. Benigno
and Benigno (2000) explore different monetary policy rules under alternative
exchange rate regimes and claim that a managed exchange rate is desirable.
Using an open economy model under incomplete markets, Ghironi (2000)
compares the performance of alternative monetary policy rules for Canada
and concludes that flexible inflation targeting dominates strict inflation tar-
geting rules and the Taylor rule. More research on monetary policy rules in
open economies is surely expected to be forthcoming in the future.
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